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NATO’S ENGAGEMENT IN DARFUR: A CASE STUDY OF NATO’S IDENTITY AS A HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER

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The title figuring on the front page is the original working title of this project. When I first decided to study this topic, I thought of using a theoretical model of the effect of values on policy. As I dug deeper into the literature and the empirical material, and listened to my supervisor’s comments, it occurred to me that this theory would not provide the most interesting insights. The course I had on Selected Topics in Security Studies with David Ambrosetti helped me see why such a theory did not work for this case. I therefore abandoned the idea of using identity and value to explain a policy, and opted for a discourse theoretical approach. The advantages of a discourse theoretical approach will be discussed at length below. The change of approach would ideally have been accompanied with a different title for the thesis, such as: «NATO’s engagement in Darfur: A discourse theoretical approach to NATO policy development». 
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I would like to thank my supervisor, Barbara Delcourt for introducing me to the theoretical richness of security studies, for subtly encouraging me to take benefit of this richness, and for bringing my project down to a far more feasible size.

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Any errors, inconsistencies or mistakes in this thesis are my responsibility alone.

Brussels/Oslo, August 2010

Thea Schjødt
ABSTRACT

The role and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation after the end of the Cold War is a subject of immediate actuality as the Alliance’s new strategic concept is to be adopted later this year. This thesis treats the pioneering mission that introduced NATO as an actor in Africa: NATO’s support mission to the African Union’s peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan from 2005 to 2007. It is asked how this policy was made possible, and how it was normalised.

NATO policies are commonly presented as determined by events. In contrast, post-structuralist discourse theory holds reality is always discursively mediated. This brings to the fore questions that are largely left unexplored by rationalist accounts. A discourse theoretical approach allows us to understand how policy options emerge, and how a policy option becomes established as the natural thing to do in a given situation.

I argue that NATO’s support mission to the AU in Darfur required a particular discursive construction of the conflict, and of NATO’s role in the international community. I use NATO official texts along with articles from three major newspapers: The New York Times from the United States, The Guardian from the United Kingdom and Le Monde from France, to establish NATO’s discourse and situate it within a larger field of partly divergent discourses.

It is argued that NATO’s official discourse and policy on Darfur derives its meaning through linking and differentiation within a larger discursive field. The discursive field is mapped and broken down into three basic discourses: the responsibility to protect, the World’s policeman, and African solutions to African problems. These discourses provide different constraints and opportunities for NATO action in Darfur.

The mobilisation of NATO in Darfur is theoreitisised as a discursive struggle, whereby one discourse on NATO’s role in Darfur: «African solutions to African problems», achieved a dominant position. NATO’s policy in Darfur was normalised through repeated reproductions of constraints, and the exclusion of alternatives. It is argued that NATO’s policy in Darfur was successfully normalised, and has been institutionalised as a more general approach to the African continent.

The contribution of this thesis is that it has applied a theoretical approach suited to reinvigorate studies on NATO’s role and identity formation in the 21st century. It shows that NATO’s policy in Darfur, far from being a straightforward adaptation to pressing necessities, is a story of active construction of the world the organisation is operating in.
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INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION

From July 2005 to December 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) organised a strategic airlift, transporting African Union (AU) peacekeepers into the Darfur region of Sudan. NATO also provided the AU personnel with training. The immense human suffering caused by a violent conflict between rebels and government-sponsored militias had received the attention of international media and led activists to call for a humanitarian intervention. But how did the North Atlantic alliance, founded to ensure the collective defence of its members in Western Europe and North America, wind up in Eastern Africa to help protect local civilians in an internal conflict?

NATO’s operation in Darfur was of limited scope, did not include the deployment of NATO combat troops, and was subjected to the political and military leadership of the African Union. Yet, it constituted a groundbreaking event. It arguably represented the farthest NATO had ever embarked from its traditional role and practice, being «out of area» both in geographical and thematic terms. In the words of one academic: «This was the first time that NATO entertained a task on the African continent. NATO undertook the mission on humanitarian grounds without invoking any treaty and without any member state’s security being under any direct threat. This was a milestone in NATO’s history».

NATO’s mission in Darfur was not a one-time-only event. In 2007, NATO launched an enabling mission to the African Union’s peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM, following the same procedure as the one established for Darfur. NATO’s operation in Darfur therefore has opened up the door to an entirely new policy field for NATO: supporting the African Union with training and equipment to build up a peacekeeping capacity fit to deal with crises on the continent.

A NATO interest in Africa is not entirely new. In 1958, NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak warned about the need to adapt to a changing strategic context in which the Soviet threat would soon emanate from Africa and Asia rather than Europe. In practice however, the Alliance contented itself with merely recognising that Africa was important strategically. It never

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¹ The term «out-of-area» is used in NATO jargon to refer to operations taking place outside the geographical area defined in art. 6 of the Washington treaty, roughly corresponding to member states’ territory. For an exploration of the term, see WINROW, Gareth, «NATO and out-of-area: A post-Cold War challenge», European Security, vol. 3, no 4, 1994, pp. 617-638.
undertook an engagement on the continent as an organisation\textsuperscript{4}. Commenting on NATO’s decision not to support a French initiative for the creation of a pan-African force in 1978, Christopher Coker says: «It was precisely because NATO was a pragmatic alliance that it wanted nothing to do with the training and equipping of a pan-African force»\textsuperscript{5}. NATO operational activity on the African continent continued to be a non-issue until the crisis in Darfur became a highly mediated international concern.

The chain of events leading up to this «milestone» operation is simply described on NATO’s own fact sheet\textsuperscript{6}: first, the African Union contacted NATO, asking for logistical support. Subsequently, NATO agreed to provide such support, and the support mission was launched. End of story. Given the novelty of this role for NATO, there being no direct predecessor or standard policy to lean on, I am interested in exploring this mission more in detail. I intend to do so by situating NATO’s mission in Darfur within a context, providing what one could consider a «thick description» of how this policy came to be and how it was normalised\textsuperscript{7}.

1.1. Research questions

Whereas the «international community’s» response to the Darfur crisis has been the subject of a growing amount of articles and book chapters\textsuperscript{8}, NATO’s specific role has received far less attention\textsuperscript{9}. The point of departure for the present research project is the ostensible paradox that NATO could go about entering a field so far outside its core tasks with a seeming straightforwardness. Analysing how NATO could create a role for itself in Africa, and how the organisation could get accept for this new role may help us to better understand expectations and perceptions of NATO’s role. It could also improve our understanding of NATO’s policy development after the end of the Cold War. More specifically, the research questions guiding the analysis are:

\textsuperscript{4} Although the Alliance was accused of supporting the Belgo-French intervention in Zaire in 1978, see COKER, Christopher, «The Western Alliance and Africa 1949-81», African Affairs, vol. 81, no\textsuperscript{3}24, 1982, pp. 319-335, p. 332; see also LELOUCHE, Pierre and Dominique MOISI, «French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle against Destabilization», International Security, vol. 3, no\textsuperscript{4}, 1979, pp. 108-133.

\textsuperscript{5} COKER, Christopher, loc.cit., p. 334.


\textsuperscript{7} A thick description means the understanding of an event «in a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures» in terms of which meanings are «produced, perceived, and interpreted», see GEERTZ, Clifford, The interpretation of cultures: selected essays, New York, Basic Books, 1973, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{9} An exception is SEGELL, Glen, loc.cit.
How was NATO’s support mission in Darfur made possible? And how has it been constructed as a natural role for NATO?

These questions arise out of a particular theoretical approach, as a trivial response could be given by citing the previously mentioned NATO fact sheet. A discourse theoretical approach allows the researcher to go more in depth. It means that NATO’s policy in Darfur will be theorised as a discursive practise, and that it will be explored from the point of view of how the mission was represented in text and transcripts. The focus is not on explaining why NATO supported the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but rather on how the policy was legitimated and founded in NATO’s official discourse. It will therefore not be asked what the «real» motives behind the operation might have been.

The assumption that NATO’s policy was made possible and normalised through discursive practices may be viewed as a hypothesis, in the sense that it is giving direction to the analysis. According to Lene Hansen, the goal in political discourse is to create a stable link between identity and policy - making the two appear consistent with one another. The observation that NATO’s policy in Darfur met with relatively little debate, combined with the fact that the approach to Darfur served as a model for NATO’s support to the African Union in Somalia seem to indicate that NATO succeeded in normalising a role for itself in peacemaking in Africa. This again indicates that NATO’s discourse on Darfur indeed established a stable link between NATO identity and policy. Theorising the policy outcome as the product of a discursive struggle allows for a thicker description of NATO identity formation and adaption.

1.2. NATO after the end of the Cold War

NATO has undergone a quite dramatic transformation since the end of the Cold War. NATO action is no longer confined to the protection of member states’ territorial integrity in the case of an armed attack from an external enemy. Instead, the Alliance has been taking on a significant amount of new tasks and missions, some of which would have been unthinkable during the Cold War. The «new» tasks are characterised by an extension of both thematic scope and geographical reach, and partnerships and enlargement as well as crisis management are among

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10 The focus on meaning rather than prediction is a general premise for discourse analysis, see TAYLOR, Stephanie, «Locating and conducting discourse analytic research», in WETHERELL, Margaret, Stephanie TAYLOR, Simeon YATES, Discourse as data: a guide for analysis, London, Sage Publications, 2001, pp. 5-48, pp.11-12.
11 The disinterest in underlying motives is a general trait in discourse analysis, see BERGSTROM, Goren and Kristina BOREUS, «Diskursanalys», in BERGSTROM, Goren and Kristina BOREUS, Textens mening och makt. Metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanaly, Lund, Studentlitteratur, 2005, pp. 305-362, p. 328. Answering such questions would have demanded a different methodological approach.
the key focus areas of NATO after the end of the Cold War. It is particularly the development within crisis management which is of interest here, along with the growing engagement outside Europe and the North Atlantic area.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO has extended and developed its definition of security. The Strategic Concept adopted in 1991 recognised that the threats facing NATO members were different from those of the Cold War. A full-scale attack was less likely to occur, instead risks were increasingly «multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess». The changed environment offered «new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security». The 1999 Strategic concept developed the broadened security concept further. Here, it was stated the global context had to be taken into account, and that the «Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension». The prospect of having to deal with humanitarian crises was also mentioned: «In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies». With NATO's broadened security concept, military response can also come to in the form of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking – the so-called Petersberg tasks.

These tasks were part of a more proactive posture, where selective intervention was envisaged. This in contrast to the traditional focus on collective defence and deterrence directed against the Soviet Union. Consequently, NATO’s strategic concept from 1991 included a separate chapter on crisis management and conflict prevention. Initially, the task seems to have been largely

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17 Ibid., art. 14.
19 Ibid., art. 25.
20 Ibid., art. 49.
perceived within a European, rather than global context\textsuperscript{24}. At the Alliance’s reunion of foreign ministers held in Oslo in June 1992, it was declared that NATO’s forces could be put at disposal for peace operations mandated by the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)\textsuperscript{25}. There was however an increasing recognition that NATO should be mandated to deal with crises arising outside NATO member states\textsuperscript{26}. Later the same year, it was added that NATO forces could be put at disposal for the United Nations\textsuperscript{27}. This was put to practice in the Balkans, where NATO initially played the role as a supporter of the UN’s peace operations. The Alliance’s engagement in Bosnia during the war from 1992 to 1995 was the first ever «out-of-area» NATO deployment. During the 1990s and through its engagement in the former Yugoslavia, NATO gradually took on more responsibility in peace enforcement and peacekeeping on behalf of the international community\textsuperscript{28}.

Despite the incremental globalisation of NATO’s missions, important differences between member states persist when it comes to the prioritising between traditional territorial collective defence on the one hand, and going increasingly global on the other\textsuperscript{29}. The developments in NATO’s formal strategic posture have more often than not not occurred in connection to a concrete event to which NATO has responded. Many researchers on NATO’s policies after the end of the Cold War therefore ascribe policy development to ad hoc adaption to events\textsuperscript{30}. However, as this thesis attempts to demonstrate, events that demand NATO intervention «are not simply there, but appear through NATO’s own discursive articulation of the Alliance’s (transformed) post-Cold War rationale»\textsuperscript{31}.

\textsuperscript{25} NATO, «Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including the Oslo Decision on NATO support for peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE)», Oslo, 4 June 1992, art. 11.
\textsuperscript{26} RÜHLE, Michael, loc.cit.; CORNISH, Paul, Partnership in crisis: the US, Europe and the full and rise of NATO, London, Institute of International Affairs, 1997, pp. 64-65.; In Brussels in 1992, NATO also revised its role in disaster assistance to include requests from non-NATO countries, see NATO, NATO’s Role in Disaster Assistance, NATO Civil Emergency Planning, Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, Brussels, 2001, p.14.
\textsuperscript{27} NATO, «Final Communiqué of the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions on NATO support for peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the UN Security Council)», Brussels, 17 December 1992, art.4-5.
\textsuperscript{29} RINGSMOSE, Jens and Sten RYNNING, Come home NATO? The Atlantic Alliance’s new strategic concept, DIIS Report 04, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} HANSEN, Lene, op.cit., p. 25.
1.3. Disposition

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter was this introduction. In chapter two, the discourse theoretical approach that underpins the analysis is presented. Key theoretical assumptions and concepts are elaborated on, and I detail how the analysis will be conducted. The theoretical chapter is followed by the analytic part. The analysis is presented in three chapters (3, 4 and 5). In chapter three I construct a tool needed for structured discourse analysis, through a mapping the discursive field within which NATO’s official discourse is situated. The discursive field will be modelled around three basic discourses. The basic discourses are structured around different concepts, and represent different ideas of what NATO’s role and identity is. Chapter four deals with the question of how NATO’s policy was made possible by tracing the policy making process as a discursive struggle, using the basic discourses as analytical instruments. Subsequently, in chapter five, the process whereby NATO’s policy in Darfur is consolidated and normalised is studied. The thesis ends with a conclusion, where the results of the analysis are briefly reviewed.
2 THEORETICAL AND METHODOICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter presents the theoretical and methodological framework that will be used in the thesis, namely discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is about identifying the discursive preconditions for the adoption of policies. It allows for the study of how discursively constructed meanings, knowledge and identities make some policies possible and exclude others. The advantage from the point of view of the research question is therefore that it enables the researcher to denaturalise policies that appear obvious or evident in a given context. Discourse analysis is not a method of analysis that can be used detached from its theoretical and philosophical foundations. Consequently, theoretical and methodological questions cannot be fully separated. In this chapter therefore, the theoretical and methodological framework will be presented as a whole. The ontological and epistemological basis for discourse analysis will be explained, and key concepts will be defined. At the end of the chapter, specific techniques and more practical questions, such as the delimitation of discourses and the choice of texts and actors, will be dealt with. But first, the study will be situated within a broader context of research on NATO’s role and identity in the post-Cold War.

2.1. State of the art: NATO’s identity in the post-Cold War world

At a general level, the present thesis is concerned with NATO’s changing identity and role in world security. This subject rose on the research agenda after the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union should, according to the dominant realist theories, make NATO fade away, as the Alliance members no longer were tied together by a common interest in fending off a Soviet invasion. Contrary to expectations however, NATO lingered on and engaged actively in the altered environment that followed the end of the Cold War. Alternative theoretical approaches were therefore lifted to the surface to account for both NATO’s continuity and the Alliance’s policies.

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Critics of the realist understanding of NATO suggested that NATO was more than a deterrent against the USSR. Liberal institutionalists argued that it would be more costly to create a new organisation than to keep the old one. Some liberal institutionalists also argue that the Alliance helped its members deal with change, and that the adaptability of NATO’s assets made the Alliance capable of responding to new types of threats. Such accounts have not specified how such treats come into being—they are presumed to exist independently of NATO’s construction of the threats it is facing. Constructivist theories also reached the study of NATO. The concept security community has been central to constructivist theorisation of NATO. A security community is a group of states that have been integrated to the point where they have a sense of community, a «togetherness», which in turn creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war. In a security community, «states make commitments to multilateral action against nonspecific threats», and hold together because they share common values. This feature distinguishes security communities from alliances, which are united (only) by a common external enemy. According to this theory, NATO’s persistence can be explained by its identity as a security community. The conceptualisation of NATO as a security community has also been used to explain NATO’s enlargement and partnership policies. These studies have argued that enlargement, which would appear irrational from a realist point of view, can be accounted for by the will to expand the security community to include former antagonists.

The research that has been generated from the conceptualisation of NATO as a value-based security community has been subject to a wide range of criticism. In many constructivist studies, NATO’s identity as a security community is treated as an independent variable that explains an outcome (a policy). The logic of cause-effect carries a suggestion of determinism. However, an extension of NATO eastwards does not follow automatically from NATO’s identity as a

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39 HANSEN, Lene, op.cit., p. 25.
42 RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas, loc.cit.
democratic security community and the enlargement has been contested and criticised by NATO member states and observers\textsuperscript{44}. Critics of the security community concept also suggest that the concept leaves observers to ignore deep divides between the US and its European allies\textsuperscript{45}. It has also been argued that the defence of «values» rarely is the sole motivation behind NATO policies\textsuperscript{46}, and it has been noted that NATO itself hardly complies with the highest democratic standards\textsuperscript{47}. At the same time as some scholars have demonstrated the role of identity and norms in the case of NATO’s enlargement, studies of other NATO policies, such as its operations in Bosnia, have contended that NATO is undergoing an identity crisis. Such studies argues that NATO does no longer have a sense of common purpose after the Cold War ended, and is therefore unable to agree on a strategy or a clear idea of its role in the world\textsuperscript{48}.

Some of these shortcomings result from the constructivist assumption that identities are fixed and stable, which leave little room for the accommodation of change, crisis and discord\textsuperscript{49}. In contrast, a poststructuralist, discourse theoretical approach has the advantage that it allows for identities and roles to be in flux. It takes into account NATO’s adaption to a changed environment, but contends that NATO’s policies are not just responses to objective «threats», that exist independently of NATO’s existence. Instead, events are constituted as relevant for NATO, for instance by representing them as threats to a member states’ security and stability. Policy is in other words understood as a discursive practice. This is not to say that threats to NATO are fictional, but that the meaning discursively ascribed to an event is consequential for the policy adopted\textsuperscript{50}. The present thesis also takes into account the concept of NATO as a security community, but it does not treat identity as an independent variable. Rather, identity is perceived as being under constant construction and negotiation, and as standing in a mutually constructive relationship to policies\textsuperscript{51}.

2.2. Discourse theory

Discourse theory allows for a questioning of how NATO could adopt a policy on Darfur and

\textsuperscript{44} WILLIAMS, Michael C. and Iver B. NEUMANN, loc.cit., p. 359.
\textsuperscript{48} KAUFMAN, Joyce P.; JOHNSON, William, NATO strategy in the 1990s: reaping the peace dividend or the whirlwind?, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{50} HANSEN, Lene, op.cit., p.25.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p.17.
how a role for NATO in Africa was established. The precondition for such analysis is a break with the view of policies as responses that naturally follow from events, as well as with the view of NATO’s identity as something conclusively defined. Instead, «textual and social processes are [seen as] intrinsically connected»52, leading discourse theorists to critically investigate how policies arise within certain modes of writing and talking about the world53. Discourses constrain how people interpret events, how they think about what is possible and what they think is the natural thing to do in a given situation54. Discourse theory therefore allows us to question what appears as obvious, and it enables us to investigate the way in which the discourses that constitute social reality are articulated and contested55. The preconditions for a specific outcome can thereby be demonstrated, and it can be shown how the outcome could have been different56. There are numerous ways of doing discourse analysis. I draw on insights from several authors, while striving for theoretical coherence.

Discourse analysis is a theoretical and methodological approach to the study of social phenomena that is built on the ontological principle that our knowledge of the world should not be treated as an objective truth57. The reason behind this scepticism towards absolute truth claims is related to discourse theorists’ claim that people’s perception of the world, what is «real» and «true», is mediated through categories that are formulated in language. Discourse theorists do not see language as a neutral instrument for communication58. Language, our basis for interpretation, is a product of a social context, or more specifically of structures of intersubjective understandings. Intersubjective understandings are constitutive of reality59. Discourse theorists therefore reject the positivist claim that there is one reality against which our knowledge of the (social) world can be measured. However, discourse theorists do not deny that «real» and «material» things exist. The point is rather that these things do not in themselves carry a meaning that is independent of our collective interpretation of them60. For instance, a burqa, a covering

57 JØRGENSEN, Marianne and Louise J. PHILLIPS, op.cit., p.5.
58 BERGSTROM, Göran and Kristina BOREUS, loc.cit., p. 326.
garment worn by women in some Islamic traditions, exists as a piece of fabric. However, in itself the clothing does not convey any meaning. Whether the burqua is interpreted for example as an instrument for oppression of women, or as a sign of respect and virtue, depends on the meaning we assign to it. The meaning assigned to the object is a factor of the discourse in which the burqua holds a representation. A burqua does not convey the same meaning in a French politician’s nationalist discourse as it does in an Afghan imam’s religious discourse, and the policy defined in relation to this object, if any at all, will vary according to the meaning attached to it. An object and its meaning cannot be surgically separated, and the world cannot meaningfully be divided into material and ideational dimensions. Discourses do not consist of language alone, but also include practices, and may be inscribed in institutions. Discourses do not only reflect reality, they also contribute to the production of reality. It is therefore important to understand discourse as both material and ideational. This feature distinguished discourse analysis from many constructivist approaches that aim to demonstrate the weight of norms and rhetoric, as opposed to material factors.

It is meaning that is the subject of study in discourse analysis. The understanding of how meaning is created has its roots in linguistics, especially Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics, and developments and criticism of his work, such as Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralism. Saussure postulated that signs (words) derive sense from their difference from one another, not from a relationship between the sign and an entity in an objective world. Meaning - the understanding we attach to a word - results from social convention, and not from a fixed relationship between the word and what the word refers to. Meaning is therefore relational – a word or a concept derives meaning from being juxtaposed to other words and concepts. Meaning is also social – it originates in social interaction and constitutes agreed codes. Saussure portended that a web of signs constituted a structure that could be uncovered through the study of language. However, in line with the poststructuralist critique of structuralism, in discourse theory the relationship between the signs is seen as inherently

62 HANSEN, Lene, *op.cit.*, p. 21-22; See also JØRGENSEN, Marianne and Louise PHILLIPS, *op.cit.*, p. 19, on Laclau and Mouffe’s view on the impossibility of an extra-discursive realm.
64 JØRGENSEN, Marianne and Louise J. PHILLIPS, *op.cit.*, p.10.
unstable. Structures exist, but they are temporary and changeable. According to Laclau and Mouffe, we constantly strive to fix the meanings of signs by placing them, through language, in particular relations to other signs. Discourse theory in political science, while acknowledging the importance of language, is more interested in the social and productive effects of language rather than pure linguistics.

Within discourse theory, the concept of discourse is used in different ways by different scholars, with different levels of specificity. In this thesis, I will distinguish between the concepts of representation, discourse and discursive field, which form different levels of generality. The concept of representation refers to our perceptions of reality as mediated through language. Representations are socially produced meanings that are attached to various social subjects and objects, and they include both material and ideational factors. There are representations of identities, objects, practices, roles and events. Several representations may co-exist, and actors struggle to fix a specific meaning to a given object or subject. By discourse I refer to social and political constructions that establish a system of relations between representations of different objects and practices. Discourses order a set of representations with a degree of regularity and coherence. This ordered system of representations appears as normal, and constitute reality for its bearers. But just as the meaning of signs is temporary, discourses can only be seen as temporarily frozen systems of meanings. The discursive field is a range of competing discourses that are relevant to a particular realm of social practice. The discursive field is what a given discourse is defined in relation to. The inherent instability of meaning means that the position...

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69 JØRGENSEN and PHILLIPS, op.cit., p. 39.
70 LACLAU, Ernest and Chantal MOUFFE, op.cit., p.111.
71 This is parallel to Mikhail Bakhtin’s critique of de Saussure’s structural linguistics. While de Saussure draws a clear line between langue (language understood as a relational system) and parole (the spoken word, the speech act), and privileges the former as the object of linguistics, Bakhtin argues that parole must be included in our analyses to make us able to understand the social importance of language. See STEWART, Susan, «Shouts on the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-Linguistics», Critical Inquiry, vol. 10, no° 2, 1983, pp. 265-281, and JØRGENSEN, Marianne W. and PHILLIPS, Louise op.cit., pp. 10-12.
73 Inspired by DOTY, Roxanne, loc.cit., p. 4.
74 HOWARTH, David and Yannis STAVRAKAKI, loc.cit., p. 3.
77 JØRGENSEN, Marianne and Louise J. PHILLIPS, op.cit., p. 27.
of dominant discourse can be undermined if carriers of oppositional discourses manage to impose their conflicting representations\textsuperscript{78}.

The concept of discourse is relevant to the study of politics because there is assumed to be a relationship between discourses and action. Politics is about the construction and maintenance of meaning\textsuperscript{79}. Discourses are assumed to be productive or reproductive of the things defined by the discourse, and they make truth claims that affect how events are interpreted. By defining what is real, and what categories are related, discourses construct limits and opportunities for action: «[D]iscourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world (...) while excluding other possible modes of identity and action»\textsuperscript{80}. Several discourses and representations may coexist, and each and every one of these may prescribe some forms of action and render others unthinkable. If and when one of these different representations or discourses is established as dominant, it has social and material consequences\textsuperscript{81}. All actions have a discursive aspect because meaning is a precondition for how we act\textsuperscript{82}. The carriers of a political project will try to impose a discourse by weaving together representations «in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the identities of objects and practices in a particular way»\textsuperscript{83}. Not everybody can establish any discourse in any field. There will often be dominant representations and discourses within a given field, and dominant representations of identities, or roles. Policy questions are articulated within a partly structured discursive field, which is both constraining and enabling for policy makers. External constraints on policy are constituted by the broader political context, which is itself a product of older and competing discourses\textsuperscript{84}.

A dominant discourse constitutes reality for its bearers, and the representations within this discourse will often be perceived as natural or self-evident: it has always been like this or that. Likewise, social phenomena, such as NATO’s policies, are often interpreted as consequences of processes that are beyond human conduct\textsuperscript{85}. However, because meanings can change, and because discourse analysts are sceptical to interpretations where actions are seen as naturally following from events, conceptual histories can provide new perspectives on such phenomena.

\textsuperscript{78} MILLIKEN, Jennifer, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 230.
\textsuperscript{79} BERGSTROME, Goran and Kristina BORŒUS, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 327.
\textsuperscript{81} BURR, Vivien, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{83} HOWARTH, David and Yannis STAVRAKAKIS, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{84} HANSEN, Lene, \textit{op.cit.} p.30.
Identity has a theoretical status as a representation, meaning that it is an intersubjective understanding, in this case to the question of «What is NATO?». Viewing identity as a representation implies that the perception of identity has consequences for what is seen as normal practice or policy, and vice-versa, that policies may affect the collective understanding of identity. Policy and identity are ontologically linked: «The collective self is (...) defined in relation to what it does and, conversely, constrained in what it does by how it is defined». The goal of policy makers is to present a policy that appears legitimate to their relevant audience, meaning that it is perceived as normal. A policy has the greatest chance of being perceived as legitimate if it is embodied in a discourse that creates a stable link between identity and policy. Creating this link requires internal discursive stability and for the external constraints on the discourse to be addressed. Identity and policy do not exist independently of one another, and in the discursive process of linking the two, identity may be reconstructed and changed.

2.3. Methodology

2.3.1. From theoretical to practical method

The method for discourse analysis that will be used in this thesis can be divided into three steps. First, one needs to delimit the text material to a «wide but manageable range of sources and timeframes», i.e. making choices. I will account for the choices made in this section. Second, from these texts, one identifies the representations that comprise the discourse. Finally, to explore change, one uncovers layering within the discourse.

The first step in the method of discourse analysis consists of making choices. This thesis focuses on one case, NATO’s engagement in Darfur, which ran from summer 2005 until 31 December 2007. The case limits the material to texts that deal with NATO and Darfur. Furthermore, I have chosen to focus on written texts. It is possible in discourse analysis to examine any sign – a painting, a movie, body language - as text because it conveys meaning. For the purpose of studying NATO’s policy in Darfur, written texts have the advantage of being easily accessible, and focusing on written texts makes for a sensible delimitation of material.

87 MCSWEENEY, Bill, op.cit., p.127.
89 HANSEN, Lene, op.cit. p.18.
91 These three steps are taken from the methodology of NEUMANN, Iver B., loc.cit., 2009.
92 Ibid., p. 63.
Within the domain of written texts, I have chosen to focus mainly on NATO official discourse and the links made within this discourse. Official discourse is the discourse through which the organisation’s action is legitimised, and therefore a key to understanding how the organisation portrays its role in the world. The focus on official discourse is related to the goals of the research, as a research model focused on official discourse is suited to «investigate the constructions of identities within official discourse, to analyze the way in which intertextual links stabilize this discourse, and to examine how official discourse encounters criticism»\textsuperscript{93}. In order to capture how the official discourse responds to criticism, the official discourse needs to be situated within a larger set of discourses and texts. I therefore include the critical discourses that NATO is forced to deal with because they are carried by influential actors in important member states. This implies that I exclude marginal political discourses, popular culture and, to a large extent, discourses carried by non-Western actors. It would have been interesting to investigate further the representations of NATO in non-Western discourse, but it would demand more competence than mustered by this author.

Concretely, the texts included in the analysis are first of all NATO’s official documents\textsuperscript{94}. The material that has been used to establish NATO’s official discourse is available at NATO’s webpage, and includes official texts, policy documents, speeches and transcripts from press conferences. By browsing «Darfur» in NATO’s open database, one hundred and ninety nine entries were found between 2004 and 2009. Not all of these have the same relevance, but none was excluded a priori. If no other source is cited in the footnotes, all the NATO texts referred to can be found on NATO’s webpage, at www.NATO.int. NATO’s decision making is based on consensus (but not unanimity). It is therefore unlikely that direct debate will be found in these texts. However, the choice of words and the principles stressed in the public declarations are indications of links to other and competing discourses in relation to which meaning is created. The most serious challenges to NATO’s official policy in Darfur can be found in the media. Three newspapers from three different countries were chosen to include a wider debate on NATO’s mission. The concrete newspapers were chosen because they are opinion leading: \textit{New York Times} from the USA, \textit{The Guardian} from the UK, and \textit{Le Monde} from France. USA, the UK and France are all among the military strongest and most influential member states of the Alliance, even if France has a special relationship with NATO. At the same time, these states represent different positions in the debate on NATO’s role, both generally and in the case of the

\textsuperscript{93} HANSEN, \textit{ap.cit.}, p.60.
\textsuperscript{94} I considered supplementing with interviews of NATO officials, but realised that it would not provide relevant data material for the subject here, which is the official discourse.
Darfur mission. The three countries chose different approaches to NATO’s mission. France was the most skeptical and did not participate in NATO’s mission. The UK divided its efforts between NATO and the EU, whereas the US was by far the most ardent supporter of an increased role for NATO in Darfur. Citations will be used quite extensively, and these citations will sometimes constitute longer extracts. This is necessary because they form the data material that the analysis is based on.

The choices made prepare the way for the analysis per se. The second step of the method is to identify representations in the source material, and to combine representations into discourses. This is what is done in chapter three of the thesis, which deals with the discursive field, or basic discourses. Concepts, or representations that are often referred to, are identified and situated within a broader discursive context. A brief conceptual history of these concepts is also provided, to support the claim that meaning is changeable.

These basic discourses provide an aid in the third step, which consists of uncovering layers in the discourse. In this thesis, the uncovering of layers is separated in two chapters. The process leading up to NATO defining a policy in Darfur is analysed first, in an attempt to answer the first research question, how NATO’s policy was made possible. Then, the development of discourses as the mission progressed is analysed, with the intention of discovering some ways in which NATO’s policy in Darfur was normalised.

2.3.2. Some methodological challenges

The principal methodological challenges can be divided in two strands. One aspect is related to the concrete case chosen for this analysis, the second aspect touches discourse analysis more in general. Regarding the challenges connected to the concrete case, two problems follow from the fact that NATO’s support mission in Darfur in itself generated relatively little public debate. First, the moderate debate on NATO’s role in Darfur can be contrasted with a massive debate on the Western response to the conflict in Darfur more generally. It is difficult to separate these lines of debate, as they are related and partly overlap. I will do my best to focus quite narrowly on what is relevant for NATO, but this cannot be entirely separated from the rest. More general studies on the international response have been referred to above, and can be consulted for a more complete picture. The second methodological challenge related to the relative lack of debate is that discourse analysis depends on texts as a source of data. However, a lack of debate is in itself an observation, it indicates that the policy was successfully normalised. Also, avoiding
debate is a demanding exercise that requires an effort to keep out conflicting discourses and representations\textsuperscript{95}. These are things that can be studied in discourse analysis.

The other strand of methodological challenges is related to discourse analysis more in general, as a subjective and interpretive approach. It can be argued that \textit{all} research conducted on social phenomena is interpretive, as it uses socially constructed concepts and understandings to categorise the world. For instance, most political analysis contributes to the normalisation of dominant representations by taking them for granted and presenting them as indisputable truths instead of questioning them\textsuperscript{96}. Still, the openly interpretive nature of discourse analysis has some implications for how the quality of research can be evaluated. Even if the terms of reliability and validity are designed for the evaluation of quantitative studies, the ideal is relevant also for qualitative research\textsuperscript{97}. 	extit{Reliability} refers to the degree to which results of a research are replicable and repeatable. Interpretation will always be subjective, but in the context of discourse analysis, reliability can be enhanced through correct referencing and openness about the sources used. 	extit{Validity} is related to whether the results yielded by research reflect an empirically existent phenomenon. Discourse theorists deny that there is an objective truth against which research can be measured. However, claims should still be backed by empirical evidence - primary sources and citations - to provide a consistent and convincing narrative of the phenomenon under study\textsuperscript{98}. It should also be acknowledged that the researcher is a part of the world under study. When conducting research and identifying representations, the analyst is making a representation of the representations she is studying. She is therefore also a part of the process of knowledge construction\textsuperscript{99}.

Summary

In this chapter, theoretical and methodological issues have been treated. The chapter opened with a state of the art, placing the current thesis in relation to a line of research on NATO’s role and identity in the post-Cold War. It was argued that the more fluid understanding of identity offered by poststructuralist discourse analysis could offer a better approach to the study of NATO’s policy development. In the second section, the basic assumptions of discourse theory were

\textsuperscript{95} See NEUMANN, Iver B., \textit{loc.cit.}, 2009, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{96} SHAPIRO, Michael, \textit{op.cit.}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{97} GOLAFSHANI, Nahid, «Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research», \textit{The Qualitative Report}, vol. 8, no° 4, 2003, pp. 597-607.
presented. In the third section, the practical method for discourse analysis used in this thesis was laid out, and necessary choices and delimitations made. The chapter ended with a few reflections on the limits and challenges of discourse analysis.
3 THE DISCURSIVE FIELD/BASIC DISCOURSES

The research questions ask how NATO’s policy in Darfur was made possible on the one hand, and how it was normalised on the other. Policies are made possible, and normalised through discursive struggles, where one order of meaning, a policy discourse, acquires a dominant position. In order to identify challenges to an otherwise dominant construction of role and policy, an analytical tool that allows for a structured analysis of the points of contestation is needed. The aim of this chapter is to develop such a tool, through a model of the discursive field. The discursive field represents the context in which NATO’s policy on Darfur derives its meaning. The discursive field is mapped around a range of competing discourses which I call basic discourses. The basic discourses have an empirical prevalence, but they are analytical constructions of an ideal-type kind. They indicate the principal points of contestation within a debate, and it is therefore a goal to «identify discourses that articulate very different constructions of identity and policy and which thereby separate the political landscape between them»\textsuperscript{100}. The first step in the construction of basic discourses is to identify concepts or representations that are frequently mobilised to define and demarcate NATO’s official discourse. Secondly, these concepts are integrated within larger discourses that establish different preconditions for action and policy. Dominant discourses have a tendency to represent things as the way they have always been. An important part of discourse analysis is therefore to provide an historical reading of key concepts in discourse to show that their meaning is not natural and unchangeable\textsuperscript{101}.

3.1. The principles demarcating NATO’s policy in Darfur

Basic discourses are identified through the reading of NATO official documents, along with a large set of texts, spanning different genres, to ensure that the analytically reproduced basic discourses have an empiric relevance. A prerequisite for the mapping of discourses is cultural competence, meaning that case of study should be well known by the researcher\textsuperscript{102}. Academic articles, standard works, newspapers and blogs were among the material used to gain the necessary overall knowledge, and to get a wide insight into the different positions existing on the subject. During this reading, three concepts manifested themselves as particularly central to the definition and delimitation in NATO’s policy discourse on Darfur. They were referred to by

\textsuperscript{100} HANSEN, Lene, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 97; NEUMANN, Iver B., \textit{loc.cit.}, 2009, p. 71.
NATO, but also existed externally to NATO’s discourse. These concepts were key points structuring disagreement within the debate\textsuperscript{103}.

The first and defining concept in NATO’s policy towards Darfur is African leadership. A press conference was held with NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konaré, on the occasion of Konaré’s visit to the NATO Headquarters on the 17 May 2005. The meeting followed a request from the African Union for logistical support, and the press conference provided an occasion for NATO and the African Union to establish the nature of NATO’s support to the AU\textsuperscript{104}. NATO’s Secretary General used the occasion to articulate the principle for NATO’s engagement very explicitly:

The African Union is asking for our assistance. \textit{The principle is, should be and will be, with the - it’s the African Union which has prime responsibility}. It is the African Union which is leading this mission. It is the African Union which asked for our support. There will be no imposition, neither by NATO nor by any other international organization--I’m speaking for NATO [my italics]\textsuperscript{105}.

The notion of African leadership is essential. It is the African Union that asks for support, and NATO cannot impose, or take initiatives that are outside what is asked for by the African Union. The principle of African leadership was also repeated by the African Union Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, at the same press conference. To the principle that the African Union is in the lead, Konaré added that the partnership between the AU and NATO was non-exclusive, and that there would be only African troops on the ground in Darfur\textsuperscript{106}.

A second and very important concept was «responsibility to protect», which was articulated by the NATO Secretary General as the rationale for NATO getting involved in Darfur: «The logic of engagement in supporting the African Union is clear: Thousands of people are dying every month in Darfur. We, the world community, cannot turn a blind eye to this tragedy. If NATO can help in improving the situation, it must do so»\textsuperscript{107}. This reasoning implicates a logic of humanitarianism, or an ethical responsibility to come to the assistance of people in need.

\textsuperscript{103} On the identification of basic discourses, see HANSEN, Lene, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{104} As NATO Spokesperson James Apparthurai said in his briefing on the 29 April 2005: «[A]n African Union delegation is expected in Brussels later in May and that will be an important time for discussions on how and whether- whether and how NATO can provide support to the AU», see APPARTHURAI, James, «Video background briefing», \textit{NATO}, Brussels, 29 April 2005.
\textsuperscript{105} DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, in \textit{NATO}, « Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konaré », Brussels, 17 May 2005.
\textsuperscript{106} KONARÉ, Alpha Oumar, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{107} DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «A Transforming Alliance», Speech at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 31 May 2005.
A third principle was used to delimit the extent of NATO’s implication, namely the assurance that NATO was not striving to be the «World’s policeman». One clear articulation of this principle was made by de Hoop-Scheffer when demanded if NATO would be made a key actor in crisis resolution on the African continent: «L’OTAN n’a pas l’ambition d’être gendarme du monde. On est ici sur la base d’une lettre du président Konaré à moi sous les conditions et sur la base des principes qu’on connaît trop bien et sur laquelle on s’est mis d’accord. [...]»\textsuperscript{108}. The meaning of these concepts derives from their representations within already existing discourses. In the following, lines will be drawn between NATO’s articulation of these concepts, and the meaning of the concepts outside NATO’s discourse. To understand how concepts are used today, it is necessary to explore how they developed, and how their meaning is conveyed within separate discourses. I will treat «responsibility to protect», «African solutions to African problems», and «World policeman» consecutively.

3.2 Three basic discourses

3.2.1. The Responsibility to Protect

In NATO’s official discourse on Darfur, the idea that the international community has a moral responsibility to come to the aid of the defenceless is an underlying principle or representation, as when the Secretary General says:

And finally, Darfur is not about international institutions working together, Darfur is not about NATO or the EU or UN or even the African Union, Darfur is about putting an end to the unspeakable suffering of millions of people there, thousands of them dying every month and so I think the conference in Addis comes at a moment where it is really necessary that the international community joins hands to try to put an end to the suffering and support the African Union--they are in the lead--to see that their mission in Darfur can be successful\textsuperscript{109}.

The «humanitarian idea» - the notion that there is a universal ethical imperative to assist human beings that are suffering, has acquired a widespread recognition\textsuperscript{110}, allowing it to be what David Ambrosetti calls a «self-justifying principle»\textsuperscript{111}. The most explicit articulations of this principle were however located within oppositional discourse, carried by journalists and activists mostly located in the USA. They referred more precisely to a «responsibility to protect», a modern idea that has its origins in the concept of genocide which was institutionalised with the Convention on

\textsuperscript{108} DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{110} AMBROSETTI, David, op.cit., p. 182.
\textsuperscript{111} My translation. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 182-183.
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948\textsuperscript{112}. The term genocide was coined by the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his book on Nazi Germany’s policies\textsuperscript{113}, but was given its most common understanding in the Genocide convention\textsuperscript{114}. The Genocide convention defines genocide as a series of acts «committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group»\textsuperscript{115}. This convention formalised a mindset whereby states committed themselves to «prevent and punish» genocide\textsuperscript{116}. Underlying this affirmation is the construction of an ethical responsibility not to be a passive bystander to atrocities such as the Holocaust\textsuperscript{117}. From a discourse theoretical point of view, it is the mobilisation of the concept of genocide that is the most interesting. «Genocide» is a representation, a truth claim about a situation. If accepted, this representation elevates a case of human suffering above normality, and introduces a sense of urgency and exceptionality. When mobilised successfully, the genocide representation creates a powerful moral compulsion to respond to, and bring an end to, the situation characterised as genocide. In other words, it excludes passivity and a non-policy as viable options. It also constructs a boundless political subject: preventing and punishing genocide is a universal matter\textsuperscript{118}.

The idea of a universal subject is difficult to consolidate with a state system, where state sovereignty is a fundamental principle. There may be instances where states are seen to have a right or even an obligation, to intervene in another state’s internal affairs, even if genocide is not clearly established. The practice of humanitarian intervention is often read into a discourse of this type. In the words of Cynthia Weber: «When state practices do not fit intersubjective understandings of what a sovereign state must be, then interference by a sovereign state into the affairs of an «aberrant» state is legitimate»\textsuperscript{119}. The concept named the «responsibility to protect» was introduced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 in its report named The Responsibility to Protect\textsuperscript{120}. The concept emerged as an attempt to resolve this conflict between the principle of state sovereignty and the possibility of intervention.

\textsuperscript{112} UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly, 9 December 1948.
\textsuperscript{115} Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, op.cit., art.3.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. art. 1.
\textsuperscript{117} HANSEN, op.cit., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{119} WEBER, Cynthia, Simulating Sovereignty: intervention, the state and symbolic exchange, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.4.
\textsuperscript{120} INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001.
for human protection purposes\textsuperscript{121}. It does so by providing one such intersubjective understanding of what a sovereign state must be: a sovereign state must provide protection for its citizens. In the discourse constructed around this idea, populations have the right to be protected from «genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity»\textsuperscript{122}. A state that does not provide such protection can be considered as aberrant, and intervention by the international community can thereby be legitimised.

The basic principle of «responsibility to protect», or R2P, is an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility. The idea is that the state holds the primary responsibility to protect its people, but it adds, significantly, that «[w]here a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect»\textsuperscript{123}. The concept of R2P had been developed shortly before the crisis in Darfur, and Darfur was seen by important observers as the testing case for this «new» norm of a responsibility to protect\textsuperscript{124}. The language introduced by the report seems to have had an impact on the language chosen to argue for greater Western implication in Darfur, specifically through a greater role played by NATO.

The concept of responsibility to protect is relevant for NATO in at least two ways. First of all, NATO and its member states have been significant contributors to the development of this concept, through actions in words and deeds. NATO’s air raid in Kosovo, which was launched in 1999 without a mandate from the UN Security Council, raised to the forefront of international debate the idea that there existed a moral imperative outside the legal realm. The Independent International Commission investigating the operation concluded that NATO’s bombing was «illegal but legitimate»\textsuperscript{125}. This ambiguity was one of the motivating factors behind the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty\textsuperscript{126}. NATO has therefore contributed to the idea that military force can be used to put an end to a situation of grave and exceptional crisis, even if the Security Council has not authorised the use of force

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}, p. VII.
\textsuperscript{122} UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, \textit{2005 World Summit Outcome}, A/60/L.1, Sixtieth session, New York, 2005, p.31, art.138-139.
\textsuperscript{123} ICISS, \textit{Ibid.}, p. XI.
\textsuperscript{126} ICISS, \textit{op.cit.} p. VII.
because of veto or the prospect of veto from one of the permanent member states. The Kosovo air campaign showed that NATO was willing to divert the Security Council in the name of humanitarian protection. The mobilisation of this predecessor could therefore be a way to argue in favour of a role for NATO in Darfur, a role that could include orchestrating a humanitarian intervention.

Secondly, NATO is potentially conferred with a special responsibility to implement the R2P. In the ICASS report, the responsibility to protect is assigned to the «international community» in case the state of residence of a population fails to assume its responsibility. What is meant by this frequently used, yet enduringly unspecific term of «the international community», is not detailed in the report. Tacitly however, a special responsibility was arguably bestowed upon actors with the capacity to act\(^\text{127}\). «The only military coalition with the capacity to engage in robust and sustained enforcement action, both inside and outside its area of operations, is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) »\(^\text{128}\). Combined with a generalised preference for multilateral rather than unilateral interventions\(^\text{129}\), NATO appears to be among the few actors that can take such responsibility in practice. NATO was indeed called to take responsibility for a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, as in this passage written by Eric Reeves and published in The Guardian:

Certainly there have been voices expressing prudent caution about humanitarian intervention in Darfur; but at this point in the genocide, prudence has become cowardice. […]A robust brigade of NATO-quality troops, ideally (if improbably) operating with a UN mandate, serving as the core of a larger force of approximately 20,000 troops, could immediately change the security dynamic on the ground in ways critical for the almost 4 million human beings now defined by the UN as "conflict-affected" and in need of humanitarian assistance\(^\text{130}\).

When NATO is placed within the Responsibility to protect-discourse, it is as a part of, and as a representative of the international community. NATO’s geographical implantation in the West is not a limitation for action, because the responsibility to protect is universal: everybody has the duty to protect in the case where a state fails its responsibility to do so. NATO, as a representative of the West, may even be seen as having a greater moral responsibility to respond to the crisis in Darfur, because it is resourceful. However, this new language does not seem to facilitate or clarify a course of action to be taken. On the one hand, the concept of responsibility


to protect would seem to reduce the barrier for international intervention because it expands the range of crimes that can legitimise an interventionist response. On the other hand, however, the two-tier division of responsibility between the state and the international community introduces a new subject of debate. Because it is the state that holds the primary responsibility to protect, it becomes debatable if and when the responsibility to protect cedes to the international community, and whether the responsibility to protect implies a military intervention.  

3.2.2. African Solutions to African Problems

From the outset, NATO’s policy in Darfur was defined by, and constrained by the idea of African leadership and the firm confinement of responsibility to the African Union. This representation of responsibility is a part of a wider discourse which can be called «African solutions to African problems». The meaning of this discourse derives from its opposition to «Western solutions to African problems», which can be seen as the message expressed by the Responsibility to protect-discourse. In relation to the idea of shared responsibility found in the Responsibility to protect-concept, the African leadership-discourse introduces a third level between state responsibility and the responsibility of the international community: namely a regional responsibility.

The mantra of «African solutions to African problems» surfaced in the wake of African decolonisation. A prominent advocate of the principle was Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana and its colonial predecessor the Gold Coast from 1952 to 1966. In 1961, he held a seminal speech, called «I Speak of Freedom». In his speech, he argued that African states needed to bury the time of colonialism where they were exploited by the Europeans, and instead «find an African solution to our problems», which for him lay in African unity. In his view, a united Africa would make a great contribution to peace in the world, and empower Africans to take responsibility for their own difficulties, instead of falling prey to Western powers’ disdain: «[...] [T]he ignominious spectacle of the U.N. in the Congo quibbling about constitutional niceties while the Republic was tottering into anarchy, [is] evidence of the callous disregard of African Independence by the Great Powers».

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 to provide a venue for finding African solutions to African problems, and therefore in principle constituted a materialisation of this concept.

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131 BELLAMY, Alex J., «Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq», Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19, no°2, 2005, pp. 31-53, p.52.


In its original form, the principle of African solutions to African problems connotes pride, initiative and empowerment. It expresses a will to break loose of the independence on the former colonial powers and come up with responses that fit the African context and are based on the recognition of equality, as opposed to the condescending attitude of the former colonisers. This discourse upholds a strong degree of otherness between Africans and their European colonisers, where the colonial powers are depicted as oppressors and the Africans as exploited. The in-group, on the other hand, is perceived as homogeneous. Africans are seen as united by a precolonial «African» identity, and brought closer together by shared experiences of outside oppression. The actual capabilities of the African continent for problem-solving fell short of the expressed intents, and in practice, the Organisation of African Unity was privileging the principle of non-interference and eschewed the involvement in internal conflicts. To the extent that there were interventions to halt massacres in African states during the Cold War, they were orchestrated by the United Nations or European nations. A fundamental weakness with the original «African solutions»-discourse was the difficulty of consoling the high valuation of pride and self-help with a dependency on Western powers.

The end of the twentieth century saw a revival of the concept of African solutions to African problems. During the 1990s, (sub-)regional African organisations became more involved in peace operations on the continent, and in 2002 the African Union replaced the OAU with an aspiration to play a bigger role in peace keeping on the continent. The principle of African solutions to African problems is part of the norms governing the African Union, and in the Constitutive act it is expressed as a principle to promote «self-reliance within the framework of the Union». An important reason for this development, besides the continued desire to reduce external interference in continental affairs, was the withdrawal of Western states from conflict management in Africa after the heavily mediatised disasters in Somalia and Rwanda. The tragedies in Rwanda and Somalia led to a tacit rallying of the West and Africa on the necessity of finding African solutions to African problems, admitting that Western intervention was both

137 Ibid., p. 106-107.
140 MAYS, op.cit., p. 107.
unreliable and risked doing more harm than good\textsuperscript{141}. The result was a scaling down of United Nations peacekeeping in terms of size as well as scope. Instead, the UN increased its reliance on burden-sharing with regional organisations\textsuperscript{142}. However, in its new institutionalisation, the African solutions-discourse faced the same problem as the last one: «While it is important that Africans have recognized the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises and armed conflict, their political will far surpasses their peacekeeping capabilities»\textsuperscript{143}.

To overcome this internal instability - pride and self-help combined with a lack of capabilities and dependency on outside help - the representation of foreign intervention was altered. Instead of being constituted as a breach of the self-help principle, the reinforcement of African capabilities with foreign help was represented as conductive to the implementation of African solutions to African problems. In its modern version, the African solutions-discourse was institutionalised as an arrangement whereby the African Union, possibly with the aid of sub-regional organisations, take the practical and political responsibility of a military intervention on the continent, under a UN mandate. Western states are expected to provide funding, logistics and training to strengthen the African forces’ capabilities to successfully conduct missions. In its «modern» version, the African solutions-discourse was not reserved for Africans locators, but was promoted also in the West. In principle, this appears to be a winning concept as it responds to the interests of both Africans and Westerners. The self-sufficiency of Africa is strengthened, and the West may avoid politically costly interventions in which their own interests and security are not directly at stake\textsuperscript{144}. The critics of this arrangement however, tend to stress that the concept is used as an excuse for Western states to avoid taking responsibility when it comes to saving lives of Africans. The African Solutions to African Problems-discourse in its modern form is therefore vulnerable to challenges that the resourceful West evades taking a greater responsibility for the resolution of conflict in Africa.

It does not seem ethically justifiable to vest all African countries with special responsibilities for helping solve conflicts anywhere on the continent – usually conflicts for which the rest of the continent’s 53 states cannot possibly be blamed – but that the Africans accept this responsibility


\textsuperscript{143} BERMAN and SAMS, \textit{op.cit.}, p.41.

can only be applauded as heroic. The main problem with the phrase may thus be that it all too conveniently lets the West ‘off the hook’

Some NATO member states have a long history of military and administrative imposition in African states, but NATO as an organisation does not have a history of engagement in Africa. The access point for NATO into the «African solutions»-discourse goes through the division of labour introduced by the idea that the African Union takes the military and political responsibility, and the West provides the AU with the logistical and financial capabilities to fulfil its responsibility. NATO in this ordering of roles represents the technologically advanced and military superior West, which may have a supporter role, but not interfere outside the limits defined by the primary responsible: the African Union. The unwillingness to take on a larger responsibility is framed in terms of the respect of African pride and leading position as a peacemaker on the African continent, as opposed to strategic disinterest. As previously stated, the meaning of «African solutions to African problem» arises in opposition to «Western solutions to African problems». The latter concept reflects the colonial mindset. Western colonial powers intervened authoritatively in African affairs and imposed their way of doing things, «civilisation». In the modern African solutions-discourse, «Africa» and the «West» are separate entities, but the relationship between the two is not characterised by animosity. The degree of otherness is reduced compared to the pan-African original version, to open the possibility that the West can provide practical and moral help and support without this breaking the sense of pride.

3.2.3. World’s Policeman

The idea that NATO should take responsibilities on behalf of the international community, be it in a leading role as advocated by the responsibility to protect-discourse, or in a support role as favoured by the African solutions-discourse, did not ring well in everyone’s ears. Opposition to NATO expanding its role and getting involved in operations outside its traditional geographic boundaries exists, and this view also surfaced on the subject of NATO’s mission in Darfur. This viewpoint is commonly represented by the metaphor of NATO as the «World’s policeman» or as a «Global Policeman». In NATO’s official discourse the influence of this discourse is sensed in the frequent assurances that «NATO has no intention to be the «global policeman»»

146 See e.g. DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «Speech by NATO Secretary General,» at the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt, October 12, 2005; DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «A Changing Alliance in a Changing World», Speech in Bratislava, Slovakia, 30 June 2005; RIZZO, Alessandro Minuto, «Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General», Conference sponsored by the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs, and NATO
The expression «World Policeman» is a feature of a discourse that has been established in the context of debates on United States foreign policy. US foreign policy has been conceptualised as varying historically between the conflicting influences of introversion and extroversion, defined as «the willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations»\(^{147}\). The idea of a «manifest destiny» to expand - be it over the region, over the North American continent or over the world - began to gain influence in the mid-1840s\(^ {148} \). Inherent to this idea and the word «destiny» is a higher purpose and the impossibility of choice, making US efforts to influence the outside world a natural and inevitable endeavour. Those who favoured isolationism or non-intervention on the other hand, argued that the US should avoid interfering in conflict that was not directly relevant to US territorial defence. This old debate is still vivid, most visibly in the questionings of the United States policies in Afghanistan and Darfur.

The 20\(^{th}\) century saw many attempts to describe the world order, understand how a balance of power was maintained and how hegemons lose their dominant position. Since the United States became recognised as one of the world’s superpowers after the Second World War, scholars have questioned how it could maintain its influence, given that all former giants and empires had sooner or later fallen. An influential contribution to the debate was Paul Kennedy’s book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*\(^ {149} \). The book treats the changing balance of power the last five hundred years and explains it by the interaction between the economy and the military. In the author’s view, a continued great power status depends on striking a balance between investments and spending on defence. Great powers therefore commonly end up in a destructive dilemma when threats to their hegemonic position compel them to divert more resources to the military even when their economic situation is deteriorating. The argument can be taken to mean that global US activism can lead to a negative diversion of funds and focus from national security.

The «world policeman» expression is normally situated in a discourse opposed to US extroversion, and the expression is therefore negatively connoted. It is most commonly used to criticise US ambitions of global hegemony, or what is perceived as such. The underlying assumption is that global ambitions will invariably end with financial and military overstretch and the fall from a great power status. Being a «world policeman» in this context means carrying

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too much of the burden of upholding world order, or intervening in conflicts without proper regard to whether the intervention serves national defence interests. The expression also bears relevance for the discussion of the relationship between the US and the United Nations, as it is the UN that on a formal and institutional level is the closest contender to a «world policeman»-status. For the US to strive for the role as the world’s policeman can thereby imply the sidestepping of the UN.

In a NATO context, the fears and criticism related to NATO going global are associated with the designation of NATO as «le gendarme du monde», which can be defined as «un bras armé chargé d’imposer sur l’ensemble de la planète des objectifs occidentaux». France has taken a particularly tough stance in the question of the scope of NATO’s role. However, the fear of NATO overstretch due to an expansion of missions that exceed capabilities is shared by many NATO member states. These states fear that missions far away may jeopardise Alliance cohesion, and undermine the validity of the collective defence principle. It is principally the United States which is pressing for NATO to take on global responsibilities to match US global strategic interests. The basic discourse that argued that NATO should not get involved in any way in the conflict in Darfur, or on the African continent in general, is characterised by a view of NATO as the prolongation of US dominance. By employing the World Policeman allegory, critics of NATO’s increasingly global role and US dominance phrase their opposition in terms of what is best for NATO. Central to the argument is the idea of «overstretch»: that NATO hyper activism will wear out the limited resources of the European allies and thus be harmful for the Alliance.

3.3 Conflicting constructions of temporal, spatial and ethical identity in the three discourses

The three basic discourses produce and reproduce distinct ideas about what NATO is: the alliance’s identity. We can classify these ideas according to the ideas they transmit on spatial,

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155 The question of overstretch in relation to a NATO engagement in Darfur was raised before NATO had formally been requested to provide support in Darfur, see NATO, «Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Defence Ministers», Taormina, 10 February 2005.
temporal and ethical identities. The temporal aspect concerns the capacity and desirability of change away from NATO’s initial conceptualisation as a military alliance concerned with the collective defence of the territory of its member states. The Responsibility to protect-discourse in its purest form articulates an idea of NATO that implies a substantial degree of change. It puts emphasis on universality, implicitly to the detriment of territorial self-defence. It does not play up prioritising between different goals, because the ethical imperative to protect is superior to all other concerns. In the concrete case, the Responsibility to protect-discourse is first and foremost an oppositional discourse, carried by activists outside and independent from the circle of NATO officials. However, it did have significant impact on the US administration, which is already the most outspoken advocate for transformation of NATO. The African solutions to African problems-discourse combines change and tradition by allowing a purely value-based mission, but strictly subordinated a more classic, national security defence. The World Police-discourse is used to discourage development towards a globalisation of NATO, by equalling out-of-area engagements with an undesired agenda of being everywhere. In this discourse therefore, there is limited room for change in the form of «out-of-area» assignments.

When it comes to spatial identity, the demarcation line is strung between territorial on the one side, and universal, i.e. non-territorial, on the other. In the Responsibility to protect-discourse, NATO is represented as the «international community», which has the responsibility to respond to extraordinary crimes against humankind with the measures at its disposal. That NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not relevant, because the moral imperative of halting genocide overrules territorial borders. The incomparable military strength of NATO confers it with a responsibility to use that strength when and where it is required. In the African solutions-discourse, both a territorial and a universal identity are included, and coordinated through the imposition of a priority order. NATO is first and foremost concerned with the security of its own member states, but it can, in a second term, contribute to operations of concern to the world, as long as the alliance is not prescribed a leading role. NATO is in this view territorial first and global second. Because of the negative connotation of the «World Policeman»-concept, the discourse centred on this concept does not allow room for universal aspirations, and maintains that NATO should focus on Europe and on traditional military alliance tasks. The World policeman-discourse is used to advocate strictly territorial role for NATO.

156 HANSEN, Lene, op.cit., p.95.
On the subject of ethical identity, the key word is responsibility. In the Responsibility to Protect-discourse, «everybody» has the responsibility to do «something». The policy advocated within a discourse of ethical responsibility often includes military humanitarian intervention, but in the concrete case this link to policy was seldom clear-cut. As a member of the international community NATO has the responsibility to do something, preferably more than what is included in a small support role. The argument is often extended to stress the fact that NATO, as an organisation flagging values of freedom and rights, cannot let the atrocities in Darfur persist. Everybody who belongs to the society must do something, especially those who have the necessary resources. NATO, as the world’s most powerful military alliance therefore has a special responsibility. The African solutions-discourse also attaches much importance to responsibility. It does not deny that the «international community» has a responsibility to prevent and respond to genocide or ethnic cleansing. However, and contrary to the Responsibility to protect-discourse, the African solutions-discourse upholds a strict division of labour and responsibilities between different actors in the «international community», similar to a principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity can be defined as follows: «[A] larger and greater body should not exercise functions which can be carried out efficiently by one smaller and lesser, but rather the former should support the latter and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the whole community». The primary responsibility for Africa’s problems lies with Africans themselves and in the concrete case with the African Union, and NATO holds a supporting role as defined and invited by the African Union. In the World Policeman-discourse, a responsibility for NATO to act in Darfur is denied. The matter of contestation here is not whether the international community is responsible for protecting civilians in Darfur or not. Rather, the world policeman-discourse excludes the idea of NATO taking on missions that are not relevant to the protection of NATO member states’ territory and direct security interests. Therefore, NATO is not a part of the international community that has the responsibility to protect in Darfur.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was first to identify the concepts that are defining and demarcating NATO’s policy towards Darfur, and integrate these concepts into a model of basic discourses. Three basic discourses structuring the debate on NATO’s role in Darfur were identified: the responsibility to protect-discourse, the African solutions to African problems-discourse, and the World policeman-discourse. The origins of these discourses outside NATO have been traced,

157 HANSEN, Lene, op.cit. p. 112.
and reflect that the debate on NATO takes place within a greater political context. The three basic discourses have been compared with regards to the constructions of identity that they convey, and it has been argued that they represent different positions in terms of temporal, spatial and ethical identity.
4 NATO AND AFRICA BECOMES A POSSIBILITY

In the previous chapter, three basic discourses structuring the debate on NATO’s role in Darfur were identified, and related to different representations of NATO’s identity. The present chapter uses these ideal type basic discourses as a structuring tool for analysing the process leading up to NATO launching its first mission in Africa in July 2005. With regards to the research questions, the present chapter aims to throw light on the question on how NATO’s policy in Darfur was made possible. Focus is on how a particular discourse and particular representations were established and accepted. The process of NATO’s mobilisation is traced and broken down to three steps. First of all, the crisis in Darfur acquired a representation that elevated it from a local concern to an international one. Secondly, NATO defined a basis for getting involved in Darfur. Finally, this basis would be accepted both from NATO members themselves and from the African Union. Far from being automatic adaptations to necessities imposed by events, all of these steps involved struggle over meanings, identity and policies.

4.1. Darfur: internal-, international-, or African crisis?

4.1.1. Creation of a crisis and activation of international responsibility

NATO action is traditionally justified on the grounds that a given situation constitutes a threat to NATO member states’ security and stability. A civil war in Eastern Africa in which the lions’ share of victims are civilian does not self-evidently fall into this category. There could be no NATO policy on Darfur before a link between NATO and Darfur was successfully created. Such a link was non-existing before the eruption of the crisis in 2003 and it continued to be non-existing for more than a year to come. Darfur was not on the agenda of NATO for the first year of the crisis, but at the same time it was barely on the agenda outside Sudan at all, with a few exceptions. The manner in which «Darfur», the name of a region in Sudan, became the «world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe»¹⁵⁹, and synonymous with ethnic cleansing and allegedly also genocide, is central to the understanding of how NATO became engaged here. Pivotal for the engagement of the international community in this case was the activation of a sense of responsibility.

Humanitarian crises and civil war in Africa do not necessarily spur a political response from the international community. Severe problems of malnutrition and heightened mortality faced by some countries in the region have been subject to a process of «normalisation», whereby the

perception of emergency has changed and higher levels of mortality are tolerated\(^{160}\). It is not an «objective» condition of crisis that decides the amount and type of response. Rather, it is through political agency that a sense of emergency is created, which if accepted may provide the basis for a policy\(^ {161}\). The conflict in Darfur went on practically unnoticed by the West for a year after its violent eruption in the first months of 2003. It was the non-governmental organisations Amnesty International\(^ {162}\) and the International Crisis Group\(^ {163}\) which were the first to publish reports on the atrocities committed in the conflict\(^ {164}\). These reports did not immediately receive the attention of a greater public. The conflict remained within a representation as a «normal» humanitarian crisis and was of concern mainly to aid agencies\(^ {165}\). The Sudanese government contributed to the silence by denying reporters and aid workers access to the region\(^ {166}\), and it was difficult to know what was really happening there.

From being an intra-state conflict in a desolate region of Africa, attracting the attention solely of humanitarian aid providers, the crisis in Darfur came to be «transformed» into a massive humanitarian crisis and a security problem that activated a responsibility of the international community to react, possibly with forceful action. A precondition for this move was that the situation was perceived as exceptional, and that it acquired a visibility\(^ {167}\). This change occurred in the spring of 2004, when New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, based on his on-the-ground research advanced the claim that the situation in Darfur constituted genocide\(^ {168}\). Kristof’s language and description of the conflict had a tremendous impact on the writings in other media that followed suit\(^ {169}\). He articulated a particular representation of the conflict in Darfur: «The most vicious ethnic cleansing you've never heard of is unfolding here in the southeastern fringes of the Sahara Desert. It's a campaign of murder, rape and pillage by Sudan's Arab rulers that has...»

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\(^{161}\) This is a parallel to the theory of securitisation, which holds that «security» is a speech act that declares a state of emergency which qualify for exceptional measures. See BUZAN, Barry, Ole WÆVER and Jaap DE WILDE, Security: A new framework for analysis, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

\(^{162}\) AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Looming crisis in Darfur, AFR 54/041/2003, 1 July 2003.

\(^{163}\) INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Sudan: Towards an incomplete peace - Africa Report n°73, December 2003.


\(^{167}\) AMBROSETTI, David, op.cit., p. 184.


forced 700,000 black African Sudanese to flee their villages»\textsuperscript{170}. In Kristof’s representation of the Darfur conflict, a clear line is drawn between perpetrators (the Arab rulers) on the one hand, and victims (black African Sudanese), on the other. The conflict is structured according to ethnic divisions: it is «lighter-skinned Arab raiders», who «are killing or driving out blacks»\textsuperscript{171}, which is central to his claim that what is occurring in Darfur is genocide\textsuperscript{172}. Kristof attempts to exclude a language of national self interest by subordinating such concerns to a moral principle of stopping mass murder. The universal moral principle of stopping genocide and ethnic cleansing entails a responsibility for the morally conscious to react. On the basis of this representation of the crisis Kristof makes a policy prescription: «Western and African countries need to intervene urgently»\textsuperscript{173}.

With the tenth anniversary of genocide in Rwanda in April 2004, the media had found the angle that allowed for an exponential rise in coverage of the conflict (Figure 1). The European newspapers, although they tended to present more complex accounts of the crisis, were also coloured by such narratives\textsuperscript{174}. Rwanda was a powerful symbol of the international community’s failure to act decisively to prevent genocide from occurring. The successful mobilisation of this metaphor introduced a particular reading of the crisis which held the «international community» accountable for providing a response, and warned against the negative consequences should the international community fail to respond. UN humanitarian coordiNATO or for Sudan, Mukesh


\textsuperscript{172} KRISTOF, Nicholas D., «Will We Say ‘Never Again’ Yet Again?», \textit{The New York Times}, March 27, 2004.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.

Kapila, contributed to this representation when he declared on the 6th of April 2004, that «the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is now the numbers involved».

The comparison with Rwanda and suggestions that the crisis amounted to genocide are significant because a situation deemed to constitute genocide is frequently seen as creating an obligation for the international community to intervene in order to halt the violence. The «genocide»-word introduces a sense of urgency that elevates the situation above a «normal» humanitarian disaster in Africa. Even if the label of genocide remained controversial, a sense of urgency and exceptionality was established. With a representation of the conflict in Darfur as the «world’s worst humanitarian disaster» largely accepted followed a demand for Western involvement. On 7 April 2004, in a speech commemorating the Rwandan genocide, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that «[w]hatever terms it uses to describe the situation [in Darfur], the international community cannot stand idly by . . . [but] must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action. By ‘action’ in such situations I mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action». His choice of words seems to have been inspired by a wish to avoid prolonged discussions of whether what was happening in Darfur could be qualified as genocide or not, as experienced in the international treatment of Rwanda in 1994.

Throughout the summer in 2004, demonstrations and campaigns to prompt action by the international community to stop the killings intensified, especially in the US, but also in Europe. Most were less clear in their policy prescriptions, and called for «robust action», which could or could not mean military intervention. However, even if a humanitarian intervention by Western states was given some thought by policy makers, it was not seriously discussed internationally. The Sudanese government strongly opposed the idea of foreign

175 KAPILA, Mukesh, cited in POWER, Samantha. «Remember Rwanda, but take action in Sudan», New York Times, April 6, 2004; see also Prunier, Gerard, op.cit., p.127.
176 STRAUS, Scott, loc.cit., p.129.
181 SLIM, Hugo, loc.cit., p.826.
183 The US’ intervention in Iraq in 2003 had probably given a serious blow to the idea of humanitarian intervention, see BELLAMY, Alex J., «Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian
troops in Darfur\textsuperscript{184}, and the Security Council focused on finding a diplomatic solution. Deployment of a UN force was not discussed at this stage. It was therefore not clear how the killings should be stopped, and serious doubt remained as to which organisation should carry out the responsibility on behalf of the international community\textsuperscript{185}.

\subsection*{4.1.2. Whose responsibility to protect? Confining responsibility to Africa}

Chad hosted talks between the Sudanese government and rebel groups, which took place in late March 2004. The Sudanese government at this point imposed a particular division of responsibility, when it argued that «the crisis in Darfur is an African problem – therefore, only the Chadian Government and the African Union should facilitate the talks [in N’djamena], while the participation of other international observers should be limited to the discussions on humanitarian matters»\textsuperscript{186}. On April 8, 2004, the parties signed the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The agreement allowed the African Union to dispatch ceasefire monitors in Darfur\textsuperscript{187}. This was the point of departure for what became the \textit{modus operandi} for the international response to Darfur: The African Union assumed responsibility for the military and political response and Western states and institutions focused on diplomacy, humanitarian aid and financial support to the African Union\textsuperscript{188}. Two academics subscribing to a responsibility to protect-discourse describe this division of responsibility as following: «The reluctance of the UN, the EU and the USA to threaten military intervention in Darfur meant that the AU assumed centre stage in the international response», indicating that they see non-African organisations as the most natural vehicles for international response\textsuperscript{189}.

The African Union accepted Khartoum’s division of responsibility, which was framed within an «African solutions to African problems»-discourse. This discourse adopted the idea from the responsibility to protect-concept that the international community has a responsibility to help

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item See debate accompanying the UN Security Council’s first resolution on Darfur, \textit{UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, 5015\textsuperscript{th} meeting, S/PV.5015, 30 July, 2004.}
  \item BELLAMY, Alex J., \textit{loc.cit.}, 2005, p.43.
  \item AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, PSC/PR/2(V), \textit{Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur)}, presented at Peace and Security Council’s 5\textsuperscript{th} session, Addis Abeba, 13 April 2004, p. 4.
  \item WILLIAMS, Paul D. and Alex J. BELLAMY, «The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur», \textit{Security Dialogue}, vol. 36, no°1, 2005, pp. 27-47, p. 35; See also O’NEILL, William G. and Violette CASSIS, \textit{op.cit.}, who say that «When it became clear that the UN and the major powers were not going to intervene militarily to stop the killing, the African Union established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) on May 28, 2004 and sent a small group of troops to monitor», p.5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
stop the suffering of people in Darfur. However, the «African solutions to African problems»-discourse does not accept a full transition of responsibility to protect to the international community as a whole. The government of Sudan is seen as still retaining the responsibility to protect, and the international community should assist the government of Sudan in fulfilling its responsibility. In July 2004 the AU began discussions on the possible deployment of a military force to protect the observers\textsuperscript{190}. In order for such protection force to be accepted by the Sudanese government, the mandate was limited with regards to the protection of civilians. The protection force was mandated only to protect civilians «under immediate threat» in the «immediate vicinity», and it was confirmed that the primary responsibility for protecting civilians lay with the Sudanese government\textsuperscript{191}.

4.2 NATO vs. African Union: Defining African leadership

4.2.1. NATO introduces a possible role under African leadership

It was only after the distribution of roles that conferred the African Union with the military responsibility, and the West with a diplomatic, financial and humanitarian role, that NATO expressed a will to take part in the international community’s response to the crisis in Darfur. It was in a speech held on 9 September 2004 that NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer mentioned Darfur for the first time. The speech was delivered the same day as US Secretary of State Colin Powell and US President George W. Bush described the Darfur crisis as genocide\textsuperscript{192}. It came in the wake of the mounting attention directed towards the crisis in Darfur, as well as increasing pressure in member states to do something to help the people there. The suggestion of NATO support was discretely made. De Hoop-Scheffer mentioned Darfur at the end of his speech, as an example of an operation where cooperation between NATO and the EU could be useful, and where the two organisations should «think creatively» about how they could complement each other, «[f]or example, by giving logistic or other assistance to the African Union, if it would ask»\textsuperscript{193}.

When NATO introduced itself as a possible contributor in the international response to the crisis in Darfur, it did so within the confines of African leadership. The Secretary General very insistently made it clear that NATO would not assume an independent responsibility for handling the crisis in Darfur. Instead, NATO would focus on assisting the African Union with logistic

\textsuperscript{190} AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII), 27 July 2004, para. 8.
\textsuperscript{191} AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII), 20 October 2004, para. 6.
\textsuperscript{193} DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «NATO after Istanbul», Speech in Helsinki, 9 September 2004.
support. The idea of African leadership required there to be an explicit request from the African Union for such support, because it was the African Union which had the uncontested leadership of the military response to the Darfur crisis. In this way, the initiative for a possible NATO implication in the crisis management in Darfur was passed to the African Union. Even if NATO did not invite a request from the African Union directly, the Secretary General repeated that the Alliance was ready to respond to a question of assistance, if it were to come\(^\text{194}\). Darfur was also discussed when US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick visited NATO’s Headquarters on 4 April 2005\(^\text{195}\).

As if to legitimise the discussions of Darfur in NATO fora, Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer talked about «[t]he humanitarian disaster, the mass murder taking place in Darfur» when he reported that the subject of Darfur had been discussed at the informal meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Vilnius, Lithuania on 20 and 21 April, 2005. It was the exceptionality of the crisis that justified NATO having the issue on its agenda. At the same time, a lot of effort was made to exclude any linkage between NATO’s concern for Darfur and military intervention under NATO auspices:

The rainy season is approaching, and we have an incredible death rate every month, and I think it was very appropriate that we discussed Darfur. Not, to avoid any misunderstanding, not to have NATO boots on the ground in Darfur, not to play an active political role there, but to begin to think about answering the question which might come—which has not come, but which might come—from the side of the African Union—the African Union is in the lead here, together with the United Nations; not NATO, the African Union—for any way to support its mission, its mission, the African Union's mission, in Darfur\(^\text{196}\).

The rationale for NATO support to the African Union was a question of capabilities in de Hoop-Scheffer’s reasoning. He mentioned that the European Union was already making a contribution, but that NATO has «the most sophisticated military planning machinery in the world»\(^\text{197}\). The connection between African leadership and a role for NATO strictly confined to logistics and planning was continuously stressed. It was insistently excluded that NATO send soldiers: «I'm not talking about sending soldiers, do not misunderstand me, there's no way NATO is going to

\(^{194}\) See e.g. DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, cited in ZECCHINI, Laurent, «’Il faut utiliser l’Otan de manière plus politique’», Le Monde, 20 February 2005.

\(^{195}\) APPATHURAI, James, «Video background briefing», 4 April, 2005; NATO, «US Secretary of State visits NATO», 4 April, 2005.


\(^{197}\) Ibid.; DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Questions and answers with NATO Secretary General», Vilnius University, Lithuania, 22 April 2005.
send soldiers into Darfur. It's the African Union, it's the Africans who take, quite rightly, the responsibility for this major problem on the African continent»

4.2.2. African leadership as blockage for NATO engagement

The leadership of the African Union in the international response to the crisis in Darfur was not something NATO was willing to challenge by engaging directly in Darfur. The opening for NATO engagement therefore would have to go through the African Union. NATO had made the relationship between itself and the AU dependent on an African Union request, as was repeated by the Secretary General:

If there would be a question or a request to NATO, landing on my desk as Secretary General—NATO, could you please assist us in any way?—as I have explained, no boots on the ground, but in the example I gave—that that would lead to a discussion. But I think we should not forget, and that's the important notion I was trying to bring across, that this is an African Union responsibility. But I would not, let's say, call it hypothetical, also because of the fact that the European Union is already giving some form of assistance. But on the other hand, we should not forget that NATO has the most sophisticated planning machinery in the world. But again, it is only when asked. I think we should make that distinction very clearly. And if we are going to be asked, to be quite honest, I do not know.

Between September 2004 when the Secretary General first introduced the possibility of NATO support and April 2005, there was a standstill in the mobilisation of NATO with regards to Darfur, for as long as no request arrived from the African Union. The European Union was funding almost half of the budget for the AMIS, but the African Union was reluctant to accept the offer of logistical assistance and strategic airlift laid out by NATO. The attitude of African states was again shaped by the Sudanese government’s strong opposition to the idea of Western military involvement in Darfur.

Darfur is a large region on the size of France, and the African Union’s limited capacity in terms of logistics and transport was often remarked and criticised. The Guardian wrote: «This is the African Union's first peace operation and it is struggling, partly because of the scale of the crisis, partly because of a lack of experience, but mainly because of a lack of logistical support. The

198 Ibid.
199 DE HOOX-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «Closing news conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the informal meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs», Vilnius, 21 April 2005.
200 See BELLAMY, Alex J., «Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq», Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 19, no°2, 2006, pp. 31-54.
4.2.3. Overcoming blockage

The anchoring of NATO’s role within a strict framework of African leadership was sporadically challenged already at an early stage. On 4 October 2004, the New York Times published a text written by Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian general that led the UN mission to Rwanda that was there when the genocide took place. Dallaire compared the international response with the indifference towards the genocide in Rwanda, and argued that a few hundred monitors such as pledged by the African Union were far from sufficient. Yet, a larger intervention would be impossible, he added, because African states lacked the logistical and transport support that Western states could provide. He proposed that NATO assume a bigger responsibility for handling the crisis in Darfur:

Sudan is a huge country with a harsh terrain and a population unlikely to welcome outside intervention. Still, I believe that a mixture of mobile African Union troops supported by NATO soldiers equipped with helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, night-vision devices and long-range special forces could protect Darfur's displaced people in their camps and remaining villages, and eliminate or incarcerate the Janjaweed.\(^\text{203}\)

Dellaire’s argument for a weighty role for NATO in crisis response in Darfur was based on the following reason. First of all, the international community has a responsibility to act to stop the killings occurring in Darfur. Second of all, relying on only a small contingent of military observers from the African Union does not fulfil the international community’s responsibility. Thirdly, a particular responsibility rests on those bodies possessing the capabilities needed to provide an efficient response, making NATO an obvious candidate for carrying out the responsibility to protect the population of Darfur against genocide. His proposal for NATO involvement went further than the prospect presented by de Hoop Scheffer, as Dellaire suggested including NATO soldiers in its support to the AU mission.

On 13 February 2005, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, SeNATOri Hillary Rodham Clinton advocated a direct NATO role in stopping the killing in the Darfur region of Sudan - including logistical, communication and transportation support\(^\text{204}\). At the same conference, the


same evening, Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan held a speech where he called for involvement by NATO and the EU in the resolution of the conflict in Darfur:

( .. ) even with the help so far given by the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and other donors, the African Union’s capacity to meet the requirements in the area of security is dwarfed by the size of the challenge. People are dying, every single day, while we fail to protect them. Additional measures are urgently required. Those organizations with real capacity -- and NATO as well as the European Union are well represented in this room - must give serious consideration to what, in practical terms, they can do to help end this tragedy.205

The African Union came under considerable pressure to enhance its logistical capabilities, and the formal request to NATO for logistic support finally came from the African Union on the 26 April 2005. At this date, NATO received a letter from the African Union, followed by an official visit the 17 May by the Chairman of the African Union, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré to the NATO headquarters.206 The request came in the context of an expansion in size of the AU mission. On the 9 June the same year, the decision to assist the African Union peace support operation in Darfur with the coordination of strategic airlift and staff capacity-building was announced.207 The NATO airlift began on 1 July 2005.208 Preceding the decision however, was a struggle over the compatibility of a role for NATO with the Alliance’s purpose and identity.

4.3. A role for NATO in Africa: Constructing acceptance

4.3.1. Opposition to NATO’s role: NATO as World Police

The idea of a support mission to the African Union in Darfur was not unconditionally accepted by all NATO members. France and Belgium were negative to a role for NATO in the response to the crisis in Darfur, and deemed it outside the Alliance’s functions.209 The opposition is largely expressed within a «World Policeman»-discourse, as in this statement from the French delegation to NATO:

[L]a France ne veut pas que l’Otan se transforme en une alliance mondiale, au risque de devenir "un club occidental de sécurité" qui étendrait son influence dans le monde, au détriment notamment des Nations Unies. [...] Pas question que l’Otan intervienne dans des crises hors d’Europe comme le souhaitent les Etats-Unis, l’Afghanistan étant un cas particulier aux yeux de

208 NATO, «NATO starts airlifting African Union troops to Darfur», 1 July 2005.
la France, et qu’elle étende ses missions à des opérations politico-humanitaires, comme au Darfour. At the NATO informal meeting of Foreign Ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania on 20 and 21 April 2005, before AU had introduced its request for NATO support, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged the Alliance to act quickly if such a request would come, since «we all have a responsibility to do what we can to alleviate the suffering in Darfur». At the same meeting, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Barnier, disagreed that there was a role for NATO in Darfur, since, he argued, «l’OTAN n’a pas vocation à être le gendarme du monde». He said that France preferred the EU to assist the African Union, arguing that the EU was better suited for the task. The special relationship between Africa and the former colonial powers was emphasised, and used as an argument to promote the EU, rather than NATO as the channel for Western logistical support.

The French considered that support to the African Union was not devoid of strategic interest, and saw the response to the crisis in Darfur as more than a common moral responsibility. The question of which organisation should take responsibility for logistical aid was framed as a question of European versus US influence. Le Monde declared that the «‘africanisation’ du règlement des conflits sur le continent, qui passe par un partage des tâches - l’Afrique fournissant les hommes, la communauté internationale les moyens de leur déploiement -, est le théâtre d’une lutte d’influence discrète». The idea of NATO as a supplier to the AU is represented as an American fad, being introduced in spite of European reticence.

On one occasion, the idea is also presented as running against African wishes, when Le Monde quotes a source who insinuates that the African Union solicited NATO’s help only after pressure from the US: «[C]’est une mouche américaine qui a piqué Alpha Oumar Konaré pour qu’il demande, 

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216 Ibid.
subitement, l'aide de l'OTAN. Il a subi des pressions politiques importantes pour en arriver là, sans consulter la plupart des pays membres de l'UA, qui s'y seraient opposés »

Although France did not wish for NATO to take on a mission in Darfur, it did not exclude it, and an accord between NATO’s member states could be found. However, the difference of opinion on the burden sharing between the EU and NATO led to a split between states before the decision from NATO to support AMIS’ mission could be announced. Washington wanted the airlift operation to be commanded by NATO, but France insisted on the EU taking charge. In the end, no agreement on a common chain of command could be reached, and therefore NATO and the EU would operate with separate command structures. NATO member states that were also members of the EU contributed to one or both of the organisations. France would channel its efforts solely through the EU.

France’s objection towards NATO involvement is pronounced in terms of commitment to its core mission, stressing the identity of NATO as a defensive military alliance. France does not object to Western involvement in Darfur as such, as it is in favour of the European Union’s engagement there. Correspondingly, France does not deny the existence of a responsibility for Western states to respond to grave human rights abuses, but it does not see NATO as the appropriate vehicle for such engagement.

4.3.2. Creating consensus - There is no rivalry

The rivalry portrayed in the French press was largely absent from NATO’s official accounts. The unproblematic nature of NATO’s engagement was therefore upheld by closing the dominant discourse from opposition. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer, rejected proposals that there was disagreement or rivalry between NATO and EU as to which organisation would assist the AU in Darfur. He denied that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Barnier, had taken a critical stand towards NATO involvement in Darfur:

To come back to Minister Barnier he did not say no, he did not say no [to NATO involvement]. He said over lunch, I'm not supposed to tell what individual ministers have said, but I can tell

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221 SEGELL, Glen, *loc.cit*, p. 9.
you that Minister Barnier said yes, let's find a way if that question comes we can support them be it the European Union, be it NATO\(^{222}\).

The question of rivalry between the European Union and NATO was nevertheless apparent in the repeated assurances of the «full transparency» in the coordination between the EU and NATO\(^{223}\). When questioned directly, NATO spokespeople tended to dismiss the idea of institutional rivalry, and instead stress a representation of the international support as a common project where the international community stood together, as De Hoop-Scheffer does in this extract:

I mean it would be absurd, I think, there's no other word than absurd, if you would see any form of competition between international organisations when the African Union tries to alleviate the unspeakable suffering of the people in Darfur and international organisations are going to assist them\(^{224}\).

Similarly, there was also a tendency, from the Secretary General as well as from member state ministers, to twist the question of rivalry and focus on the point of consent, which was that the African Union was in the lead of the international response. For example, the French Minister of Defence, Michèle Alliot-Marie, declared that the idea of rivalry did not present itself, and that there was an «accord total [de tous les ministres] pour dire que l'UA est chef de file» of the operation\(^{225}\). The concept of African solutions to African problems was a key to consensus. The basic feature of this principle, and the discourse built up around it, was the idea of African leadership. Applied to NATO’s policy on Darfur, it meant that the African Union was the sole responsible for the military response to the crisis, and that the rest of the international community, of which NATO was a part, would only get involved via support to the African

\(^{222}\) DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, in «Questions and answers with NATO Secretary General», Vilnius University, Lithuania, 22 April. 2005.


\(^{224}\) DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, in «Press Conference after the plenary meeting of the EAPC Security Forum», Åre, Sweden, 25 May. 2005; see also Jamie Shea’s report where he cited the Estonian ambassador’s comment that the people of Darfur do not care which institution that brings the help, in NATO, «Report by by Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division», EAPC Security Forum, Åre, Sweden, 25 may 2005.

\(^{225}\) Quoted in Le Monde, «L’Union européenne s’engage à soutenir la mission de paix au Darfour », Le Monde, 23 May 2005.

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Union. Concretely, this meant for NATO that it would only take action if asked to do so by the African Union. The support provided would also be decided upon the request of the African Union, but the predominant conception was that NATO’s role was limited to logistics and enabling tasks. NATO would not deploy ground forces in Darfur. Within these confines, the Alliance defined a proposal to the African Union that consisted of strategic airlift as well as logistical support and training.

4.3.3. The discourse on Darfur: A stable link between identity and policy

In a sense, this policy, and the African solutions to African problems-discourse as a whole, consolidates the discourses that make up the discursive field. It allows NATO to «do something», as requested by the Responsibility to protect-concept: «As you know, the situation in that region [Darfur] is appalling, and we must do all that is in our power, in coordination with other organisations, starting with the EU, to assist the African Union in its efforts». At the same time, NATO avoids assuming a costly and controversial leadership, that would be negative according to the World Policeman-idea:

Mais l’OTAN n’est pas tous azimuts. Nous n’avons ni l’ambition, ni les capacités, ni les moyens financiers, d’être les gendarmes du monde. Si les alliés considèrent que nos intérêts sont en jeu, comme c’était le cas en Afghanistan, l’OTAN peut intervenir. Si on parle de l’Afrique, par exemple du Darfour, je suis en faveur de solutions africaines pour les problèmes africains, sauf si l’Union africaine, avec les Nations unies, demande à l’OTAN d’intervenir pour apporter un soutien logistique.

The African leadership-discourse is meaningful because it is different from the World Policeman-discourse: NATO is not taking the lead to handle situations everywhere, it only responds to demands for logistical support. It is meaningful because it is different from the responsibility to protect-discourse that demands humanitarian intervention by Western states. «African solutions to African problems» is the opposition to Western solutions to African problems, which a Western-led humanitarian intervention would be. NATO’s policy was made possible because of the highly mediated security situation there, which activated a demand for international assistance to the resolution to the crisis. It was also made possible because there already was a regional organisation, the AU, taking responsibility for the military and political response. However, it was not «objective» events in themselves that decided NATO’s policy.

227 NATO, «NATO Secretary General pledges Darfur support», 26 May 2005.
NATO’s policy can be meaningfully understood as a discursive practice, where representations of events are integrated within a discourse on NATO’s role and purpose.

At the same time as discussions were ongoing, Darfur was attributed meaning in what can be seen as a discursive construction of NATO’s rationale. When the meeting in Vilnius was ongoing in April, before the formal request from the African Union had been received, NATO’s press dispatch on the meeting included discussions on Darfur in an argument that the meeting had been a step on the way to the broadening of NATO’s political agenda, and represented a reinforcement of the Alliance as a strategic forum. When the support mission to the African Union was decided upon, NATO, represented by its Secretary General, was integrating Darfur within a discourse on NATO’s new identity. In his speeches, NATO is represented as transformed, in a positive and constructive way. It is an organisation that is capable of acting globally, without trying to be the World’s Policeman, thus successfully combining traditional tasks on the one hand, and more diverse and more globalised missions on the other:

[…] we have moved away from the narrow, geographical approach to security that characterised NATO for almost five decades. We demonstrate this with our operation in Afghanistan, and with our training mission in Iraq. And we may demonstrate it again soon by offering logistic support—not troops on the ground—to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Darfur […] All these are clear demonstrations that NATO is no longer a “eurocentric” Alliance. But we are not turning into a world policeman – NATO has neither the ambition nor the capability to deal with emergencies all over the globe. However we do now all look at NATO as an instrument that we can use wherever our common security interests demand it. This is a sea change in the way we think about – and employ – the Alliance. And it offers new, unprecedented opportunities for transatlantic security cooperation well beyond this continent.

The process of attribution of meaning and normalisation of NATO’s role is the subject for the next chapter.

Summary

In this chapter the process through which NATO was mobilised as an actor in the international response to the crisis in Darfur was analysed. The mobilisation of NATO was not straightforward, and not without contestations. It was argued that the representation of the conflict in Darfur as an exceptionally grave crisis provided a backdrop for international engagement there. At the same time, NATO member states were reluctant to intervene militarily, and some member states, France and Belgium in particular, were very reluctant to see NATO enter Africa. Supporting the African Union’s peacekeeping efforts became a way to respond to demands to do

230 NATO, «Vilnius meeting broadens Alliance’s political agenda», 22 April 2005.
231 DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Reinventing NATO – Does the Alliance reflect the changing nature of Transatlantic Security?», Key note address by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the «New Defence Agenda», Conference, Brussels, 24 May 2005.
something, while confining the political and military responsibility to Africa. The discourse of African solutions to African problems, or African leadership, carried restrictions to what Western actors such as NATO could do. At the same time, these restrictions were presented as legitimate, and anchored in a representation of African pride and self-help.
5 NORMALISING NATO IN DARFUR

In the previous chapter, the process of mobilisation of NATO to contribute to the African Union’s mission in Darfur was analysed. It was argued that NATO’s policy in Darfur derived its meaning in relation to the basic discourses constituting the discursive field. In the present chapter, the period from when NATO launched its enabling mission in July 2005 until the termination of this mission in December 2007 will be analysed. It will also be looked at how the mission has been represented in NATO discourse after it was terminated. During this period, the African Union’s exclusive responsibility for handling the international response to the crisis in Darfur was criticised. In this context, NATO was challenged to increase its role, first by NGOs and activists, and then from official level in the United States. This brought some potential instability to the policy of African leadership which had obtained the consensus of NATO members and the African Union. The first part of this chapter deals with the challenges to NATO’s discourse, which called on NATO to go beyond the strict limits of African leadership. The second part treats NATO’s response to these challenges. The third and last part of the chapter argues that NATO’s policy in Darfur contributed to a transformed NATO identity.

5.1. Challenging African leadership: NATO taking command in Darfur?

5.1.1. African solutions insufficient?

The most radical demand for an increased role for NATO in Darfur came from activists mainly located in the USA. Civil society, religious communities and some NGOs constituted a powerful movement that demanded action in Darfur232. The activists’ discourse challenged the policy in which the African Union took the sole responsibility for the military response to the crisis in Darfur and argued in favour of a strengthened Western engagement in the resolution of the conflict, including military force. The US, the UN and NATO were all targeted by activists, but it will be focused on the challenge towards NATO. This challenge to NATO’s policy in Darfur can be theorised as a discursive struggle between the African solutions-discourse and the responsibility to protect-discourse.

Already while the concrete contents of NATO’s support mission to the African Union in Darfur were being discussed, Madeleine Albright along with other former foreign ministers, recommended that NATO do more. Their policy proposal was explicitly framed within a «responsibility to protect»-discourse: «the international community, consistent with the

emerging international norm of the "Responsibility to Protect," must act in this glaring case of genocide and do whatever is necessary to halt the killing and abuse of innocent civilians.\textsuperscript{233} Although the African Union was acclaimed for its efforts so far, they considered that the AU needed much more support, beyond the logistical support being prepared. Albright and her homologues’ proposal included putting a brigade-sized element of NATO troops on the ground in Darfur, under UN authorisation, while waiting for the African Union to build up sufficient force on its own. They also suggested that NATO pursue a Security Council approval for the establishment of a no-fly zone, that NATO aircrafts would enforce.\textsuperscript{234}

The international non-governmental organisation International Crisis Group (ICG) would also present a concrete proposal for an increased military role for NATO in Darfur. In July 2005 the ICG published a report entitled \textit{The AU’s mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps}. Central to the argument of an increased Western role is the representation of the African Union’s mission as inadequate. In its report, the ICG argues that the AMIS is too weak to provide sufficient protection for Darfuri civilians, and that the principle of responsibility to protect requires an increased effort by the international community. The African Union, it says, is hamstrung by its «limited capacity, insufficient resources and political constraints.»\textsuperscript{235} The ICG criticises both the continued reliance on the cooperation from the Sudanese government as a prerequisite for action, and the idea of «African solutions to African problems»:

Equally flawed is the concept that the atrocities are African-only problems that require African-only solutions. The well-documented abuses that continue to occur demand broader and more robust international efforts aimed at enhancing the AU’s ability to lead. In view of the Sudanese government's abdication of its sovereign duty and to the extent that the AU cannot adequately protect Sudan's civilians, the broader international community has a responsibility to do so.\textsuperscript{236}

It calls the «African solutions»-policy a «convenient excuse» for U.S. and European policy makers «to do no more than respond to AU requests for financial and logistical support.»\textsuperscript{237} This discourse therefore opposes the view that the international community’s responsibility to protect can be carried out through logistical support to the African Union. Because the Sudanese government has consistently failed to protect civilians in Darfur, and the AU is too weak on its own to do so, the «international community», meaning the West, has a responsibility to go in and

\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid, p.14.
The ICG deems NATO the most appropriate actor, because NATO detains a Response Force that is specialised in crisis response. The ICG recommends therefore that:

NATO should work closely with the AU to deploy its own bridging force and bring the total force up to 12,000 to 15,000 within 60 days and maintain it at that level until the AU can perform the mission entirely with its own personnel. The AU should agree that until such time, its units would come under command and control of the NATO mission. The UN Security Council should authorise the mission with a civilian protection mandate but if it does not, the AU and NATO would need to assume the responsibility and agree on an appropriate mandate. If the Sudanese government does not accept such a mission, NATO and the AU would need to prepare a much larger one to operate in a nonpermissive environment.\textsuperscript{238}

The ICG apparently bases its policy proposal on the Kosovo-precedent, where it was argued that the need to bring an end to human suffering superseded the concern for approval by the UN Security Council. However, there are some ambiguities in ICG’s proposal related to the role of the African Union. On the one hand, it is stated that the situation demands "robust international efforts aimed at enhancing the AU’s ability to lead". On the other hand, US and European policy makers are criticised for doing "no more than responding to AU requests for financial and logistical support", and it is proposed that NATO take over the command of African Union units and troops. For as long as the African Union does not demand more assistance, it is unclear how the US and European policy can organise a robust effort and at the same time conserve AU leadership.

The demands for a bigger role for NATO in the international response to the crisis in Darfur, through the deployment of troops, or by the enforcement of a no-fly zone, were not ignored by NATO. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop-Scheffer addressed these demands for a strengthened NATO role in a speech held on the 20 September 2005 at the Columbia University in New York, USA. Significantly, in this speech, an impression is given that NATO would have liked to do more, but that the "political realities" are preventing the alliance from doing so.

Some academics and journalists have called on the West to take robust action, to deploy a brigade, or to establish a no-fly zone, to end the hostilities. And I understand why. But whether we like it or not, the political realities have required a different approach. The Sudanese Government has made it clear that they will accept only African troops, not forces from the West. The UN Security Council has not approved a mandate for any kind of intervention force. And the African Union believes that there should be African solutions to African problems. With which, by the way, I fundamentally agree. With these realities in mind, NATO is taking on a different role – helping the African Union to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p. 2.
This speech, compared with the speech held three weeks later, in Egypt illustrate the versatility of the concept of African solutions to African problems.

Why are we doing this [assisting AMIS]? Because we want to help implement African solutions to African problems. I am aware that NATO’s engagement outside its traditional area of operations has raised questions here in this country and in the region. It is also to address these questions that I am visiting our partners from the Mediterranean Dialogue. Let me make two points here today. First, that NATO has no intention to be the “global policeman”. Allies have neither the desire nor the necessary capabilities to take on the job of the “gendarmes du monde” as they would say in French. Second […] NATO is taking on these complex missions by working hand in hand with the rest of the international community.

One notices that in the US, where the greatest pressure for an increased role for NATO was found, NATO’s policy in Darfur is presented as restrained by the lack of mandate from the UN and the opposition from the Sudanese government and the African Union towards Western troops. In Egypt on the other hand, one of the states that the most whole-heartedly supported the Sudanese government, it is emphasised that NATO has no intention of becoming the World’s policeman, implying that NATO is not interested in leading operations on the African continent.

When NATO’s mission was extended during the months of August and September however, it did not exceed the areas already agreed to. The extensions included airlifting civilian police in addition to the AU troops, and the starting up of capacity building training. The duration of the strategic airlift was extended, and it was also communicated that Darfur was on the agenda of NATO political meetings. Despite the discussions on Darfur, it was denied that NATO sought any active leadership role, or ground involvement in Darfur.

The ICG’s recommendations had some influence and was to be reproduced by some journalists, activists, and politicians. However, in reproducing these policy recommendations, there was often a logical gap between the demands that Western countries take over peacekeeping, but at the same time saying that the US should not provide troops.

240 DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «Speech by NATO Secretary General», at the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Egypt, October 12, 2005.
244 APPATHURAI, James, «Press conference by NATO Spokesman», at meetings of Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 8 December 2005.
245 H. Res. 723, which recommended the deployment of a NATO civilian protection force was approved by the US House of Representatives with 412 votes against 7 on 26 September 2006.
246 Nicholas Kristof, for example, repeats the demand for a NATO bridging force until the UN can take over peacekeeping in Darfur. When the UN force arrives, he says, it should not include American ground troops, because that would give credit to the argument that the US was leading an intervention in the Arab world. See KRISTOF, Nicholas, «Disposable Cameras for Disposable People», New York Times, 12 February, 2006.
5.1.2. Bush and «NATO stewardship»

The UN Secretary Kofi Annan advocated a transition of the mission in Darfur from AU to the UN, and the African Union was debating this issue early in 2006. NATO refused to discuss on a possible role for NATO if this transition would be decided on, and repeated that no such request had been received. On 13 February 2006, Kofi Annan met with George W. Bush to discuss how Western countries could contribute to a strengthened peacekeeping force in Darfur through participation in a UN force that was to take over from AMIS. Mr. Annan described the future UN force as consisting of «well-trained, well-equipped troops from Western countries», as well as troops from third world countries. The Bush administration faced pressure from important constituencies to do more in Darfur, and the United States stood out as the most outspoken advocate of more international involvement in Darfur. However, Bush denied that American ground troops would be sent to Darfur. Instead, he would argue for an enhanced role for NATO.

The most apparent breach with the official NATO line of policy came on February 17th 2006. During a non-manuscripted session, President George W. Bush said that NATO could play a key role in «the stewardship, planning, facilitating, organizing, probably double the number of peacekeepers that are there now in order to start beginning some sense of security». This could be taken to implicate that NATO would expand its role from being a limited logistical contributor to taking over the leadership of the peacekeeping mission and send NATO soldiers. This speech challenged the presentation that NATO had hitherto given of the principles for its role in Darfur. NATO, represented by its Secretary General, had stressed that NATO should not play a political role in Darfur, and that the peacekeeping mission was entirely under the leadership of the African Union. De Hoop Scheffer had even stated that «there's no way NATO is going to send soldiers into Darfur. It's the African Union, it's the Africans who


249 HEINZE, Eric A. loc.cit.


252 The same day, Senators Joe Biden and Sam Brownback introduced a Resolution, S. RES. 383, where they recommended NATO to enforce a no-fly zone and deploy bridging troops in Darfur.
take, quite rightly, the responsibility for this major problem on the African continent.\textsuperscript{253} President Bush’s mention of a NATO «stewardship» could possibly destabilise the division of roles that had constituted the fundament for agreement between the African Union and NATO, which was based very insistently on African leadership. On 27 March 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan telephoned NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to discuss continued support of NATO to the African Union, and the potential transition from the AU to a UN peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{254}

5.1.3. Constructing consensus: «Nobody is discussing NATO leadership»

Bush’s proposal did not only challenge NATO’s official policy, it also exceeded the space for political backing domestically. American officials therefore came forward to qualify and dedramatise Bush’s suggestion. They explained that while President Bush spoke of «a NATO stewardship», it meant that «NATO would command only logistical operations, not the African Union troops». A senior State Department official said that «the United States proposal continued to be "to strengthen the A.U." until United Nations forces arrive later that year». It was specified that the US would not send American soldiers to Darfur.\textsuperscript{255}

From the side of NATO, Bush’s challenge to official policy was dealt with through denial. From 20 to the 21 of March 2006, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer paid a visit to Washington, and Darfur was among the subjects discussed. In a NATO press statement, it was reported that the NATO Secretary General and the US President shared the same opinion on a possible role for NATO if the UN were to take over the responsibility for peacekeeping in Darfur:

On Darfur, the US President and the Secretary General agreed that if the African Union’s mission were to transition to a United Nation’s mission in six months time, NATO may well be asked for more support. In those circumstances, the Secretary General said he believed that NATO would look positively at such a request, not in terms of sending a NATO force as such but rather in terms of reinforcing its current enabling role in the area of planning, logistics and airlift.\textsuperscript{256}

In this statement, Bush’s proposal for an extension of NATO’s role is transformed. Bush arguably talked about strengthening NATO’s role, by taking on more tasks and responsibility. In NATO’s press statement, it is referred only to a prolongation within the present confines of an enabling role. There is no mention of NATO «stewardship». This could have meant that the US and NATO were on line in the role they wanted from the Alliance. However, a certain amount of

\textsuperscript{253} DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Questions and answers with NATO Secretary General», Vilnius University, Lithuania, 22 April 2005.
\textsuperscript{254} NATO, «Possible further NATO support for Darfur», NATO, 29 March 2006.
\textsuperscript{256} NATO, «NATO Secretary General visits the United States», NATO, 21 March 2006.
ambiguity remained at the press conference with George W. Bush and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on 21 March 2006. Bush summarised their meetings:

We also talked about Darfur and the Sudan. I'd called the Secretary General earlier this year. I talked to him about a strategy that would enable NATO to take the lead in Darfur [my italics]. However, some things have to happen prior to that happening, and the first thing is that the African Union must request from the United Nations a U.N. mission to convert the AU mission to a U.N. mission, at which point that's done, the -- NATO can move in with United States help within -- inside of NATO -- to make it clear to the Sudanese government that we're intent upon providing security for the people there [my italics], and intent upon helping work toward a lasting peace agreement. 257

Bush’s statement upholds a divergent representation of what NATO’s role can be in Darfur, by continuing to insinuate that NATO could take a leadership role. The picture of NATO «moving in», and making it «clear to the Sudanese government that we are intent of providing security for the people there» can be interpreted as a suggestion that NATO enter Darfur with ground troops in the framework of an enforcement mission.

At the weekly press briefing with NATO spokesperson James Apparthurai the day after, a journalist suggested that there was a «sense of lack of clarity» between what Bush was proposing, and what de Hoop Scheffer said that NATO agreed on, since Bush continued to mention a NATO lead, whereas de Hoop Scheffer talked about an enabling role 258. Apparthurai simply denied that there was any lack of clarity. A week later, when asked about the ambiguity of NATO’s role in a possible UN peacekeeping force, Apparthurai said:

We should be clear no one is discussing or planning or considering... I’ll repeat, no one is discussing, planning or considering a NATO force on the ground in Darfur. That is not going to be one of the options. This is simply a supporting role that the Alliance might be able to play upon request of the United Nations 259.

By denying that there was any request for a leading role for NATO in Darfur, NATO managed to uphold a representation of the enabling role as a consensual policy. A request from Kofi Annan came on the 27 March 2006 to develop possible options for continued support for the AU, as well as for a possible follow-on UN mission. It was stressed however, that «[t]hese options will not envisage any NATO force on the ground in Darfur, nor a leading role for the Alliance» 260.

257 BUSH, George W., cited in «Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and George W. Bush, President of the United States », NATO, 21 March 2006.
260 NATO, «Possible further NATO support for Darfur», 29 March 2006; see also DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Background briefing by NATO Secretary General on the upcoming ministerial meeting in Sofia», 25 April, 2006.
5.2. Normalising NATO in Africa

NATO’s initial support mission to the African Union in Darfur was extended several times, and it was declared that the Alliance was ready to continue its support when the AU mission was transferred to the UN\textsuperscript{261}. The negotiations for a mandate for a UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur were complicated and tedious as the Sudanese government opposed a transition from AU to UN responsibility. Finally, as a compromise, a hybrid AU-UN force, the UNAMID, would inherit AU’s mission in Darfur. NATO’s support was not extended to the hybrid force, and therefore terminated at the date of transition, the 31 December 2007. However, the cooperation between the AU and NATO was not over. Instead, NATO’s support mission to AMIS in Darfur initialised a NATO’s capacity-building support role to the AU.

The experience in Darfur provided a formula that was copied when NATO authorised a support mission to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia, AMISOM. NATO’s role there, which was agreed upon in June 2007, consisted of organising strategic airlift upon request from the AU. The continuity between the Darfur and Somalia missions was explicitly mentioned in NATO’s press dispatch, which stated that «[t]he assistance will be similar in to the airlift NATO provided to the AU for expanding its peacekeeping mission in Darfur»\textsuperscript{262}. The principles that were developed with regards to the mission in Darfur are reproduced, and presented as a standard code:

All NATO support to the African Union is based on the principle of African ownership with all assistance provided being request-driven. In implementing its support, NATO seeks to have a minimum footprint and coordinate closely with other international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with bilateral partners to ensure maximum complementarity and effectiveness\textsuperscript{263}.

Interestingly, with regards to its support mission to the African Union in Somalia, NATO does not mobilise an idea of a humanitarian imperative, or a responsibility to protect. The role of NATO in supporting logistically the African Union in its peacekeeping tasks therefore appears to have acquired a legitimacy in itself. Also, NATO supports a study which will be undertaken on the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF)\textsuperscript{264}, following the same logic of strengthening the African Union’s ability to deal with crises on its own continent. Several visits and exchanges between NATO and the AU have taken place, and a will to expand cooperation

\textsuperscript{261} NATO, «Final communiqué», Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session, Brussels, 8 June 2006, art. 8.
\textsuperscript{262} NATO, «NATO agrees to support AU Somalia mission», 15 June 2007; see also NATO, «Assisting the African Union in Somalia», no date, (accessed 1 August 2010).
\textsuperscript{263} NATO, «NATO supporting AU mission», 1 February 2008.
\textsuperscript{264} NATO, «Contributing to the establishment of an African stabilization force», no date (accessed 1 August, 2010).
and install a long-term relationship between the two organisations has been expressed\textsuperscript{265}. Darfur therefore set precedence and opened up a new policy space for NATO. It made thinkable, and therefore doable, what had previously been a non-issue:

Interest in NATO’s training capacities is not confined to the Middle East. We also get requests from Africa. A few years ago, it was almost unthinkable to put the words «NATO» and «Africa» in the same sentence. Today, NATO is supporting the African Union in addressing the Darfur crisis – at the request of the AU. And we are thinking about other ways in which we can support the evolution of the African Union into a stronger and more effective regional peacekeeper\textsuperscript{266}.

5.3. Darfur and the transformed NATO

Darfur was anchored within a particular representation of NATO’s identity, in a discourse that obtained a dominant status in debates on NATO’s role with regards to Darfur. NATO’s policy on Darfur took in elements of competing discourses, making it a discourse of compromise between «values» and «hard interests», between a global- and a regional focus, between tradition and change. With Darfur becoming a part of NATO’s representation of its identity, NATO’s identity has undergone changes, in that new purposes and functions are stressed.

When it comes to ethical identity, De Hoop-Scheffer initially distinguished between out-of-area engagements where NATO’s interests are directly at stake, such as in Afghanistan, and out-of-area engagements where NATO’s interests and security are not threatened, such as Darfur\textsuperscript{267}. Later on, he used an extended definition of security to present humanitarianism as a continuation of NATO’s security role. Missions like the one towards Darfur represent adaption and change, but not a breach with the Alliance’s focus on security. «Values» are represented as an integral part of NATO’s security policy, bringing in a dimension beyond interests in its strictest sense.

Yet even if we all agree that NATO is not a humanitarian relief agency: if we can help, as in the case of the earthquake in Pakistan, should we say “no”? And if the African Union asks us for help – not for boots on the ground, to be sure, but for logistical support – can we tell them that we are too busy elsewhere? In my view, this would have been the wrong answer. Our security policy is based on interests and on values. And this means that we need to help when we can,

\textsuperscript{265} NATO, «African Union looks to long-term cooperation with NATO», 2 March 2007; NATO, «Bucharest Summit Declaration», Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Bucharest, 3 April 2008; NATO, «African Union discusses practical cooperation with NATO», 19 February 2010; DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «Keeping NATO relevant: A shareholders report», Speech by Secretary General at NATO Parliamentary Assembly annual session, Copenhagen, 15 November 2005; There was establishment of liason between NATO and the African Union, see APPATHURAI, James, «Press briefiing by the NATO’s Spokesman», NATO, 17 May 2006.

\textsuperscript{266} DE HOOP-SCHIEFFER, Jaap, «Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Grandes conférences catholiques», Brussels, March 1, 2007.

where we can. Helping the people of Afghanistan to shed the Taliban’s yoke, or helping the African Union to be more effective in looking after its own continent – both are investments in a more stable and just global order. And that means they both are investments in our own long-term security.”

With regards to spatial identity, NATO’s support mission to the African Union has been part of a development that has given NATO the possibility to take on more global tasks, without being seen so aspire global leadership and a «World Policeman»-role. NATO is represented as a member of the international community, working together with other organisations to bring about a safer world: «NATO is increasingly an organisation which is able to bring together the international community in the broadest sense to defend common values and common security interests». The logic that is gaining hold is that «the Alliance should not be a global Alliance, but should have global partners». The keyword seems to be partnerships, with NATO playing an enabling role, rather than a leadership role. Darfur is hailed as an important turning point in NATO’s relations with the UN, and used to argue for the importance of a close relationship between NATO and the UN. The demand for NATO support is used as an example of NATO’s sustained relevance. The fact that NATO is discussing security problems outside the Euro-Atlantic as it did with Darfur, is used to support an argument of the Alliance’s important role as a forum for political dialogue.

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268 DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Grandes conférences catholiques», Brussels, 1 March 2007; Same argument in DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «NATO: Defending Values and Security», Speech by NATO Secretary General, National School of Public Administration, Warsaw, 16 February 2006; and RIZZO, Alessandro Minuto, «Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General», Law Faculty of the University of Zagreb, 23 February 2006.

269 See e.g. DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Grandes conférences catholiques», Brussels, 1 March 2007.


272 NATO, »Joint point de presse with NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon«, Brussels, 24 January, 2007.


274 This is significant, as the relationship between NATO and the UN was dense when NATO decided to go outside the UN Security Council when launching an operation in Kosovo in 1999.


276 DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «Opening statement by NATO Secretary General», at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 8 December 2005.
Concerning temporal identity, Darfur represents an increased diversity of NATO activities, and is integrated in a representation of NATO’s capability to adapt to changing circumstances\textsuperscript{277}. It is interesting that NATO’s policy in Darfur is indeed represented as a response dictated by events. On several occasions, it appears to be said that NATO is not orchestrating a humanitarian intervention in Darfur because of political constraints, such as the lack of demand by the African Union and the UN for such engagement. This is significant because it appears that NATO does not exclude the principle for it to undertake humanitarian intervention in Africa, given that the «political realities» allow it\textsuperscript{278}.

Looking ahead, the pressure on NATO to take on even more operations is likely to increase. Indeed, the Alliance is in many ways a victim of its own success. There are, however, limits to what NATO can do and a danger that the Alliance may undermine its own standing by taking on more than it can successfully accomplish. NATO is neither a global policeman nor a global humanitarian relief organisation and is certainly not an alternative to the United Nations. It does, nevertheless, have the ability to convert what is usually limited political will and almost invariably scarce resources into effective international action in those situations where the 26 Allies agree on the need to intervene\textsuperscript{279}.

Even if NATO’s policy at all stages was constituted as a sensible compromise, the policy emerging within the discursive constructions represented a quite extraordinary development. NATO opened up a new field of policy with the support to the African Union. Darfur was mentioned along with NATO’s other missions, like it was a normal and self-evident task for NATO to undertake. In normalising a new role, Darfur contributed to development and small alterations of NATO’s identity. Darfur is referred to in speeches held by the Secretary General of NATO and his Deputy to illustrate what is portrayed as positive change\textsuperscript{280}. The more proactive role taken by the Alliance is celebrated: «For an Alliance which never fired a shot in the Cold War and was essentially waiting to be attacked, it never ceases to impress me that today NATO’s Allies and many Partner countries are deployed on operations and missions on three continents [:Europe, Asia and Africa]»\textsuperscript{281}.

Summary

This chapter dealt with the period from when NATO started its support mission to the African

\textsuperscript{277} RICE, Condoleezza, «Press availability with Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State», following meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December 2005.


\textsuperscript{279} PARDEW, James and Christopher BENNETT, «NATO’s evolving operations», NATO, 1 January 2006.

\textsuperscript{280} E.g. DE HOOP-SCHEFFER, Jaap, «NATO’s role in Gulf Security», Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Rand conference, Doha, 1 December 2005.

Union in Darfur. Focus was on the process of normalisation of NATO’s role. It was shown that the limits to NATO’s role - which had been defined under the headline of African leadership - continued to be challenged. There was pressure from journalists, academics, press groups and politicians on NATO to assume a bigger role in the halting of the conflict. The most significant challenge to NATO’s representation of its policy as dictated by the situation came when US President Bush announced an ambition of NATO «stewardship» in crisis resolution in Darfur. These demands were countered by referring to the restraints imposed by the concept of African leadership. The concept of African leadership was normalised to an extent where it could be reproduced without much justification.
CONCLUSION

This thesis asked the question of how NATO’s support mission to the African Union in Darfur was made possible, on the one hand, and how this role for NATO was normalised, on the other. These questions arose from a discourse theoretical approach, which entails a focus on the discursive preconditions for actions. The assumption guiding the analysis was that NATO’s policy on Darfur could be seen as a discursive practice. Accordingly, this policy was made possible and normalised within a discourse that was successfully established as dominant, through the exclusion of alternative discourses. The analysis therefore consisted of exploring how this discursive struggle unfolded.

The method of discourse analysis is the study of texts. The research questions incited a focus on NATO’s official discourse, where policy is articulated and legitimised. My empirical data consisted of official texts along with articles from three newspapers from three different NATO member states. The reading of these texts, along with background material, allowed for an identification of concepts that were central to the construction and demarcation of NATO’s policy. These concepts were analytically integrated within three different basic discourses that articulated different representations of NATO’s role and identity. These basic discourses were used as lenses through which the process of NATO’s policy formation was viewed.

NATO’s policy in Darfur consisted of providing logistical support to the African Union’s mission there. The meaning of this policy arises in opposition to the alternatives. NATO having a policy on Darfur, was the opposite of NATO not having any policy on Darfur. NATO’s policy in Darfur was submitted to AU leadership and initiative, as opposed to NATO leadership and initiative. It was confined to logistic support, as opposed to operative military support. All these alternatives were voiced. French and Belgians contested the idea that NATO take on a mission in Africa at all. US President Bush pushed for NATO «stewardship» in Darfur. Activists, journalists and some politicians argued that NATO forces should be a key element in a military, humanitarian intervention in Darfur. All these alternatives potentially challenged the stability and legitimacy of NATO’s discourse and policy.

However, NATO successfully marginalised these alternative representations and the discourses they are a part of. It did so by anchoring its policy within a discourse centred in the concept of African leadership. By articulating its policy within this discourse, NATO managed to counter critique both from those who felt NATO did too much (NATO as World Police), and those who felt it did too little (NATO as responsible to protect). In articulating its policy within this
discourse, NATO reproduced a particular understanding of the principle of African leadership, and it strengthened a particular understanding of NATO’s role and identity. Darfur was integrated within a representation of NATO’s identity as a relevant organisation, capable of adapting to global challenges without aspiring global leadership.

This thesis has not aimed at theory testing. Rather, the objective was to understand one case - NATO’s policy towards Darfur - through the use of discourse analysis. Still, the insights gained from this thesis have implications beyond this specific case. It has been demonstrated that a discourse analytic framework can be applied to generate findings that other approaches were unable to provide. Discourse analysis may therefore be a fruitful approach to the study of NATO’s role and policies. The limited scope of this thesis meant that many subjects were left unexplored. Further research could include more cases, to investigate discursive processes in NATO from a comparative perspective. With the increasing globalisation of NATO’s operations, more attention should be devoted to discourses on NATO outside NATO member states. In order to throw light on other aspects of NATO’s policy development, future research could use interview material and observation to understand practices, such as the actions of individual decision makers within a bureaucratic environment.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EU European Union
ICG International Crisis Group
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO/NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU Organisation of African Unity
R2P Responsibility to Protect
UN United Nations
UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics