The 'war on drugs' in Latin America
– A new perpetuum motion? –

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Lukas Hähnel
Silent enim leges inter arma …?

In times of war, the law falls silent …?

- Cicero: 52 b.c. -
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- CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
- D – Democrat
- DTO – Drug Trafficking Organization
- FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
- GOM – Government of Mexico
- GOP – The Republican Party
- PGR – Office of the Mexican Attorney General
- R - Republican
- USG – United States Government
- WOLA – Washington Office on Latin America
Abstract

Questioning the 'paradigmatic change' in the war on drugs proclaimed by the Obama administration, this case study analyzes U.S. policy toward Mexico.

To this end, the Bush and the Obama administration's construction of the issue is analyzed through Ole Waever's concept of (de)securitization and the respective speech act in the first part of the analysis. Presuming that the Obama administration executed a clear change in policy toward Mexico, the study demonstrates the difference of the discourse both administration use and how this is reflected in respective strategies. While the Obama presidency did reframe the issue of drug-related violence in Mexico and 'demilitarized' its discourse as well as its strategy, the analysis reveals that the change in discourse is not matched by a clear and corresponding difference in the instruments attributed; the announced paradigmatic change was not executed.

The second part of the analysis critically examines how this result can be explained: Hypothesizing that the exchange of decision-makers and their respective cognitive background accounts for changes and consistencies from the former to the current administration, the case study adopts a cognitive approach to decision-making processes in international relations. The analysis examines the professional and educational background as well as core belief-systems of the key decision-makers involved in drafting the respective strategies. The study identifies a number of ideational and cognitive factors that explain the changes introduced by the Obama administration. At the same time, the analysis reveals several cognitive consistencies between the two administrations that account for unchanged policies, proving clear correlations between core belief-systems of decision-makers and strategies adopted.

The case study concludes that the partial change in strategy toward Mexico from the Bush to the Obama administration reflects the ideational and cognitive background of the key personnel involved. These cognitive factors being critical, the U.S. drug strategy in Latin America can be changed only if the perception of the issue itself is changed.
I. Introduction

Forty years ago, President Nixon and the United States went to war;\(^1\) not against an ordinary enemy, but against a product, and everyone involved with it, from producers to consumers: the ‘war on drugs’ was declared. Since then, the United States have fought a two-front war. On the home front, an interdiction policy targeted mainly consumers, while the U.S. sought to use military as well as police instruments abroad to disrupt supply chains and prevent drugs from crossing their border. The ‘war on drugs’ has been fought by both Democratic and Republican administrations since the Nixon administration. The main foreign policy initiative to this end was the so-called ‘Plan Colombia’, a program for military equipment, training and aid to the Colombian government initiated by the Clinton administration. The most recent U.S. foreign policy project against drug trafficking in Latin America is the so-called ‘Merida Initiative’, founded during the second term of George W. Bush. This assistance program is the U.S. response to a changing topography in drug trafficking routes, cartel power structures in Latin America and the dramatic drug-related violence in Mexico. In 2009, Barack Obama announced ‘The Merida Initiative and Beyond’ (Merida and Beyond), a follow-up to the previous initiative. This analysis will determine whether the war on drugs has, in fact, become a perpetuum motion in U.S. – Latin American relations, by examining whether the Obama administration continues the policies conducted by previous presidencies. In order to do so, I will conduct a case study on the strategies against transnational drug-trafficking in Mexico of the current and the previous U.S. administration. The case study focuses on the following questions: First, to what extent was there a change in the Merida Initiative from the Bush to the Obama administration? My first hypothesis is that there has been a clear change in policy. To test this presumption, I will examine how both strategies have been elaborated and contrast the outcomes of this process. In the second part of the analysis, I will investigate the question why the presumed change in policy happened. My second hypothesis is that a distinct strategy was formulated due to the exchange of key decision-makers and their respective cognitive backgrounds.

With the crack down on the influential Medellin and Cali cartels in the late eighties and early nineties, the center of gravity in international drug trade within the Western Hemisphere changed.\(^2\) Colombia remained the main producer but U.S. efforts against drug trafficking changed trafficking routes and cartels within the region. The importance of Mexico as a transit and later also as a producing country grew rapidly, with Mexico becoming the main corridor through which cartels


funnel drugs into the U.S.: About 90% of all the cocaine consumed in the United States transits Mexico. In 2007 the Bush presidency announced together with Mexico a cooperation plan to help the Mexican government (GOM) deal with the shocking violence in connection with drug trafficking organizations (DTO). Violence in Mexico has escalated since 2006. A new database released by the Mexican administration of President Calderón offers insight into the dimension this violence has taken. In the period from December 2006 until the end of 2010, 34,612 casualties were counted. As a start for the violence in Mexico, analysts identify a series of high-level arrests in 2001 that changed the balance of power among Mexican cartels. The struggle intensified when the Gulf Cartel managed to hire a number of former elite soldiers from the Mexican army in early 2002. The group, the so-called 'Zetas', had been especially trained to fight DTO by the U.S. government (USG) before deserting the Special Forces. With commando-type operations and targeted assassinations of rival cartel members, the Gulf Cartel was able to strengthen its influence. Los Zetas brought a new dimension of violence to the conflict: they use modern and advanced weapons and are extremely violent. In 2005-2006 their existence prompted other cartels to create similar troops such as Los Negros or Los Pelones. Fueled by drug revenue, these armed groups are equipped with sophisticated weaponry, from assault to heavy arms. The groups not only fight each other, but launch significant attacks on local law enforcement: “The Negros are believed to be responsible for the recent rise in attacks against police officers in Nuevo Laredo, in an attempt to wrestle control over the local police from the Zetas.”

With an extremely high toll of violence and a significant corruption rate, “drug traffickers have become the law of the land in many Mexican cities because of their ability to corrupt and threaten public officials.” Analysts classified Mexico as a country without rule of law. In 2005, at least 1,573 killings were reported in connection with DTO, reaching an unprecedented level of violence. In response, the Mexican government arrested over 79,000 people on drug trafficking-related charges between 2000 and 2006. These arrests were composed of 78,831 low level arrests.

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3 Johnson, David T.: Guns, Drugs and Violence - The Merida Initiative and the Challenge in Mexico. Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Foreign Affairs Committee as Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Washington, DC, 18.3.2009.
7 Congressional Research Service: Mexico’s Drug Cartels. op. cit., p. 8.
8 Freeman, Laurie: State of Siege. op. cit., p.1
9 Ibidem.
and 15 cartel leaders, 74 lieutenants, 53 financial officers, and 428 hitmen (sicarios). Nonetheless, corruption, intimidation and affiliation between cartels and law enforcement were especially widespread during that time.

In the light of the increasing violence, Presidential candidate at the time, Felipe Calderón, made the internal security situation in Mexico his main priority in his electoral campaign. Having won the election, the president-elect traveled to Washington DC seeking U.S. assistance. Since then, Calderón himself felt impelled to state that cartel violence threatens the Mexican state. Taking on the widespread corruption, President Calderón initiated a security sector reform and deployed the military to regain control while aiming for high-level arrests. These arrests have lead to an escalation of violence since 2006: between December 2006, when Calderón came into power, and the end of 2010, 34,612 people were killed, 15,273 in 2010 alone, making it the bloodiest year of the ongoing conflict. Recently, Ciudad Juarez has made international headlines, being labeled the most dangerous city in the world; the border city has a higher death rate than Kabul or Baghdad. Public displays of violence, shootouts in plain daylight, kidnappings, executions and assaults on residents, journalists and civil servants have become normality. Parts of Mexico are no longer ruled by law, but by violence and corruption; Mexico is no longer exercising sovereignty over parts of its territory and can no longer guarantee security for its citizens. Calderon’s request for help in Washington and the unstable situation at the border have prompted the U.S. to intensify their efforts in combating DTO. Together with the Calderon administration, the Bush presidency

![Figure 1: Caricature of the drug-related violence in Mexico. Danziger: 2009.](image)

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elaborated the Merida Initiative to counter the escalating violence and fight drug cartels.

The situation in Mexico has been treated extensively by the press since the escalation of the violence. Besides the media coverage, academia has treated the subject mostly in think tanks, institutes and policy papers. There are a number of research centers that already focused on Mexico in general before the issue made it to the top of the intergovernmental agenda and that now draw special attention to the situation:

The Wilson Center, for example, has a Mexico institute that devotes its work to five policy fields: Security Cooperation, Economic Integration, Migration and Migrants, Border Issues, and Energy and Natural Resources. Within their Security Cooperation portal the institute publishes articles, policy papers, analyses, reports and books. The Wilson Center adopts a broad approach to the subject and analyzes the bilateral cooperation as well as domestic reform projects in Mexico, human rights questions, U.S. firearms trafficking and many other aspects in addition to classic security issues. Thus, the Wilson Center treats the issue from a comprehensive perspective, trying to link academia to public officials and aiming at providing non-partisan research. As a joint publication, the Wilson Center recently published a book on U.S. efforts in the 'war on drugs' in Mexico: Shared Responsibility – U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime. The title of the book reflects the aforementioned comprehensive approach and focuses on U.S. domestic and foreign policy strategies as well as the Mexican strategy.

Other think tanks that focus on U.S.-Mexican security cooperation include the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), an advocacy think tank promoting human rights, democracy and social justice for the Americas. WOLA has three programs that touch U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, namely Mexico, drug policy and regional security policy. The think tank produces mainly policy papers, reports and analyses focusing on human rights and promoting citizen security, not only in Mexico, but in Latin America as a whole. Subsequently, WOLA's research has a clear agenda and, thus, a distinct approach that aims at promoting this agenda. This does not limit the quality of the research, on which Congress frequently relies in testimonies, but has to be taken into account when analyzing it.

A third important research institute is the Brookings Institute, a policy-oriented think tank with a wide range of different research centers, including a foreign policy program and a Latin American Initiative with a focus on Mexico. Similarly to the other Institutes, Brookings provides analyses,

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19 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), see: http://www.wola.org/.
20 Brookings Institute, see: http://www.brookings.edu/.
reports and commentaries. The Institute focuses on the U.S.-policy side, conducts mainly state-centered research on the topic and provides research on current events in Mexico.

Besides these private institutions, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)21 of the U.S. legislature periodically publishes reports and fact sheets on Mexico and its bilateral relations with the United States. Other official reports include those of the Government Accountability Office (GAO)22 or USAID23. Yet, these reports are mainly descriptive in-depth research, identifying past or potential future policy issues for Congress.

All these institutes have a focus on U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in general and the 'war on drugs' in particular. Their focus on Mexico has changed from an economy and immigration-centered approach to including the U.S.-Mexican cooperation with regard to drug-trafficking and security issues. Yet, these studies mainly analyze structural problems, causes and the strategies themselves.24 A reference point for analyses and a critique often addressed is the resemblance of the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia.25 It shows the continuance in U.S. foreign policy to combat illegal drug trafficking in Colombia and other countries and thereof derives 'lessons learned' to advocate specific policy changes and proposals for decision-makers. But these studies focus on the developments on the ground and on the outcome of the political processes in both countries but not on how this outcome came about. This is the void this study will fill. This case study will focus on the potential and much proclaimed change from the Bush administration that Obama advertised in his electoral campaign. This is the starting point for the analysis: In his campaign Obama announced “to fundamentally change the status quo in Washington.”26 This campaign theme nurtured high expectations for the new president to alter U.S. policies, not only on the domestic but on the international level. With regard to the 'war on drugs', this change was adopted and affirmed by Obama's 'drug czar': "We should stop using the metaphor about the war on drugs" because “People look at it as a war on them, and frankly we're not at war with the people of this country.”27

21 Congressional Research Service, see: http://opencrs.com/.
While the construction of the 'war on drugs' in general has been analyzed before\textsuperscript{28} and current research focuses on the analysis of the actual policies and their implication, this study will question whether and why the advertised change happened. To do so, this analysis will conduct a case study of U.S.-policy toward Mexico, from the Bush to the Obama administration. In contrast to other analyses, I will take a constructivist approach and use Waever's concept of securitization in order to analyze how the Bush and the Obama administrations elaborated the issue. The construction of the issue will be contrasted against the actual strategy of respective administration to answer the question whether or not there has been a clear change in policy or if the Obama administration continues the 'war on drugs' in Mexico. This will constitute the first part of this study and be the basis upon which I will build the second part of the analysis. This will examine how the findings of part one can be explained and thus fill the void in current research to answer the following question: Why has this (non)change occurred? To clarify the question I will analyze norms and identities on three levels: First, I will succinctly identify general norms in U.S.-Latin American relations, to then, on a second level, concisely analyze differing norms and identities between the Republican and the Democratic Party with regard to foreign policy. The third and main level of analysis will focus on the principle decision-makers involved in drafting the Merida Initiative and the follow-up strategy \textit{Merida and Beyond}. Adopting this cognitive approach, I will focus on personal backgrounds, core belief-systems and simplified images on the individual level of decision-makers. In order to draw a comprehensive picture of the cognition of decision-makers, the analysis has to be threefold: First and second, the analysis of the collective conscience in terms of national norms and party identity constitutes the general cognitive background, while the third level allows to focus on individual cognitive peculiarities. The choice to focus on the cognitive background of decision-makers derives from the hypothesis that the exchange of key personnel accounts for major changes made by the Obama administration. Yet, since the party and the national level are part of the cognitive background of these decision-makers, it is necessary to include these levels into a comprehensive study.

In order to pursue this analysis, the case study will be structured as follows: I will first lay out my theoretical and conceptual avenues. Positioning myself within the constructivist approach, I will then comment on the way I will use Waever's concept of securitization in the first part of the analysis. Subsequently, I will touch the basics of cognitive research to introduce the different concepts used in the second part of the analysis. Thus, this chapter will show how I will approach

each question, define the main concepts involved and lay out a method for each of the two analyses. The second chapter will be devoted to answer the first question: Has there been a change in policy toward Mexico between the Bush and the Obama administration? Presuming that there has been a clear change in strategy in the 'war on drugs' in Mexico from one presidency to the other, I will use Waever's concept of securitization to analyze the speech act and the way, and each administration constructed the issue. In a second step, these findings will be contrasted against the actual policies of both the Merida Initiative and Merida and Beyond. The third and final step of this part will contrast these policies to identify diverging and continuing factors between the two initiatives and to ultimately conclude whether or not there has been a change. While the second chapter focused on the 'how' of the strategy, the third section will examine the 'why': Presuming that the exchange of key personnel with their distinct cognitive background accounts for the (non)changes made, there will be three levels of analysis: First, foreign policy norms on the national level of the United States will be examined. Second, party identities of the Republican and the Democratic Party will be analyzed. And third, key decision-makers will be identified to, then, analyze their personal background, core belief-systems and simplified images against which they make decisions and draft strategies. This will constitute a comprehensive analysis of the cognitive background of the key decision-makers involved and allow to identify factors that account for changes or continuances in the policies of the two administrations. The last part of this study will conclude the findings of both analysis and determine whether my hypotheses have been verified or falsified. Furthermore, I will classify these results in the academic context and open possible new avenues for further research.

II. Theory and Concepts

This study will analyze how the issues of drug trafficking, drug violence and the encompassing situation in Mexico were addressed by the Bush and the Obama administration in the United States. The foreign policy instruments used are closely linked to the perception and problematization of the issue itself. In a first part, the elaboration of the Merida Initiative of both administrations will be studied: The central questions will be how the issue was problematized and addressed, and what the differences from one administration to the other were. In a second part, the question 'why' is central: Why was the problem treated from a certain angle and why was the political outcome as it is? Looking at the questions 'how' and 'why' from a more theoretical level, this study will look at the construction of the drug issue in Mexico as a security question to the United States. The focus on
the elaboration of the question centers around the presumption that the issue was not simply 'there' and had not to be inevitably addressed the way it has been. This study asks how the issue of drugs in Mexico became a U.S. security concern, implying that state concerns and interests are not given. Presuming that these interests change over time and by focusing on the way they came about, I subscribe to a constructivist perspective to analyze how and why transnational drug trafficking (was) 'turned into' a matter of national security.

A) Constructivism

Constructivism is a critical approach to international relations. While there is no consensual agreement whether constructivism does or does not constitute a distinct theory in international relations, it does challenge the classical realist view that a nation's interests in the international system are given and materialistic. For this study it is important to understand how the constructivist approach conceptualizes actions such as policies (in this case the Merida Initiative) and the way they come about. The approach itself is founded in critical sociology of knowledge which questions realities and puts the term 'knowledge' into perspective by arguing that societies are socially constructed. Within the international relations theory the approach analyzes how identities are constructed and how they influence interest and, ultimately, decisions.

Alexander Wendt, the most recognized scholar of the constructivist approach, argues that fundamental structures of international politics, as such a system, are socially constructed. These structures are the environment of actors, or agents, and their choices. They consist of a set of rules and institutions that the agents agree upon. Not only is this structure the environment for agents, as such, it also contributes to shaping the identities, thus interests of the agents, ultimately having an impact on their actions. Since the structure has been socially constructed by and through the agent, it reflects the consensual norms and rules of agents. Hence, agent and structure are interdependent and constitute each other mutually. Being socially constructed through a set of shared ideas, the structure can be material as well as immaterial. These ideas ultimately form norms, rules and institutions. Social change within the system comes about through a change in ideas which have a direct impact on the structure. Identity plays a crucial role in this: The structure determines how actors perceive themselves and each other. In an intersubjective process of interaction between

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agents, they construct identities. This shapes expectations toward identities, resulting in constraints and limits for different roles. Agents filling out these roles are bound to certain identities, attributed to these roles by the structure. These identities shape the agent’s choices and possibilities by excluding certain choices while pressing the agent toward others. The role of the agents within the system is also constructed: Roles of agents, as well as the system, depend on a set of shared ideas. These ideas are constructed and expressed through knowledge and discourse. But where are these ideas coming from? The background against which agents operate and through which the structure has been constructed is made up by a collective conscience and norms. These norms can be defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors”. The collective conscience is a “set of shared ideas and beliefs that informed the thinking and behavior of members of a given society.” These shared ideas and norms are embodied in the identity of the agents and of the members that constitute the society. The collective conscience and the norms are critical in the analysis because they determine how agents conceive each other and how they attribute tasks, roles and power within the system. This in turn forms the structure in which agents operate. The collective conscience is expressed through social facts such as language, practice of social conduct, institutions, adherence to norms or distribution of power. This complex construct in which the agent finds himself, determines the perception, the choice and ultimately the action of the agent.

Identifying these social facts as crucial in forming the structure, influencing and defining the role of the agent, they permit a deeper look at how decisions were made and why. Therefore, the first question within this study will be how the agent constructs the question of the drug-related problem; through which social acts is this construction manifest: How is it framed by speech acts, to what norms do the agents refer and how is the distribution of power and instruments within their policy? The second part will analyze why the issue was problematized that way and how the norms setting the background to policy decisions came about. Hence, I will focus on the norms, identities and ideas that determine the agent and influence the agent’s choice of action.

B) Securitization and Desecuritization

The sociology of knowledge emphasizes the defining importance of intersubjective interpretation of an issue.\(^{36}\) With regard to threats and security, one can state that “nothing is a risk in itself; there is no objective risk. But, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger.”\(^{37}\) To analyze how the drug issue in Mexico was constructed as a threat by the U.S.-government, I will refer to Waever's concept of securitization and desecuritization as the instrument of analysis.

The traditional, realist approach to determine what security is, relies on the premise that security is a reality which exists in itself. The second premise is that the more security there is, the better. That is to say that security in itself is thought to be good, while in opposition to that, insecurity is conceived as bad and to be avoided.\(^{38}\) Security in the classic approach always refers to defense and state-related issues which evoke the need for the state to address a threat.\(^{39}\) Waever's approach is language-based: He argues that in addressing issues through a security-related vocabulary, the actor and the audience relate to certain mechanisms and tools to solve the problem. Hence, the elaboration of an issue in certain terms presumes a special set of choices ex ante. In his concept, Waever tries to elaborate a different approach to security than how it was treated and studied before. He distances himself from the traditional assumption that security is a reality prior and independent from language. Acknowledging that the state plays a central role in security matters, the concept still revolves around issues of defense and sovereignty of the state. His second assumption is that by addressing an issue through the vocabulary of security, and by identifying it as a security issue, the image of threat defense is evoked allowing the state to assume the central role in addressing this issue.\(^{40}\)

Securitization is originally a concept of the banking insurance sector and was applied to international relations.\(^{41}\) Situating himself outside of the debate on security definition that has embarked since the 1980's, Waever proposes a unique and different approach to the subject. He distances himself from Galtung's holistic approach of individual security which challenges the before existing narrow and state-centric concept. By pointing out that “neither individual security

\(^{36}\) For the benchmark that introduced the term 'social construction' into social sciences, see: Berger, Peter and Luckmann, Thomas: Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. op. cit.
\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 46f.
nor international security exist”, he subscribes to the view that issues, norms and structure are constructed. As a norm, security is a shared set of values and “similarly social in the sense of being constituted intersubjectively in a specific field”. Security is defined and formed through a set of practice and an ongoing debate. This debate shapes issues as security matters through language, through discourse. This is the essential difference to the holistic approach of individual security: while the aforementioned approach enlarges and thereby challenges the previously dominant concept of state-centered security, Waever's concept does not seek to define what qualifies as a security matter, but rather how it is qualified as such.

In contrast to the approach of individual security, Waever still sees the state and hence national security at the center of security analysis. The survival and the sovereignty of the state rest at the core of security questions. Linking this classic concept to the identity of the state, Waever argues that war tests the sovereignty and hence the core identity of the state. The important step in the conceptual reasoning of Waever is the following: He suggests that the act of a war and the linkage to identity and state survival, transported through language, can also be metaphorically used and therefore extended to other issues, not classified as security issues in classical terms. Huysmans emphasizes that security is therefore political in nature; security does not mean something but it does something. This is to say that an issue is being transformed into a matter of security by elaborating the issue in a vocabulary of war.

Furthermore, by transforming this issue into a matter of security, the logic of war applies to the issue, framing means and solution in that manner. “By uttering 'security', a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it”. Waever argues that security in itself does not exist as a concept. By applying a security-related language to a subject, the issue is constructed as security. He therefore qualifies security itself as a 'Speech Act': “In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act”. It is not what but how security is. The speech act is the focal point to find out how security is being attributed to a subject and how this frames the discourse as well as the possible solutions to the issue. The act of labeling a problem as a security issue is called securitization: By moving an issue out of the discourse of security, by detaching it from state sovereignty and war-linked vocabulary, a subject can be desecuritized. Thus, issues can be pushed or lowered on the political scale.

42 Waever, Ole, op. cit., p. 48.
43 Ibid., p. 51.
45 Waever, Ole, op. cit., p. 55.
46 Ibidem.
Securitizing an issue allows the use of certain tools but also brings about constraints. The perceived importance attributed to the subject is raised, and failure to solve the issue would be seen as a fundamental malfunction of the state or its elites. Thus, securitization is not necessarily desirable but, while opening up new instruments, prevents the use of others, makes the threat existential and raises the stakes for decision-makers. Securitizing can mobilize last resources but also contribute to the escalation of a situation. On the other hand, desecuritizing an issue might exclude the mobilization of all possible means, but it also frames the subject as not endangering the core identity of the state, leaving more margin to negotiate and solve the issue politically by ordinary means. In this context, Waever identifies the processes of securitization and desecuritization as raising or lowering the threshold to mobilize different types of instruments.\(^{47}\) So, security is an instrument in itself, securitization the process and the tool implemented through the speech act.

In the context of this study, the main objective in the third chapter will be to adopt this concept in order to study the construction, or in Waever's terms, securitization of the issue by United States decision-makers. Waever suggests to study securitization on the basis of three questions: when, how, and why? The when and the how will be addressed in Part 3 of the study. The speech act will be central to this as it is the act of securitization. Therefore it will be necessary to analyze the discourse of the decision-makers and see in which way they address the issue. It is essential to qualitatively assert the terms in which the issue was elaborated publicly. Waever's speech act is based on discourse; suggesting that a topic can be reframed through discourse implies that there has to be a speaker and an audience or public. Waever identifies the speaker, i.e. using the speech act, as the power-holders, the elites of a state, but who is the audience? The audience, consequently, has to be the public in terms of population of the state. If the state needs to justify the resort to violence or the mobilization of extraordinary means, it has to be to its public. This can be publicly in newspapers, debates or speeches, but also in parliament, committees or testimonies. The critical point is that the state has to reframe the subject in a manner that it can legitimately make use of instruments. This is to say that it has to adopt a discourse in public; to reframe the issue in secretive manner would not generate legitimacy. Within the United States this legitimacy is generated through public discourse in the media and in the parliament. The U.S. congress is a crucial institution for the acceptance of policies since it has to confirm the budget. This fact generates public debates in congress with testimonies and speeches in the respective commissions before the approval of the fiscal year's budget. These debates are valuable sources for the study of the securitization of the issue. The justification of both administrations on how much has to be spent is

\(^{47}\) *Ibidem.*
interlinked with the question, on what the budget will be spent on. Administration has also to justify why it is necessary for congress to approve of the requested budget. If we apply Waever's concept of securitization to this political process, the U.S. government might try to securitize the drug issue in Mexico in order to mobilize “all necessary means”48 to solve the problem. Since Congress has the 'power of the purse', the means attributed can be quantified in financial terms. Still, applying Waever's concept, if the administration frames an issue in security terms, it will be able to extract more money from congress in order to mobilize the 'necessary' instruments. It will therefore be necessary to analyze how the administration elaborated on the drug-related situation in Mexico in public and Congress, but also to look at the demands made and ultimately at the funds allocated by Congress. The comparison between demand and approval allows to draw conclusions about the effective framing of the issue. Still, the framing itself will be at the center of interest in this part of the study. Therefore, there will be a careful analysis of the 'speech act', of the public discourse on the matter in congress. With regard to the budget and the respective requests, I will rely on written reports for the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS is “the non-partisan public policy research arm of the United States Congress.”49 These reports constitute a solid source for how much money was requested and what it was requested for. These reports will prove important to determine with what justification how much money was requested for what. In addition to the Congress-related documents, further documents will be analyzed as well, such as press-statements, public speeches and other means of public discourse. The aim is to broadly analyze different types of documents in order to grasp the 'speech act' of the U.S. government.

Hence, the Bush and the Obama administration will be analyzed separately in order to analyze to what extent there has been change or continuance in the policy after the change of administration. Therefore, the analytical frame elaborated above will be applied to each of the two administrations, to see how they constructed and securitized the issue. I will also analyze the outcome of this process, that is to say the policy itself. After these two analyses, I will evaluate the findings and contrast them against each other to identify divergences and convergences of the policies. While the 'how' will be central to the third part of the analysis, the 'why' will be treated separately. Waever's concept helps to analyze the elaboration of the concept but provides little possibility to examine what drove the actors to (de)securitize the issue the way they did. Yet, for this study the question why the drug issue in Mexico was securitized in a certain way is essential. I will thus turn to cognitive approaches to decision-making in order to conceptualize the second part of the analysis.

48 Ibid. p. 55
C) Cognitive approaches

Originally, cognition is based in the field of psychology and was introduced through this tenet to the study of international relations. Cognition and constructivism are in so far compatible as they both analyze the subjective perception of an issue by individuals. In order to understand what influence cognition has on how leaders interpret and assess situations as well as what impact this has on choices made by those leaders, it is necessary to understand how information is processed by those leaders. Cognitive approaches allow to determine the substance of beliefs, images and preferences that decision-makers hold. This lets us better understand why people make choices and the (un)conscious reasoning behind it.

In order to answer the question why the drug issue in Mexico was constructed in a certain way, the second part of the analysis focuses on decision-makers and the cognitive structure they are embedded in. Analyzing the process and constraints of decision-making will permit to draw conclusions on the question why decision-makers elaborated and executed the Mexico policy of the U.S. the way they did. This chapter will introduce the theoretical and conceptional basis of cognitive research. Against this background, I will conceptualize the analytical framework and elaborate a structure for the second part of the analysis. To do so, I will proceed in the following manner: First, I will draw on fundamental cognitive research in psychology to determine how information processing works and to understand the way we remember and perceive situations. Second, there will be an introduction into cognitive research on decision-making processes in international relations. Discussing the common research program and different cognitive approaches to international relations will permit to narrow down and subsequently identify the concepts used for the analysis. By focusing on representational research I will then introduce the 'operational code research' and the concept of 'cognitive mapping' in order to grasp the second research question and lay out the conceptual framework for the analysis.

1. Basic cognition

From a neurobiological perspective, perceiving and remembering are holistic and not chronological. This means that there are fragments of information stored in the brain that need to be associated with each other. These clustered information components constitute the overall picture that we perceive as factual knowledge or a 'situation'. This emphasizes that it is cognitive processes that

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determine what we perceive and how we perceive. But how does this work? In order to perceive information, the mind arranges, separates and connects input. While genetic parameters determine basic cognition, highly complex issues are processed through formerly acquired experience and learning processes. That is to say that the information is mirrored against the education, experience and culture of the perceiving individual, leading different people to diverging perceptions of one and the same situation. Additionally, our brain has a limited capacity to process information, making the brain process events with a selected cognition. Besides selective memory and cognition, the mind fills existing gaps between the information segments to be capable to coherently interpret a situation. These added segments are perceived as 'real' by the mind. Even though this makes sense biologically, it provides the basis for different interpretations by people of the same situation.

While the short-term memory, or working-memory, is very limited and fundamental for imminent processing, the long-term memory provides the context against which current events are measured. Remembering is, just as perceiving, a “creative, constructivist process” in which the mind tries to connect fragmented traces of memory to construct a coherent memory. Hence, the neuronal memory is an associative memory interconnecting memories that are influencing directly the perception of an issue and indirectly the action. This is often a subconscious process, impacting on how we frame and evaluate situations. What we expect a situation to be therefore depends heavily on what we experienced before. This is what Robert Jervis draws upon and what he calls cognitive consistency: “Consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images.”

2. Cognition and International Relations

There is a considerable theoretical diversity with regard to cognitive research in international relations and foreign policy analysis. The focus on the psychological impact on decision-making became best known with Robert Jervis' book Perception and Misperception (1976) but expands beyond that work. Researchers disagree over an array of methodology and differences in theoretical approaches: different methodological approaches include Jervis' historical case study, laboratory studies or the analysis of documents among others. By using different methodological approaches, researchers differ on what can be considered a “rational actor.”

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51 Ibid., p. 5.
52 Ibidem.
53 Ibid., p. 9.
54 Jervis, Robert: Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 1976, p. 117.
55 Ibid.
approaches, researchers also developed a number of different theories concerning cognitive processing of decision-makers.\textsuperscript{58} Despite these differences, there are a number of basic assumptions researchers in cognition agree upon. These assumptions frame the field of the study of cognition of power holders and establish a research program. Research programs are shared sets of basic beliefs that constitute the framework of analysis in science. These beliefs make research coherent and direct a research program over periods of time until fundamental changes in the belief-system occur and modify the research program. These positive heuristics\textsuperscript{59} constitute the underlying premises, also of the cognitive research program in international relations. Tetlock and McGuire tried to see cognition in the light of a research program and identify its common positive heuristics.\textsuperscript{60} The basic assumptions, what they call 'hard core', of the cognitive research program consist of two key assumptions: 1. The heavy and yet incomplete information load on the intentions and capabilities of other states, and on the wide array of possible instruments to choose from. “Policy-makers must choose among options which vary on many, seemingly incommensurable value dimensions.”\textsuperscript{61} The second shared belief of researchers is that “policy-makers (like all human beings) are limited capacity information processors who resort to simplifying strategies to deal with the complexity, uncertainty, and painful trade-offs with which the world confronts them.”\textsuperscript{62} That means that decisions are made by people who measure their decisions against a subjective perception of a constructed situation that is made up by limited information, processed through a conditioned cognition. Hence, decision-makers perceive their information through a constructed environment and thus construct a proper, simplified environment.

Tetlock and McGuire distinguish between two basic cognitive strategies that power holders use to make decisions. The first one is that decision-makers use past experience in order to interpret new situations. Therefore, it is the personal background and knowledge which frames the assimilation of new information and which guides the individual to choose among different policy options. It is the question of what decision-makers think. The question of how they think is the second cognitive strategy. It is the “reliance on low-effort judgmental and choice heuristics that permit policy-makers to make up their minds quickly and with confidence in the correctness of their position.”\textsuperscript{63} The

\textsuperscript{57} e.g. Tetlock, Philip E.: Psychological research on foreign policy: A methodological overview. In: \textit{Review of personality and social psychology.} Vol. 9, 1983.
\textsuperscript{58} e.g. Cognitive Consistency Theory, Attribution Theory, the Theory of Individual Differences in Leader Style or Behavioral Decision Theory.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid. p. 149 f.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. p. 150.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibidem.
former strategy is studied in the framework of representational research while the latter is examined within process research. In the present study of cognitive constraints in the decision-making of U.S. officials with regard to the policy toward Mexico, I will subscribe to the representational research.

**a) Representational research**

How we understand information in general depends on previous experience and general knowledge. In international relations, this shapes our perception and hence our definition of other states. These constructed images of ourselves, of others, and of respective capabilities frame possible reactions to a situation that seem plausible or imperative. Researchers have developed various terms to conceptualize the information perception process by political leaders. These concepts include the notions of scripts by Abelson, operational codes by George and Holsti, cognitive or mental maps by Axelrod, stereotypes by Allport or Hamilton, frames by Minsky, nuclear scenes by Tomkins, prototypes by Cantor and Mischel as well as schemas by Nisbett and Ross. In order to properly grasp the subject of this study, I will focus on two major concepts of representational research: the concept of 'cognitive mapping' and the concept of 'operational codes'.

**b) Cognitive Mapping**

The concept of cognitive mapping aims at understanding the casual structure of cognitive representations of policy domains. It was originally elaborated by Robert Axelrod and it actually visualizes how a person asserts a certain policy issue. A decision-maker “progresses through sequential cognitive steps when he or she perceives a new international situation that may require a policy response”.

This allows a simulation of the process with a computer-based model. Axelrod bases his maps on concepts and casual beliefs that link the concepts. Within the visual model, these concepts are represented by points, while the linking casual beliefs are represented by arrows.

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64 Axelrod, Robert (ed.): Structure of decision – the cognitive maps of political elites. 1976.
The cognitive map approach allows an extensive visualization of the cognitive process and the computerized simulation even allows predictions on this basis. There have been several studies of decision-makers' cognitive maps and they have proven to elaborate large maps with many variables. From his studies, Axelrod concludes an image of a decision-maker as a person who has more beliefs than he can cope with and who therefore “employs a simplified image of the policy environment that is structurally within the context of his simplified image.”\(^{66}\) It is that conclusion that is important for this analysis: decision-makers ignore trade-offs and rarely consider reciprocal casual relations.\(^{67}\) Such a portrait of decision-makers' cognitive process allows the conclusion that simplified images are employed in order to cope with complicated and multifaceted situations.

This simplification is an important factor to understand why certain decisions have been made, against which background and how situations were assessed. Thus, my study will seek to analyze the simplified images through which key decision-makers perceive the situation in Mexico and against which they elaborate their policy strategies.

**c) Operational code research**

As a second concept, I will focus on the operational code research, introduced by Alexander George in 1969 while studying the belief-systems of decision-makers in the USSR.\(^{68}\) George assessed that decision-makers cognitively rely on operational codes in order to effectively structure information of the international environment.\(^{69}\) These codes provide norms, standards and guidelines to process information and assess situations. Hence, they have a direct impact on the perception of decision-makers and thus on the decisions themselves. Being interdependable and, in constructivist terms, mutually constituting, there can still be a hierarchy detected among these codes. That is to say that there are rather superficial operational codes and more fundamental ones. The fundamental operational codes can also be seen as core beliefs of decision-makers. These core beliefs determine the weaker codes and influence the choice of instruments. Holsti elaborated on this concept and found that core beliefs, or in his words 'master beliefs', can account for major policy changes.\(^{70} \textit{71}\)

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\(^{66}\) Axelrod, Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 244.


\(^{70}\) Traditionally, this approach was founded on the classification of master beliefs with respect to a catalog of philosophical questions into two categories: One belief system adopting a rather Hobbesian point of view in international relations while the other subscribes to a rather harmonious interpretation. In order to emancipate from the traditionally on inter-state conflicts based concept, I will focus on the notion of master beliefs and not adopt the fundamental classification of power holders into Type A and Type B categories.

\(^{71}\) Holsti, Ole: Foreign policy formation viewed cognitively. In: Axelrod, R. (ed.): *Structure of Decision*, 1976, pp. 18-
These core beliefs have many connections to other, more peripheral beliefs, which makes it hard for them to be changed. Because the less central beliefs depend on core beliefs, they too would have to be changed accordingly with the master belief. The master belief determines the assumptions a political leader has with regard to an issue. That in turn frames and influences the choice of instruments and ultimately impacts on the policy that is decided on. Writing on the interpretation of political leaders during the Cold War, Tetlock notes that either side had an unlimited ability to view international events in ways that confirm their initial belief.\textsuperscript{72} By perceiving their counterpart according to their core beliefs, they adapted strategies. This set a framework for policies that was hard to change. Since core beliefs are highly connected with peripheral beliefs, deeply embedded in our perceptions and in accordance with the principle of least resistance, core beliefs are rarely changed.\textsuperscript{73}

This is the most important implication for our study: the prevalence of core belief-systems and their tendencies to be only hardly, and if so, slowly changed. I will therefore focus on these belief-systems with a special emphasis on core beliefs to analyze the cognitive constraints in the decision-making process of U.S. officials with regard to Mexico.

\textbf{D) Conclusion Theory and Concepts}

To sum up the concepts and theories introduced above, I will recall the outline and discuss how I will conduct this study. This research will be twofold: first I will analyze how the issue was constructed, to then inquire why this was done. Subscribing to a constructivist tenet, first the process of agents constructing the issue will be analyzed: how does the agent refer to norms and identity, and how is this process constituting? The second part will analyze the norms and identity that led to the elaboration of respective policy. Hence, I will focus on the norms, identities and ideas that determine the agent and influence the agents choice of action.

This being the general theoretical framework, I will apply different concepts to the two stages of this study. For the first part, I will use Waever’s concept of (de)securitization to analyze how the issue was constructed. To do so, I will turn to discourse analysis and study the speech act in the process of securitization. Accordingly, I will analyze a number of public documents and speeches of power-holders to determine how they framed the issue. I will study the Bush and the Obama presidency separately to determine how respective administration constructed the issue and to


\textsuperscript{72} Tetlock, Philip E. and McGuire, Charles jr.: Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy. op. cit., p. 156.
identify to what extent there has been change or continuance in the policy. Then, I will evaluate the findings and contrast them against each other to identify divergences and convergences of the policies.

For the second part of the analysis, I will question why there were these policy convergences or divergences. To identify the shared expectations about appropriate behavior and the set of shared ideas and beliefs that form a common cognitive background for decision-makers, I will first analyze the national and the party level, before turning to the individual one.

Thus, I will first focus on the collective conscience by analyzing norms in U.S.-Latin American relations and ideational factors in the identities of the Republican and the Democratic Party to determine how actors perceive their counterparts and themselves. In a second step, I will focus on the individual cognitive background of the key decision-makers involved. This constitutes the largest part of the analysis, since, while there is a collective conscience, information is always mirrored against the distinct education and experience of each individual. Hence, limited information processing capacity and selective memory influence the way decision-makers perceive situations and lead to the construction of a subjective, simplified situation. On the individual level, there are three dimensions that I will examine: personal background, simplified images and core belief-systems. Combining the analytical approach of cognitive mapping and the operational code, I will a) study the simplified images against which the administrations elaborated their policies to find out how they assessed the situation. Then, I will b) analyze the belief-systems of decision-makers and identify core beliefs to determine why the administrations assessed the situation this way and why they preferred certain policies to others.

III. (De)Securitization?

In this section I will analyze how the U.S. administrations have securitized the drug issue and how that has influenced the Merida Initiative. I will study in how far there was a change in discourse from the Bush to the Obama administration and analyze to what extent that has translated into actual policy changes. The objective is to analyze the speech act, see how discourse has framed the issue. That is to say that I will examine to what extent security or military terms have been used in discourse whilst referring to the issue. This in turn will be contrasted against the policy outcome of each administration and to analyze if and how these developments interrelate. This will permit a solid foundation to answer the question how U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico was constructed. It
also allows for a thorough analysis of the policy of each administration and the answer of the question if there was a change in policy between the Bush and the Obama administration. Thirdly, these differences or continuances between both administrations will be discussed and contrasted, building a solid foundation for the second part of the analysis.

In order to achieve these objectives, the following plan will be adopted: First, the securitization of the drug trafficking issue in Mexico by the Bush administration will be analyzed. This will be done by analyzing the speech act and its implications on financial and instrumental resources. It is essential to note that this analysis does not assess the implementation but analyzes the declaratory policy. In order to do so, I will analyze discourses of the Bush administration as well as financial requests to Congress. It is important to identify who is talking about security and what is the frame of reference. Once this will be determined, the outcome of the process, i.e. the policy itself, will be analyzed. In a second step, the speech act of the issue by the Obama administration will be analyzed in the same manner. Finally, the findings of the analysis will be discussed and contrasted in order to determine to what extent there has been change from one administration to the other.

A) Bush administration

1. Construction of the issue

The elaboration of a bilateral agreement was initiated during a visit of President Bush to the town of Merida in Mexico in March 2007. Before what came to be known as the 'Merida Initiative', the situation of drug trafficking between Mexico and the United States and the violence in Mexico thereof resulting had been debated in the U.S. primarily in the context of border security. Even in the press-conference after the initial meeting on the Merida Initiative, President Bush portrayed the situation as mainly a border security problem for the United States.\(^{74}\) When the initiative was announced, it took many members of Congress by surprise as they learned it from the media or other non-official channels.\(^{75}\) During the time the initiative was elaborated and later proposed to Congress, it was the Democrats that held the majority in both the House of Representatives\(^{76}\) and the Senate.\(^{77}\) That means that the Bush administration relied on bipartisan support in order to pass proposed bills. The funding of the bill was discussed by Congress only in 2008 when the term of the Bush administration slowly came to an end.


\(^{76}\) The Washington Post: The U.S. Congress Votes Online Database – 110\(^{th}\) Congress, House of Representatives.

\(^{77}\) The Washington Post: The U.S. Congress Votes Online Database – 110\(^{th}\) Congress, Senate.
But how did the administration construct the problem, how was it securitized? The Bush administration and the Congressmen referred to the drug issue in Mexico as a security problem for both Mexico and the United States. It is important to notice that the Bush administration did not elaborate the plan publicly but as a presidential agreement. Because the process was not public, not even congress was able to monitor negotiations. This means that it is not possible to assess the speech act during negotiations but that this study has to rely on statements that were made after the initiative was announced. Additionally, I will rely both on congressional debates that took place during legislative approval as well as on statements by the administration in the course of this process.

In the first public statement George W. Bush adopted a discourse that was founded on partnership and cooperation: “This bill includes $465 million for the Merida Initiative – a partnership with Mexico and nations in Central America to crack down on violent drug trafficking gangs.” Bush tried to underline that the United States respect the sovereignty of Mexico and see themselves as an equal partner, supporting Mexican efforts. The administration went even further and adopted the term of 'shared responsibility'. This acknowledges that notably U.S. demand for drugs and weapons imported from the United States fuel the 'narcoviolence' in Mexico. With regard to a strategic response to these challenges, the Press Secretary put it this way: “Together our countries can defeat criminal organizations that threaten our region, and we look forward to working closely

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80 Ibidem.
83 Ibid. p. 47.
with our neighbors to realize that goal." The statement emphasizes multiple aspects: first, the fact that criminal organizations pose a threat not only to the two countries, but to the whole region, and second, that the U.S. aspire to cooperate with Mexico to defeat this threat. And third, it identifies the criminal organizations as being at the heart of the problem. In using the terms 'threat' and 'defeat', the Secretary frames the issue in classical security terms: one defeats an enemy that poses a threat, classically another state. This logic is being transferred onto a non-state actor, organized crime. The notion 'threat' is referred to in multiple other instances such as other official press statements or the joint statement on the Merida Initiative by the USG and the GOM. After the first meeting of High-Level Consultative Group for the Merida Initiative between Mexico and the U.S., the joint statement reads: “We intend to continue working on key issues that affect the national security of our countries”. It clearly identifies the issue as a threat to the national security of both countries. The statement further reads that the situation “pose[s] a clear and present threat to the lives and well-being of U.S. and Mexican citizens.” This joint estimation on the Secretary level of both countries underlines the importance the administrations want to attribute to the issue. The categorization as a national security issue frames the problem as a challenge to the core function of a state, providing security for the country and its citizens. The reference to a direct threat for the lives of citizens gives the impression that both states do not have a choice but to directly act. This suggestion is reinforced by emphasizing the necessity “to prevail in this fight.” Together with vocabulary such as 'combat' or 'strategic', the notion 'fight' seems to point toward a violent resolution of the situation. Similarly, the director of National Drug Control Policy sees the issue as a “challenge to sovereignty in the region”. Relating the Merida Initiative to sovereignty, being one of the constituting elements of a state, attributes tremendous importance and urgency to the initiative. This discourse suggests that when the sovereignty of a state, or worse a region, is at risk, all necessary means need to be appropriated. Subscribing to this speech act, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs further securitized the policy: “This is truly a national security program for the United States”.

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84 White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Request to Fund Security Cooperation with Mexico and Central America. Statement by the Press Secretary, 22.10.2007.
85 Ibidem.
87 The High-Level Consultative Group pools relevant politicians at the Secretary level of both the U.S. and Mexico.
90 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem.
characterized the Merida Initiative as a “critical national priority”\textsuperscript{93} when signing the bill. These estimations testify that the Bush administration constructed a discourse of high priority for this issue in order to frame a debate in Congress. Framing it as a challenge to both national security and sovereignty, this speech act suggests that the survival of the country itself is at stake and demands for decisive action.

When discussing the issue in Congress, the Bush administration needed several votes from the opposing Democratic Party in order to pass the bill. In order to better understand how the issue was framed and securitized in Congress, it is necessary to look into the congressional debates on the bill. In this context, the speech act can be analyzed just as clearly as in the public statements analyzed before. There were diverging evaluations of the Merida Initiative in Congress but in the end Congress “recognize(d) the urgency of the threat” and emphasized that “this threat is real.”\textsuperscript{94} It was especially the Senators and Congressmen from the southern part of the U.S. that took interest in the debate. In Congress, the issue was mainly framed in terms of border security, immigration, corruption on the Mexican side and most importantly national security. The following statement is a good example to illustrate the security framing of the Merida Initiative in Congress: “Our own national security is at stake, as are human lives and economic prosperity. For these reasons, we must support the Merida Initiative.”\textsuperscript{95} But on 'both sides of the aisle'\textsuperscript{96} the discourse is reminiscent of what would be reproduced in the first Joint Statement of the High-Level Consultative Group. Democrats use vocabulary such as “battle against organized crime”, “hitting American cities” or “violence spilling over the border”. And talk about the “responsibility to protect American citizens”.\textsuperscript{97} All this vocabulary frames the issue in a rather violent, even warlike way. Even referring to the international law concept, ‘responsibility to protect’ suggests a direct link between the policy issue at hand and a conflict situation. Similarly, and yet clearer, is the discourse on the ‘war on drugs’ that has been widely adopted in Congress, even by Democratic Congressmen from districts far away from the border, for example Congressman Patrick J. Kennedy from Rhode Island. He adopts the discourse of the “war against illegal narcotics”\textsuperscript{98}. Another example is Congressman

\textsuperscript{93} White House: President Bush Signs H.R. 2642, the Supplemental Appropriations Act. \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{94} Walters, John P., Shannon, Thomas A. and Johnson, David T.: The Merida Initiative – Our Partnership Moves Forward. \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{96} That is to say both Democrats and Republicans.
McGaul from Texas, who states that President Calderon of Mexico “is at war with these drug cartels. And we need to fight this war against the drug cartels.”\textsuperscript{99} There are other examples going as far as to compare the situation in Mexico to World War II\textsuperscript{100}, referring to “front lines”\textsuperscript{101} and talking about the “invasion into the United States.”\textsuperscript{102} The speech act of war and the framing of the issue in corresponding terms clearly generate fear and urges for support to fund the bill.

In the same context, the Bush administration contextualized the demand for financial funding for the Merida Initiative legislatively in a particular context as well: The first request for the Merida budget was voted on by the 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress as the 'Supplemental Appropriations Act' (H.R. 2642) of the ‘2008 Iraq War supplemental funding bill’.\textsuperscript{103} The demand for financial assets is grouped in H.R. 2642, together with requests such as program funds in the context of the attack on the U.S. embassy in Serbia on February 21, 2008, or the request for funds for a 'Foreign Military Financing Program' in Darfur. This can also be understood as a way of framing a certain issue and sending out a message to Congress. Legislatively, the Merida Initiative was placed among military programs and peace missions, which created an association with military and security problems in U.S. foreign policy and follows the line of the war analogy. Another analogy to war can be seen in the fact that the Merida Initiative was designed as a Presidential agreement and not as a treaty, hence without congressional input. As Senator Leahy complains, “neither the Mexican or Central American legislatures, nor the U.S. Congress, nor representatives of civil society, had a role in shaping the Merida Initiative. There was no refinement through consultation. I first learned of it from the press, as did other Members of Congress.”\textsuperscript{104} Excluding Congress from negotiations can be compared with past World War II practices of the U.S. going to war. In article one, section eight, the U.S. Constitution specifies that “The Congress shall have power to […] declare War”.\textsuperscript{105} Yet, Congress has not declared war since World War II, with administrations bypassing Congress and avoiding to officially declare war. These military engagements are still funded by Congress, but it is the President, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, who decides on the operations.

Similarly, the Bush administration concluded a presidential agreement and did not consult Congress


\textsuperscript{102} Poe, Ted (R): Debate on Merida Initiative. \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{103} U.S. House of Representatives: 2008 Iraq War supplemental funding bill. For additional information see: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=2008_Iraq_War_supplemental_funding_bill

\textsuperscript{104} Leahy, Patrick (D): On The Merida Initiative. Congressional Record. \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{105} The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Section 8.
for the Merida Initiative. Adopting similar legislative procedures as when deploying troops and taking on the issue personally, Bush reemphasizes the special importance and underlines the priority he attributes to the situation.

Besides the war analogy, another frame of reference is used in congressional debates: terrorism. The drug cartels and terrorists are often linked to one another. A Republican member of the Foreign Affairs Committee stated that “drugs and cartels and the violence and terror that they bring not only undermine public safety but threaten our security as a Nation.” The National Security Advisor confirms in a briefing that it is the “drug traffickers and terrorists who have resources, weapons and money” that pose the threat. Just before leaving office in January 2009 he reiterates that “the way to understate it [the situation in Mexico] is to say it is a terrorism problem, it is a narco-trafficking problem.” Similarly, yet more drastic, a Republican representative from California frames the issue: “[O]ur border is burning. Mexico is in flames with violence. We are not taking on a war on drugs down at the border; we are taking on the battle against narco-terrorism.” Exemplarily, this discourse can be qualified as yet another step further in securitizing the issue. While the war analogy could be qualified as a speech act of ‘militarization’, this speech act refers to current core fears in U.S. society since 9/11/2001. Merging drug-trafficking and terrorism into one category implies that no distinction should be made in addressing them. The notion ‘terrorism’ suggests that the necessity to act is of the utmost urgency. Having quoted only Republicans so far, this speech act is used on both sides of the aisle. For example, Democrat Gene Green from Texas assesses the situation as follows: “There is literally a battle going on in Mexico, our closest neighbor, and there has been an effort to try and support them in their battle with narcotics and narco-terrorism, and that is what this bill is about”. Furthermore, the tendency to use the terrorism analogy can be especially observed with representatives from states bordering Mexico. This suggests that the rhetorical escalation of the speech act is not necessarily due to party affiliation but to a greater extent to the question if the representative is affected by incidents on the ground. Thus, the upward spiral of discourse, to frame the issue in radical terms, mirrors the urgency with which the speaker associates the issue.

106 Chabot, Steve (R): Debate on Merida Initiative. op. cit.
2. Needs and Instruments

a) Needs

As the analysis of the public construction through the speech act above has shown, there was an array of problems that were identified with regard to the drug trafficking problem between Mexico and the United States. In order to analyze the needs the Bush administration defined and due to the non-existence of a public debate prior to the proposal for Congress, the needs will be analyzed as defined in the proposed bill.

With regard to Mexico, the bill states several problems and raises issues that need to be addressed. Among those is the definition of the drug crisis as a “significant security threat” to the U.S. The next statement is that 90% of illegal drugs entering the U.S. come through Mexico. Immediately following this statement, the bill emphasizes that through the same channels, arms, precursor chemicals, and bulk cash are transferred back south. This statement indicates the awareness of the transnational dimension of the drug trade and the mutual dependence. In the same light, the bill proposes “an approach of joint responsibility to confront the threat”. In order to meet these challenges, “a comprehensive interdiction and security strategy planned and executed jointly with our southern neighbors” is needed: the Merida Initiative. The United States pledge “to intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking (including demand-related portions) and continue to combat trafficking of weapons and bulk currency to Mexico”, as well as “to augment cooperation, coordination, and the exchange of information to fight criminal organizations on both sides of the border”. As further needs, the U.S identifies the need to elaborate a long-term strategy to help Mexico “to build the capacity of their own law enforcement agencies and enhance the rule of law, as well as to fortify United States illicit narcotics reduction efforts.” This mirrors the framing of the issue as an external issue penetrating into the U.S., the need to enhance border security and impede illegal intrusion.

In a joint statement of the Mexican and U.S. administration, both governments identified the need “to disrupt drug-trafficking (including precursor chemicals); weapons trafficking, illicit financial

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Ibid. Title I, Sec. 101 (3).
Ibid. Title I, Sec. 101 (6).
Ibid. Title I, Sec. 101 (7).
Ibid. Title I, Sec. 101 (10).
Ibid. Title I, Sec. 101 (11).
activities and currency smuggling, and human trafficking.” Additionally, the Merida Initiative defines further needs as “strengthening civilian institutions and rule of law programs in Mexico” and “anti-corruption, transparency, and human rights programs to ensure due process and expand a culture of lawfulness in Mexico.” These needs are very general and not further specified. The call for anti-corruption, transparency and human rights programs is related to the fear that the funding for the Initiative will be absorbed by corrupt Mexican officials. Furthermore, these aspects are translated into a joint strategy centering around four major points: First, to break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; Second, to assist the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border, air, and maritime controls; Third, to improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; And fourth, to curtail gang activity in Mexico and Central America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.

b) Instruments

In order to implement the Merida Initiative, Mexico and the United States established bilateral consultancy groups that were to meet regularly. First, the so-called 'High-Level Consultative Group' (HLCG) was established. It is a bi-annual cabinet-level summit that includes all departments deemed concerned. The first and only meeting of the Bush administration's HLCG took place in December 2008, just before leaving office. To finance the policy, the Bush administration requested a total of $1.1 billion for the Merida Initiative in Congress. This is split up into $550,000,000 for the Fiscal Year 2008 (FY08) and $550,000,000 for the FY09 budget. For 2008, the Bush administration requested $500 million for Mexico and $50 million for Central America. In 2009, the administration requested a budget of $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Central America. As indicated above, this analysis will concentrate on the part of the Merida Initiative concerned with Mexico and will not take the funding for Central America into account.

In order to identify the attribution of instruments, I will turn to the budget of the Merida Initiative. The following chart shows how the attributed funds were allocated.

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118 H.R. 6028. *op. cit.*, Title I, Subtitle B, Sec. 121.
120 Rice, Condoleezza and Espinosa, Patricia: Joint News Conference of U.S. Secretary of State Rice and Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Espinosa following the inaugural meeting of the Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group. 19.12.2008.
122 For additional information on the part concerning Central America see e.g.: Engel, Eliot L.; Shannon, Thomas A.; Thale, Geoff; Sibaja, Harold and Casals, Beatriz C.: Testimonies before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere – Central America and the Merida Initiative. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 8.5.2008.
Analyzing the table, the biggest amount of money is invested in Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism and Border Security Section. This money is “intended to provide significant equipment and technology infrastructure improvements for Mexican military and law enforcement agencies.”\textsuperscript{123} In financial terms, the biggest part of the cooperation is funding equipment and technology. In order determine how funds were distributed I analyze the Program Description of the Merida Initiative for the FY 2008 and FY 2009 by the Bush administration. The analysis of this program description allows an in-depth analysis of the instruments: Besides the Program Support, the Initiative is structured into three main sections. Each section will be successively examined to conclude with an analysis of the results.

For the 'Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism and Border Security' section of the Initiative, the following expenditures are defined: eight transport helicopters, including training, maintainable, parts and night vision worth $208.3 million,\textsuperscript{124} refurbishing and equipping of 2 Citation surveillance aircraft worth $2.8 million,\textsuperscript{125} mobile gamma ray scanners for FY 2009 worth $20.2 million,\textsuperscript{126} ion scanners for FY 2008 worth $1.5 million,\textsuperscript{127} four CASA 235 patrol aircrafts worth $100 million each FY08 and FY09.\textsuperscript{128} The whole section funds only U.S. equipment and equipment-related expenses which are being transferred to Mexican military agencies: the Bell helicopters are destined for the Mexican Air Force.\textsuperscript{129} The mobile gamma ray scanners for the Mexican army for use at army check-points,\textsuperscript{130} the ion scanners will be delivered to the National Defense Secretariat,\textsuperscript{131} and the

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Type of Funding} & \textbf{FY2008 Supplemental Request (Mexico)} & \textbf{FY2008 Supplemental Request (Central America)} & \textbf{FY2009 Request (Mexico)} & \textbf{FY2009 Request (Central America)} \\
\hline
Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism, and Border Security & 305.3 & 16.6 & 238.3 & 40.0 \\
Public Security and Law Enforcement & 56.1 & 25.7 & 158.5 & 32.0 \\
Institution Building and Rule of Law & 100.6 & 7.7 & 30.7 & 23.0 \\
Program Support & 37.0 & — & 22.5 & 5.0 \\
\hline
Total & 500.0 & 50.0 & 450.0 & 100.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{Figure 4: Merida Initiative – Mexico and Central America Components FY 08-09 ($ in millions).}

\textsuperscript{123} Congressional Research Service: Merida Initiative – Background and Funding. \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{124} Wilson Center for Scholars: Merida Initiative – Program description reference document FY08 and FY09.
\textsuperscript{29.2.2008}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11f.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.
Casa aircraft are destined for Mexican Navy to seize and deny the use of Mexican waters to transnational criminals and terrorists.\textsuperscript{132} Only the refurbishing of the two aircrafts is designed for a civilian agency, the Office of the Mexican Attorney General (PGR). This means that the largest portion of the cooperation agreements is almost exclusively destined for military purpose and consists entirely of equipment. Also, the portion 'Public Security and Law Enforcement' is mainly designed to deliver heavy equipment such as 3 helicopters\textsuperscript{133} and 3 surveillance aircrafts\textsuperscript{134} under the heading 'Crime Prevention and Police Modernization'. Also, the other items in this portion are only material in nature and modernize the security forces only in their equipment (for more details see table in Annex 1). It is only the portion 'Institution-Building and Rule of Law' that addresses non-material needs. As the section indicates, mostly training and expertise is provided in order to support Mexican reform processes. It is the PGR in particular that still receives hardware in order to build real as well as digital infrastructure.\textsuperscript{135}

Analyzing critically what instruments have been attributed there, a number of trends can be identified. First, the way the issue was securitized during the public debate is clearly reflected in the policy output, the Program Description of the Merida Initiative. The military and security dimensions of the speech act are the most heavily reflected ones in the budget. The biggest portion of the budget is destined directly for the Mexican military; equipment (mainly helicopters and aircraft) and even the equipment the civil security forces are to obtain, seem military in nature (e.g. surveillance aircraft). This reflects the approach of the Bush administration. Second, the speech act of terrorism used by some congressional members is also clearly reflected in the Initiative; in the document the terms counterterrorism and counternarcotics go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{136} Third, the aspect of border security and illegal immigration addressed in several discourses is very present through funding (e.g. extradition training, funding of the National Migration Institute and biometric data-tracking). Fourth, the portion of the budget designated for equipment is tremendously bigger than the funds allocated to capacity building and training of authorities. Fifth, a transnational cooperation is hardly envisioned: The cross-border initiative OASI\textsuperscript{SS} seems to be the only real cooperation in a transnational sense, the other programs appear to be rather assistance than cooperation. Also, this program is funded with only $2,000,000 in FY08 and $4,500,000 in FY09\textsuperscript{137} which can be classified as a minor fraction of the overall initiative. Sixth, the funds attributed to civil society and

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 12.  
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p.25.  
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 27.  
\textsuperscript{135} See most notably: Ibid., part 2, pp. 19-24.  
\textsuperscript{136} See e.g.: Ibid., pp. 5, 12, 22f., 25f., 27, or p. 34.  
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 18.
NGO'S make up less than 1% of the total budget.\textsuperscript{138} The securitization of the problem in itself, and the traditional concept of security suggest that it is the role of the state to guarantee security. Again, the attribution of instruments confirms the Bush administration's conception of security. In the light of points five and six, the above-discussed commitment to “strengthening civilian institutions and rule of law programs in Mexico” and “transparency, and human rights programs”\textsuperscript{139} might have to be critically put into perspective. Seventh, the demand reduction on the Mexican side was only funded after the GOM requested it. The explicit mentioning of Mexico's demand in the program description is the only one in the document and underlines the importance the USG attributes to the fact that the GOM initiated this. It also reflects that these measures that do not comply with the traditional concept of security and hence seem to be disregarded. This leads to the final point of this part of the analysis: The Merida Initiative has not attributed any assets to domestic measures within the U.S.. Congressional debates have shown diverging opinions to this end but this disagreement seems to follow party lines.\textsuperscript{140} The debates, as well as the allocation of funding, support the interpretation that the Bush administration conceived the problem as an external one, infiltrating the U.S. Not addressing domestic demand, money laundering in the U.S. or the southbound weapon flow puts the administration's commitment to an approach of joint responsibility into question.

\section*{B) Obama administration}

\subsection*{1. Construction of the issue}

To understand how the Obama administration constructed the Merida Initiative and the concerning issues, it is important to notice the different initial situation in comparison with the Bush administration: the Obama administration built upon an already existing initiative. Attention from Congress and from the media built a different context for the elaboration of the subject by the Obama administration. Similarly to the prior presidency, the new administration assigned the issue a “high priority”.\textsuperscript{141} At the same time, the HLCG announced “paradigmatic change”\textsuperscript{142} for the Merida Initiative. In the following I will examine the speech act of the Obama administration and test

\textsuperscript{138} See Annex 1.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{110th U.S. Congress: H.R. 6028. op. cit., Title I, Subtitle B, Sec. 121.}
\textsuperscript{141} Clinton, Hillary: Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa after their meeting. Mexico City, 23.3.2010.
whether this paradigmatic change has taken place.

A first factor in the framing of the issue is the fact that the Obama administration altered the name of the initiative from 'Merida Initiative' to 'Merida Initiative and beyond'. It shows the new administration’s claim to build upon and at the same time change the existing cooperation. Obama emphasized the dimension of shared responsibility between Mexico and the U.S. “for defeating and dismantling the illicit criminal networks that traffic drugs into the United States and illegal weapons and illicit revenues into Mexico”. Similarly to Bush, Obama himself uses the term “shared responsibility”. Mentioning the responsibility of the U.S. on multiple occasions, he reiterates that “this is something that we take very seriously”. Besides Obama, all the administration adopts the same or a similar discourse, from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton down to the level of Deputy and Assistant Secretary of State. This shared responsibility is characterized by Obama as the U.S. demand for drugs, the southbound weapons-flow and money laundering fueling violence in Mexico.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration uses a different speech act for the situation in Mexico than the Bush administration. Instead of using military vocabulary such as 'fight', 'combat', 'war', 'front lines' and referring to 'national security', the Obama administration frames the issue largely differently. For example, the Obama presidency does not use the term 'narcoterrorism' or refer to terrorists in the discourse on the Merida Initiative. Describing individuals involved in drug trafficking, the administration rather refers to terms such as 'criminal elements' or 'cartels'. Instead of using the notion threat, the Obama administration refers to the issue as a “struggle” or “an extraordinary challenge from drug-fueled, organized crime.” The notion of a challenge does not relate to military terms and hence to a military solution of the problem. Besides the notion

\[143\] Jacobson, Roberta S.: Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. 27.5.2010.

\[144\] White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Joint Statement from President Barack Obama and President Felipe Calderón. Washington DC, 19.5.2010.

\[145\] Obama, Barack: Remarks at the Summit of the Americas. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 17.4.2009.

\[146\] White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada. Guadalajara, Mexico, 10.8.2009.


\[148\] e.g. Clinton, Hillary: Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa after their meeting. \textit{op. cit.}

\[149\] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Guns, Drugs and Violence – The Merida Initiative and the Challenge in Mexico. Hearing by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. 18.3.2009.


\[151\] White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada. \textit{op. cit.}

\[152\] Obama, Barack: Remarks at the Summit of the Americas. \textit{op. cit.}

\[153\] U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Guns, Drugs and Violence. \textit{op. cit.}

\[154\] \textit{Ibidem.}
'challenge', which is used on different occasions, the issue has been contextualized in other non-security-related terms. President Obama stated that “President Calderon [...] has taken on an extraordinarily difficult task dealing with these drug cartels”. On another occasion he described Calderón's policy as a “very courageous effort to deal with a [...] set of drug cartels [...] that are not only resulting in extraordinary violence to the people of Mexico, but are also undermining institutions”. With this statement Obama points out the danger that the drug cartels pose without resorting to a war-like discourse. He uses the word 'to deal with' and 'effort' to describe how Calderón is taking on the issue which relates rather to a problem than to a 'fight' or 'combat'. Yet, underscoring the importance of the issue, he underlines “to continue confronting the urgent threat to our common security”. That shows that Obama still classifies the issue as a security one. Yet, when asked directly if he considered the situation a national security threat that could require sending national troops to the border, Obama does not affirm but rather reframes the issue. He uses a speech act emphasizing economic, social and other dimensions of the issue like the southbound weapons-flow from the U.S. In contrast to President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton tends to use a more militarized discourse; for example when she defines the necessity “to combat and defeat organized transnational crime” or when she states that the “narcotics cartels are waging war on civil society.” This discourse seems like a militarization of the problem and hence to oppose the way Obama constructs and frames the issue. Yet, on the same occasion, Secretary Clinton recognizes that a solely military approach is problematic and that “it is not what militaries train to do.” Later, referring to the situation in Mexico as 'a problem', she seems to relativize. Still, it shows that the military component still plays a considerable role in the securitization by the Obama administration. Barack Obama himself reiterates on several occasions his confidence in “applying the law enforcement techniques that are necessary to curb the power of the cartels”. It shows that

156 Valenzuela Arturo: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's Trip to Mexico on March 23, 2010. op. cit.
157 See e.g. Obama, Barack: Remarks at the Summit of the Americas. op cit. or White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Joint Statement from President Barack Obama and President Felipe Calderón. op. cit. as well as U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Guns, Drugs and Violence. op. cit, testimony by David Johnson.
158 Obama, Barack: More on the Economy. op. cit.
159 White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada. op. cit.
160 Ibidem.
161 Ibidem.
162 Clinton, Hillary: Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa. op. cit.
163 Ibidem.
164 Ibidem.
165 White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada. op. cit.
Obama tries to demilitarize the issue, framing it differently than the Bush administration. In contrast to the former administration, the new one does not incorporate the financing for Merida in a war-funding supplemental bill but into the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 under the provision of the Department of State. In the contrast to the former administration, the new one does not incorporate the financing for Merida in a war-funding supplemental bill but into the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 under the provision of the Department of State. Obama does not try to desecuritize the issue but he reframes it in a none-military way, referring to civil security agencies, opening the way to attribute not only military but also civil instruments. Clinton adopts a similar discourse when asked if the military strategy of the Bush administration was not enough. She states clearly that “we want and are working toward a comprehensive strategy”. In doing so, the Obama administration securitizes the situation as an issue of public safety. The administration states that they are “expanding the Merida Initiative beyond what it was traditionally considered to be, because it is not just about security.” In a joint statement of President Obama and President Calderón, the Presidents commit “to cooperate to promote public safety and social resiliency, and to bring people and institutions together across our shared border.” This enlarges the scope of the speech act used by the Bush administration significantly: The new administration constructs the issue as one that “will not simply be solved by law enforcement”. The discourse of officials includes frequent references to respective citizens, civil society, people or local communities. The Merida Initiative is framed as a tool to confront the “threats to the welfare, prosperity, and security of our citizens”. This framing hints at a different, rather non-traditional concept of security. As seen above, the traditional concept of security is state-centered; the reference to civil society and personal security enlarges the scope not only of issues that fall into the security domain, but also of the needs and instruments attributed to these issues. Thus, Clinton states: “we are working not only government-to-government but civil society-to-civil society and people-to-people.” To her, this includes “social and economic development” as well as “education and health”. Obama adopted

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the same discourse and the same scope. Still, in this context, it is interesting to see that this approach was already adopted by Democrats and used to criticize the Bush administration's proposal of the Merida Initiative to Congress in 2008. And so, the Democratic government seeks to adopt a “comprehensive strategy” where “Security is key” and “paramount”. But the concept of security is significantly different from the one used by the Bush administration; Clinton emphasized: “[W]e want to make sure that when we talk about security, it’s not just security in the most obvious sense, to be safe in your home, but it’s economic security, it’s health security, it’s all of the ways that individuals have a chance to lead a productive and successful life.”

2. Needs and Instruments
In the previous section, the Obama administration’s speech act and discourse were analyzed, framing the assessment of the issues to be countered by the Merida Initiative. Contrarily to the Bush administration, the public elaboration of the issue by the Obama administration permits to analyze the needs defined through discourse.

a) Needs
The Obama administration took on the Merida Initiative when the new ambassador of the U.S. to Mexico Carlos Pascual was appointed in August 2009. Through a series of meetings and in the light of the FY2011 budget preparation, the revision of the bilateral cooperation to that point began. Officially, it was President Obama's visit to Guadalajara that launched the revision of the process. Secretary Clinton and her Mexican counterpart Secretary Espinosa defined four pillars on which the new strategy would rest. In accordance with the framing of the issue that has been analyzed above, the following four fields were defined as central to the new Merida Initiative: first, disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime; second, institutionalizing the rule of law in Mexico; third,
creating a '21st Century Border'; fourth, building strong and resilient communities. In a joint statement Obama and Calderón defined the needs as

“disrupting the capacity of criminal organizations that act in both countries by weakening their operational, logistical, and financial capabilities; supporting efforts to strengthen public institutions responsible for combating organized crime, including the promotion of the full observance of rule of law, human rights, and active civil society participation; developing a secure and competitive Twenty-First Century Border; and, building strong and resilient communities in both countries by supporting efforts to address the root causes of crime and violence, especially concerning youth, promoting the culture of lawfulness, reducing illicit drug use, and stemming the flow of potential recruits for the cartels by promoting constructive, legal alternatives for young people.”

As seen in Clinton's statement on the concept of security, the 'Merida Initiative and beyond' broadens its definition of needs and consequently the way instruments are attributed. Focusing less on the supply of equipment, the Obama administration seeks to support the Calderón administration more in disrupting financial flows of the drug-trafficking organization. This is based on a redefinition of criminal organizations as profit-driven entities.

**b) Instruments**

The first pillar of *Merida and Beyond* addresses this issue. The effort includes an increase in joint cross-border law enforcement operation and an increase in intelligence information sharing between the two countries. This trend is also reflected in the budget for FY2011 for Mexico; while the extremely expensive equipment items had been appropriated in previous supplemental, a shift in policy is reflected in the budget for assistance to Mexico. The Obama administration decreased the budget for the 'Foreign Military Financing' account of the State Department by $257,250,000 compared to FY2010. The category 'Peace and Security' for Mexico was reduced in $360,900,000 including a decline of $115,500,000 in funds for 'counternarcotics' assistance from FY10 to FY11, reflecting the demilitarization of the speech act by the Obama presidency. At the same time, an additional $117,000,000 has been allocated to 'Governing Justly and Democratically' including $104,000,000 for 'Rule of Law and Human Rights' as the major portion of this item, making this the largest category of the whole initiative. It shows the importance the Obama

183 U.S. Embassy to Mexico: Merida Initiative At a Glance – The Road to the High Level Consultative Group Meeting.
184 White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Joint Statement from President Barack Obama and President Felipe Calderón. op. cit.
187 Ibid., p.726.
188 Ibidem.
administration attributes to developing strong civilian institutions and to upholding human rights while taking on the drug cartels. Although relatively small in total numbers, the assistance in 'Economic Growth' was almost doubled\textsuperscript{189} and 'Development Assistance' increased by over 150\%\textsuperscript{190}.

The justification of the budget shows a distribution of funds away from heavy equipment, now encompassing economic issues and supporting civil society. This includes a stronger focus on training and information sharing. The budget justification underlines the importance of 'capacity building', including for the military\textsuperscript{191} rather than solely focusing on machinery. The narcotics control and law enforcement items include the technical assistance and equipment initiated by the Bush administration, but emphasize also information and introduce support “for drug demand reduction efforts, including better epidemiological data and groups involved in prevention and treatment”.\textsuperscript{192}

Continuing to support institution-building, the new strategy also funds “crime and gang prevention programs, rehabilitation of criminal offenders, and supports community-based strategies to deter violence.”\textsuperscript{193} As an example of how the administration tackles the domestic side of the issue, the Obama administration “authorized $10 million to hire additional Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF) inspectors under the agency’s Project Gunrunner”\textsuperscript{194} to identify U.S. gun dealers that fuel the southbound weapons flow to Mexican drug traffickers. Obama on arms: "I'm making it a priority to ratify the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms Convention as another tool that we can use to prevent this

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\caption{U.S.-Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations – Mexico FY11.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., p. 727.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p. 725.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p. 727.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 728.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibidem.
from happening. Also, President Obama requested Congress for $5.6 billion to initiate domestic programs to reduce the demand for drugs.

In order to foster mutual dialogue, to revise and implement the strategy, the Obama and the Calderón administrations established working groups on several levels: The High Level Consultative Group which was already designated by the Bush administration, annually meets on the cabinet level to elaborate and review strategies. This group receives reports from the Policy Coordination Group which meets at Deputy and Assistant Secretary level to produce work plans and new cooperative arrangements in all four pillars of the initiative. Once a month the Bilateral Coordination Group meets at the Mexican Foreign Ministry to review the progress of Merida Initiative programs, develop communications strategies, and to accelerate deliveries. The multi-level cooperation is complemented by local working groups such as a group focusing exclusively on the violence in select border cities. This particular group made a field assessment of the San Diego-Tijuana and El Paso-Ciudad Juarez corridors in December 2009 and January 2010 to conclude that there was a need to further enhance cooperation on the border. Additional bilateral cooperation programs include the exchange of financial intelligence and law enforcement coordination to prevent the financing of the cartels and a bilateral work program to combat the flow of illegal weapons. Besides the regular meetings in the different working groups, the cooperation has been institutionalized. In May 2010 a permanent office was opened: the Merida Initiative Bilateral Implementation Office. The office is presented as a tool “to work together on a daily basis on Merida Initiative projects, strengthening coordination, and improving the pace of deliveries.” The periodical meetings on the different levels and the institutionalized office reflect Secretary Clinton's discourse on the all-the-way-down approach. Nevertheless, these meetings form cooperation on the policy level only. It has been criticized that on the operational level, significant gaps are remaining.

Analyzing critically the relation between the construction of the issue and the attribution of instruments, a series of tendencies can be identified: First, the budget clearly reflects the way the Obama administration has de-militarized the speech act concerning the Merida Initiative. The big

195 Obama, Barack: Remarks at the Summit of the Americas. op. cit.
196 Clinton, Hillary: Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa. op. cit.
197 U.S. Embassy to Mexico: Merida Initiative At a Glance. op. cit.
198 Ibidem.
199 Ibidem.
200 Clinton, Hillary: Remarks with Mexican Foreign Secretary Patricia Espinosa. op. cit.
cuts in the budget of the FY 2011 on foreign military financing and equipment mirror the way the administration refrained from military terms in its discourses. Second, the term ‘terrorism’ has been eradicated from the Merida Initiative. There is no reference to a connection between drug-traffickers or drug cartels and terrorist groups any longer. The term 'narcoterrorism' does neither occur in the administration's discourse nor in official documents. Third, border security remains an important component of the Merida Initiative. One of the four pillars is dedicated to 'build a 21st century border'. Yet, the Obama administration reframed the issue and included the trade and economic aspect into its strategy. Fourth, the all-the-way-down approach by Secretary Clinton seems underway. Transnational cooperation between government officials were not as much part of the administration's discourse as they are put into practice. The different working groups, the establishment of the permanent office and cross-border cooperation seem to be an essential part of the new strategy. Fifth, the concept of security was changed, which is clearly reflected in the strategy and instruments. Referring constantly to the people, citizens and communities, the Obama administration defined the fourth pillar of Merida and Beyond, to build strong and resilient communities. A tremendous increase in financing for related projects is nonetheless harshly put into perspective when looking at total numbers. Taken the framing of the subject into account and recognizing that the fourth pillar clearly receives the smallest portion of the budget, the balance between the two seems disproportionate. Sixth, on the domestic side, the Obama administration has attributed some funds to reduce demand in the U.S.. It has also started programs to counter the illicit weapons-flow south and enhanced financial intelligence cooperation with the GOM to identify drug-related assets within the U.S.. Still, these measures make up a rather light portion of the effort, despite reiterating the shared responsibility for the subject.

C) Comparison

1. Differences

The first difference in the way the two administrations treated the issue and the policies they elaborated is the way they referred to the public. The Bush administration concluded a presidential agreement with the Calderón administration. The negotiations were held in private and neither U.S. nor Mexican legislation or civil society was included. That means the administration designed the whole Merida Initiative without external input and was able to push its own agenda to the fullest

\[203\] cf. Leahy, Patrick (D): On The Merida Initiative Congressional Record. op. cit.
extent. The Obama administration proceeded differently: It has to be noted that the new administration hardly had a choice since the policy was already under way and legislation and civil society on both sides of the border were awaiting Obama's stand toward Merida. Still, the administration adopted an approach that incorporated legislation and elaborated the new strategy much more in public than the Bush administration did. This is especially visible through the joint press statements after several bilateral meetings on the issue. Despite this public discourse, civil society has still been excluded in the process of defining the new strategy by the Obama administration just as by the Bush administration.

The strategy itself changed its focal point. While the Bush-Merida focused mainly on high-value-targeting of drug capos and equipment delivery to impede drug-flow into the U.S., the Obama administration adopted a more comprehensive approach. Besides curbing narcotrafficking, the new strategy focuses on socio-economic and institutional reform as well as supporting civil society.

The Bush presidency introduced the High-Level Consultative Group in order to coordinate the assistance with Mexico. Under *Merida and Beyond* the cooperation was institutionalized. First, bilateral working groups on different administrative levels were introduced. Then, a permanent office was installed to spur delivery and improve cooperation. While transnational cooperation played a minor role in the Bush-Merida Initiative, the Obama presidency focuses more on cross-border programs, especially along the border region. The bilateral all-the-way-down approach has been institutionalized down to the deputy secretary level and bilateral programs have been initiated.

Another change that has been made from one administration to another is the way the subject was elaborated. While the Bush presidency framed the subject in military terms and qualified it as a national security threat, the Obama administration de-militarized the discourse and reconstructed the issue as a criminal matter. While the Bush-Merida Initiative also emphasized the link between narcotraffickers and terrorism, using speech acts such as narco-terrorism, the Obama administration refrained from this. Looking at the budget attributed to the two strategies, the Bush presidency used the militarization strategy to justify the budget for military equipment and the military approach in itself. The securitization in these terms gave the impression that exceptional means were necessary to counter the 'threat'. The Obama administration still securitized the issue but in a different way. Not referring to it as an existential threat to the state but rather by framing it as a social and criminal issue, the Obama presidency changed the framing of the issue, which is reflected in the shift of

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204 For example, the visit by the Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives to Mexico in February 2009, right after President Obama took office.

205 See e.g. U.S. Embassy to Mexico: Merida Initiative At a Glance. *op. cit.*
instruments attributed.

Obama's *Merida and Beyond* encompasses four pillars, two of which are new and enlarge the needs that are defined. Pillar three and four are about creating a 21st century border and building strong and resilient communities. In contrast to the first Merida Initiative, the border is framed as a point of exchange between people and economies. While the Merida Initiative emphasized the shielding character of the southern U.S. border, promoting and boosting border security to intercept drugs and prevent illegal immigration, *Merida and Beyond* refers to the border as a place for exchange. This includes interception but is not reduced to it. The new strategy also emphasizes two-way inspection to address drug trafficking as well as weapon and money-bulk trafficking.206 Still, both these inspections will be performed by the Mexican officials. The second new pillar of *Merida and Beyond* is to build strong and resilient communities to withstand crime and violence. Although projects for civil society had been included in the initial initiative, they had only been funded with about 1% of the total budget. Building upon and expanding existing Merida-funded programs,207 *Merida and Beyond* funds through USAID projects for civil society to address socio-economic needs. Still, compared to the other pillars, the budget attributed to the fourth one is the smallest.208 In terms of funds, a general trend is visible: While the original Merida Initiative focused heavily on equipment such as aircraft and attributed only minor funding for training, *Merida and Beyond* has reversed the trend and attributes more funding for training than for equipment.

The domestic dimension of the Merida Initiative was non-existent. While the Bush presidency did allocate funds for demand reduction to Mexico upon request, no funding for domestic programs was provided. *Merida and Beyond* introduced programs to counter domestic demand reduction, measures against money laundering and the weapons-flow into Mexico. Yet again, in terms of budget attribution, these programs make up only a light portion of the overall allowance.

2. **Continuation**

The first change was the slight modification of the name from 'the Merida Initiative' to 'the Merida Initiative and Beyond'. It reflects the intention to enlarge and change the policy in place. At the


208 By October 2010 about $1,000,000 have been approved for 17 projects. See. Ribando Seelke, Clare and Finklea, Kristin M.: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation. *op. cit.*, p. 23.
same time, it shows continuance because it builds upon existing efforts. So in a way, the Obama administration promotes change while predicating the new strategy on the old one.

Pillar one and two can be identified as the basis of the Merida Initiative upon which the new strategy was built. The need to break the power of the cartels, originally articulated by the Bush administration, has been endorsed by the Obama administration as well. The shift from the supply of equipment to the enhancement of intelligence sharing and cross-border law enforcement operations presents the continuation of the initial Merida policy\(^{209}\); first the equipment was delivered and training was provided to empower Mexican police forces to arrest high-ranking narcotraffickers. In a second step, *Merida and Beyond* complements this approach by providing information and cooperating in investigations. Also, the title of the first pillar in the Obama strategy does not limit funds to disrupting the capacity of drug-trafficking organizations but includes 'organized crime' in general. This leaves the possibility to address other forms of organized crime such as human trafficking or alien smuggling.

The second pillar forms the other official continuation of the Merida Initiative. The Bush administration focused on capacity building in the judicial system of Mexico. The Obama administration calls this institutionalizing the rule of law by reforming police, the judicial and penal system.\(^{210}\) The initial Merida initiative attributed already big funds for training and special equipment for the judicial sector. *Merida and Beyond* builds upon this and attributes $207,000,000 to the item 'Governing Justly and Democratically', increasing the former budget in 2011 by more than 100%.\(^{211}\) Even if the new strategy attributes significantly more funds to this pillar, it still constitutes a part of the first initiative.

Another consistency in the two strategies is the importance attributed to border security. The Bush administration attributed significant funds to equipment for border personnel and referred to the border consistently in discourse. Although contextualizing the issue differently, the Obama administration similarly attached great importance to the question of border security. Changing the discourse and hence the perspective from illegal immigration, that supposedly goes hand in hand with drug-trafficking, to economic exchange and security in the border region does not however change the core of the strategic goal: to secure the border and to prevent illicit substance smuggling. Also with regard to border security, President Bush deployed 6,000 National Guard troops along the


\(^{210}\) cf. U.S. Embassy to Mexico: Merida Initiative At a Glance - The Road to the High Level Consultative Group Meeting. *op. cit.*

southern border in 2006.\textsuperscript{212} In May 2010, after the escalation of violence on the Mexican side of the border, President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol.\textsuperscript{213}

An additional trend that can be found in both strategies is the relatively small attribution of funds for domestic programs. Although the Obama administration introduced domestic programs for the first time, the relative portion with regard to the whole program rests fractional. This point can be interpreted in two ways: one could emphasize the fact that there has been a change but at the same time the change does not match the discourse by the administration on domestic responsibility of the United States.

**D) Conclusion (De)Securitization**

To conclude, a number of factors can be reemphasized. The way the two administrations securitized and constructed the issue differed significantly. While the Bush administration excluded the public and Congress from the elaboration of the strategy to the extent that Congressmen learned about its existence from the media, the Obama administration negotiated more publicly. The Bush administration militarized the subject both through discourse and then by attributing funds mostly to equipment, the military and security agencies. The Obama presidency shifted away from this approach and focused more on civilian institutions and included funding for communities and civil society. This reflects the re-conceptualization of security away from the classical understanding toward a more comprehensive concept. Still, a great number of programs and goals were kept in Merida and Beyond such as the first two pillars and concerns addressed by the Bush administration were elaborated and addressed.

So, even though there has been a significant shifting in the policy from one presidency to the other, the “paradigmatic change”\textsuperscript{214} announced for Merida and Beyond is exaggerated. Building on the foundations of the first Merida Initiative, the new strategy can be described as a reorientation of existing efforts.

**IV. Identities, Norms and Cognition**


\textsuperscript{214} Clinton Hillary: Joint Statement of the Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime. \textit{op. cit.}
Why were there so many changes between the Bush and the Obama administration with regard to the Merida Initiative? And, if such radical change was to happen, why did the Obama administration not put aside the Bush administration's strategy completely and start over again, leaving aside the military dimension? As seen in part three, a number of changes have occurred, most significantly the broadening of the initiative and the move away from delivering heavy machinery and other equipment. Still, the military dimension of *Merida and Beyond* remains significant and the question is why.

Four external factors can be identified: first, the increased violence in Mexico is to mention. In Mexico, the Calderón administration started its campaign against organized crime and, with the support of the Bush administration's Merida Initiative, deployed the military to take action against drug traffickers. The strategy to focus on the arrest of leading members of the cartels resulted in the decapitation of different cartels. These arrests spurred the competition among drug trafficking organizations, destabilizing prior balance between these organizations, which lead to a very steep increase in violence in 2009.\(^{215}\) The Calderón administration rethought its strategy and addressed these needs to the Obama administration. For the Obama administration the violence and its visual display in the streets together with the feedback of the GOM was a first indicator that the strategy would have to be readjusted. The fact that it took the Obama administration until August 2009 to put the issue on the agenda seems to depend on issues like Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq that the new presidency devoted most of its attention in foreign politics to. Focusing on the U.S. side, there will be three levels that will be analyzed in this part: first, the special relation between the United States and the Latin American continent and its impact on U.S. norms vis-à-vis this region; second, the identities of the Republican and the Democratic Party respectively; and third, the cognitive background of the key decision-makers involved in drafting both the Merida Initiative and *Merida and Beyond*. These different levels of analysis seek to draw a comprehensive picture of the cognitive background against which the initiatives were elaborated, certain instruments were chosen and others were discarded.

**A) Norms in U.S. – Latin American relations**

There are several factors that have to be analyzed in order to understand why there was such a significant conceptual change in U.S. policy toward Mexico with the turnover of the new

\(^{215}\) For example, in December 2009 alone, the monthly death toll has exceeded 1,000 casualties. cf.: The Guardian: Mexico drug war murders. Online Spreadsheet.: https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdHU3cVdwbmVLaWpoMkJOcU5BZlFVcUE&hl=en#gid=0
presidency. On the national level it is important to analyze the relation between the United States and Latin America as a collective conscience and norms influencing today's policies. Defining norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors”, it is important to turn to prior U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and the norms it created over time. Since the early 19th century, the U.S. sought to dominate the Latin American continent. The Monroe doctrine laid the foundation for the U.S. claim for hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Breaking with former isolationism, the U.S. from then on regarded Latin America as their direct sphere of influence. Using 'Dollar' and 'Gun Boat Diplomacy' in regular interventions, the USG sought to protect its domestic economy. This way the United States laid the foundation, establishing a perception of Latin America as its own backyard and hence deriving the norms for themselves to military intervene when deemed necessary. The 'good neighbor policy' introduced in the 1930's halted military interventions, but used economic means to exercise power upon Latin American states. After World War II the U.S. reengaged actively in Latin American domestic politics. Most visibly during the Nixon and the Ford administration, the U.S. supported the coup d'état against the Allende presidency in Chile in 1973, supported the Brazilian and Paraguayan dictatorship and backed the Argentinian coup in 1976 with military assistance. After the failed intervention in Cuba, the Kennedy administration refrained from direct military interference. Kennedy introduced the 'Alliance for Progress' in order to deepen economic ties with the U.S. and impede further left-wing revolutions. President Carter adopted a different approach to Latin America and tried to curb dictatorships, adopting a discourse much more focused on humanitarian norms. The Reagan presidency reversed this trend and refocused on military options as foreign policy instruments.

This very brief overview shows the way the U.S. treats Latin America as its own sphere of influence. With the Monroe doctrine as a general legitimation for interference, the U.S. has exercised influence over the continent either militarily or economically since 1823. The most recent

216 Checkel, Jeffrey T.: Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe. op. cit., p. 83.
219 Ibid., p.159.
223 See e.g. Carter, Jimmy: Inaugural address. 20.1.1977.
examples are Plan Colombia, an ongoing initiative for, mostly military, assistance to the Colombian government in its struggle against paramilitaries, guerillas and narco-traffic, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), including Mexico and Canada, and its proposed extension to all the Americas as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This shows that the United States still try to exercise influence over the American continent as a whole. Still, after the end of the Cold War, military assistance diminished and was, before Merida, only apparent in the context of Plan Colombia. Therefore, we can identify a certain continuance of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America. Nevertheless, despite overall persistence of the exceptional character of Latin America as clear U.S. sphere of influence, U.S. foreign policy has varied between administrations: As seen above, since the end of World War II, Republican administrations tended to focus on military support, or even military interventions in order to defend what they qualified U.S. interest in the Americas. Prominent examples are the Iran-Contra Affair or U.S. military support for the Pinochet regime. While Democratic Presidents such as Kennedy and Carter still tried to maintain U.S. influence, they adopted another approach: Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress and Carter refrained from military assistance. Both focused on economic development in order to promote free markets and strengthen economic influence. Still, Kennedy also did order to execute the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the invasion of Cuba through a CIA intervention. Also, the Clinton presidency initiated Plan Colombia, a military assistance plan which transferred heavy equipment, provided training and even deployed U.S. military personnel to Colombia. It shows that there is a significant difference in discourse between Republican and Democratic administrations that is reflected in the repeated shift from a military to an economic focus. Still, the United States claim the Americas as their sphere of influence and both Republicans and Democrats have authorized military assistance as well as military interventions when deemed necessary. These interventionist norms have transcended different governments and prevailed: Be they economic or military in nature, the U.S. perceive themselves as the legitimate hegemon in the Western Hemisphere.

226 NAFTA Secretariat: http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/.
230 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library: The bay of pigs. sine dato.
B) Party identities

When analyzing the political change from one administration to another, this change is also a transition from a Republican government to a presidency lead by Democrats. Looking at the way Republicans and Democrats tend to see themselves and define their identity, a number of differences can be identified:

Republicans associate themselves with conservative values in U.S. politics while Democrats are rather liberal. The first and most important issue to the Republican Party is national defense.\(^{232}\) The Republican Party (GOP) still relies on the basic concept of peace through military strength and cites Ronald Reagan's Cold War approach as essential for today as it was at the time.\(^{233}\) The GOP hence adopts a very traditional approach of security and peace: peace is the absence of war through deterrence. National defense is for the Republican Party essentially defending the homeland militarily. The discourse of Republican representatives in Congress shows the way they perceive the situation in Mexico: as a threat to national security.\(^{234}\) Following the logic that the protection of the homeland is the top priority for Republicans, this demands and justifies high spending and even military deployment. The Mexican-U.S. relation is marked by a suspicion from Mexico \textit{vis-à-vis} the U.S. with respect to national sovereignty. Having initiated the demand of assistance, the GOM made it clear that a troop deployment by the U.S. into Mexico was not an option.\(^{235}\) Adopting the traditional and conservative approach that defines Republican identity, a support of the partner state's military seems coherent. This strategy is in line with assistance programs carried out in other Republican presidencies such as Nixon\(^{236}\) or Reagan\(^{237}\). When the deployment of troops is esteemed unfavorable, for domestic or external reasons, military assistance is considered.

The Democratic Party presents itself in a different light. Its image and identity is based much more upon civil issues. On its website the party presents its inherent issues which constitute the norms the party founds itself upon (‘what we stand for’).\(^{238}\) Out of 17 issues that define the Democratic identity, only one touches National Security. This subject ranges not on top of the list and is embedded among a range of social issues. Thus, a clear tendency toward social and economic matters is visible. The Democratic Party puts forth its strategic goals for National Security as

\(^{233}\) \url{http://www.gop.com/index.php/issues/issues/}
\(^{234}\) Ibid., National Defense.
\(^{235}\) Bush, George W., Calderón, Felipe and Harper, Stephen J.: Joint News Conference in Montebello. \textit{op. cit.}
\(^{236}\) The 'Nixon-Doctrine': e.g. military support for Saudi-Arabia and Iran in the 1970's. cf. Encyclopedia of the New American Nation: Arms Transfers and Trade –The Vietnam war and the Nixon doctrine. sine dato.
\(^{237}\) e.g. US support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war or the Iran-Contra-Affair.
'Ending the War in Iraq', 'Securing America's Border' and 'Reducing the threat of Nuclear Weapons'. This shows the approach the Democratic Party is taking on National Security. In contrast to Republicans, the Democratic Party emphasizes the reduction of weapons and the ending of the war in Iraq. The securing of the border is framed as “the work of federal law enforcement officials [...] with state, local, and tribal law enforcement”, identifying civil law enforcement as the appropriate instrument to secure the border. In its strategic document, 'The 2008 Democratic National Platform', still being the guiding document for the party today, the Democratic National Committee defines its strategic goals. The security concept advanced in the platform shows a much broader vision of security than the one promoted by the GOP: energy security, countering climate change, global health, democratic development, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the pursuit of abolishing nuclear weapons are some of the issues defined by the party. This concept of security not only enlarges the scope of what security defines, it also pushes for a demilitarization in certain parts, which clearly differentiates this concept from the concept of the Republican party. This concept reflects the norms and the identity of the Democratic Party and constitutes the background against which the new concept for the Merida Initiative was elaborated. Paired with Mexico's demand for a broader approach that goes beyond the supply for equipment and encompasses dimensions such as institution building, the identity of the Democratic Party is clearly reflected in Merida and Beyond.

C) Key decision-makers' cognitive backgrounds

a) Identifying key decision-makers

The first step in analyzing the cognition of decision-makers is to define who elaborated and shaped the strategies. In this context, it is essential to note that both Merida and Merida and Beyond are cooperative strategies, elaborated conjointly by the U.S. and Mexican governments. Both the Bush administration and the Obama administration noted that they want to assist Mexico’s government in its effort to meet the challenges. That is to say that the U.S., as some analysts describe it, follows

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239 Ibid., National Security.
240 Ibidem.
242 Ibid., pp. 27-44.
243 Bailey, John: Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico. op. cit.
Mexico's lead. I question this assessment to a certain extent. Against the background of the difficult U.S.-Mexican relations in the past, in particular with regard to Mexico's sovereignty and the sensitive relation between the two armed forces, it seems certain that the U.S. emphasize Mexico’s leading role in the process and underline its sovereignty. Still, the strategies were elaborated jointly and in cooperation. Also, the USG significantly influences the strategy by deciding what fund to attribute to which area of the strategy. Throughout the framing of the issue, both presidencies referred to U.S. national interest that the respective strategies addressed and discourse in Congress also testifies of the pushing of domestic agendas in the framework of both Merida Initiatives. Additionally, it is ultimately U.S. funding that makes cooperation between the two countries possible. This factor indicates the influence the USG has in shaping particular policies. Thus, the two strategies have to be seen as the product of negotiations between the GOM and the USG with an emphasis on Mexico's leading role, but it would be oversimplified to conclude that the U.S. would just follow Mexico's lead. Against this background I will consider the input of the U.S. side into the strategies as critical to the policy as a whole. Thus, to understand why Merida and Merida and Beyond differ in certain aspects while adopting similar approaches in other areas, I will focus on norms and identities by USG officials who significantly contributed to shaping respective policies. To identify these norms and identities I will use the cognitive framework elaborated in chapter two of this study. To operationalize the approach I will first identify key decision-makers in the Bush and the Obama administration that were involved in shaping the two strategies. Then, I will analyze their personal background and discourse in order to understand their core belief-systems and the simplified images they construct for themselves of the situation in Mexico. This will allow me to analyze how they perceive the situation and why they preferred certain policies to others.

At the first glance, it seems difficult to determine the key decision-makers within the Bush administration that contributed to shaping the Merida Initiative. This is due to the way the initiative was negotiated. The Bush presidency designed the strategy in cooperation with the Calderón administration as a presidential agreement. The two governments did so in private without

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244 The USG is aware of the unprecedented willingness of the GOM to work together and of the sensitive background against which this cooperation will take place. See e.g. Shannon, Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State: Testimony Before the Subcommittee On State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs of the House Committee on Appropriations. 10.3.2009.

245 In talks between the Presidents, Secretary of States and within the High-Level Consultative Groups. See: U.S. Embassy to Mexico: Merida Initiative At a Glance. op. cit.

246 For the Bush administration cf.: U.S. Department of State and Government of Mexico: Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative. op. cit.; for the Obama administration cf.: White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderón of Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada. op. cit.

informing neither Congress nor civil society. Initially, the President-elect Caldéron expressed interest in a bilateral cooperation on drug trafficking when visiting Washington D.C. in November 2006. This was followed by negotiations in March and May 2007. Congress learned about these developments as late as in summer 2007 and was briefed by the State Department only in mid-September. Still, there is no concrete information on who was involved in designing the agreement but there are indicators that suggest the key personnel involved:

First and foremost, the initiative was based on a joint meeting by President Bush and President Calderón in Merida in March 2007. During his Latin American tour, President Bush's visit to Mexico constituted the first meeting after which strategic planning for the Merida Initiative started. Second, it was the State Department that was to brief Senate and the Secretary of State, who started negotiations with Mexico on the subject. Being the only person referred to besides the President, Secretary of State Rice is attributed a leading role in the initiative. Another important indicator to identify key personnel working on the initiative is to determine who briefed Congress. After strong protest from Congress for being bypassed, both Houses held first hearings on the Merida Initiative in November 2007. The experts testifying before Congress indicate who has been working on the issue. The experts invited were Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, and David Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. Lastly, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates played a key role in shaping contacts with the Mexican military and designing the Merida Initiative as being the main counterpart and prime contact for the Mexican military.

For the Obama administration, most of the key personnel were exchanged. The elaboration of the subject was done in a much more public way and information on participating officials is easier to find. Since first working mechanisms were already established, a bigger number of officials participated in the negotiations. Nonetheless, analyzing the discourse and searching for participants in initial negotiations, the number of key decision-makers can be limited. In order to operationalize the analysis, the most important power holders will be analyzed. This is, first, President Obama who

250 Ibid., p. 4.
251 Congressional Research Service: Merida Initiative – Background and Funding. op. cit., p. 1f.
re-initiated negotiations with President Calderón at a summit in Guadalajara in August 2009. This meeting initiated a process of strategic planning that was deepened by a meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Mexican counterpart. At this meeting in September 2009, the two ministers established the four pillars upon which Obama's *Merida and Beyond* would rest. The Merida Initiative had already established the High-Level Consultative Group consisting of cabinet-level officials whose purpose is "to set strategic direction" for the Merida Initiative. This Consultative Group included Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Carlos Pascual, U.S. ambassador to Mexico, identifying them as mainly responsible for bilateral negotiations and strategic development of the initiative.

**b) Analyzing key decision-makers’ cognition**

The narrative of national security, the securitization and ultimately militarization of the issue, by framing it in one context with terrorism and war-like wording, can be explained first as a tool to generate more funds, but also as part of a belief-system by the key actors and their respective concepts of security. Recalling the findings of the cognitive approaches to decision-making in international relations, it is important to note a number of aspects: Due to both limited information at hand and a limited capacity by individuals to process this information, the subjective perception by decision-makers is defined through a simplified image of the situation at hand. In order to make their decision, power-holders rely on past experience. This past experience form core beliefs that constitute norms, standards and guidance for future decisions. In order to identify these core beliefs, the background of key decision-makers will be studied, to determine why they drafted each strategy the way they did.

The first and most obvious factor that can account for the continuances between the Merida Initiative and *Merida and Beyond* is the fact that the Obama administration kept key officials from the Bush administration: Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs David Johnson. The two were involved in drafting both initiatives and stayed in office after the administration changed. Johnson, having studied at a military college and having worked for the conservative Heritage Foundation, did not...

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255 *Ibidem.*
258 International Narcotics Control Board: Member Profile David T. Johnson. sine dado.
259 Heritage Foundation, Official Website: http://www.heritage.org/.
not change his perceptions and beliefs when the administration changed. The same is true for Gates, who lead the George Bush School of Governance and was a close advisor to President Bush Sr. Keeping Gates and Johnson means that the Obama administration agrees at least to a certain extent with the policy they have promoted. It thus allows them to further exercise their function within the administration, influencing the new *Merida and Beyond* initiative.

President Bush himself showed on many occasions his preference for military over diplomatic or other approaches. Afghanistan and Iraq being the most obvious and prominent examples, Bush uses the discourse of war and terrorism as a tool. Within the Bush administration many key actors have a conservative military background: Condoleezza Rice is the leading figure and prime example of this. With regard to her perception of conflict situations, Rice's academic background is of importance: She was schooled in the ways of the Cold War, power politics being already at the center of her political reasoning. Yet, the 2001 terror attacks changed her: Friends of hers stated that, “already a conservative, she became convinced, [...] that she was helping to preside over nothing less than the struggle between modernity and fundamentalism, and [she] evolved along with Mr. Bush into more of a hard-liner.”

In an interview in 2003, Rice stated that “Power matters. But there can be no absence of moral content in American foreign policy […]. Europeans giggle at this and say we’re naive and so on, but we’re not Europeans, we’re Americans – and we have different principles.” The statement underlines the exceptional role Rice sees the United States in and the principle or norms that distinguish them from 'Europeans'. The combination of the Cold War, power politics-centered perception of world politics, together with the conviction of American exceptionalism is reflected in her 2000 manifest for a Republican-led U.S.-foreign policy: "Foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the country on key priorities: building a military ready to ensure American power, coping with rogue regimes, and managing Beijing and Moscow. Above all, the next president must be comfortable with America's special role as the world's leader." It clearly shows her focus on the military as the most important instrument in the foreign policy spectrum of the United States. This belief is reflected in her political discourse on major foreign policy issues during the Bush administration, such as the war against Iraq: “We do

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262 See e.g. Altheide, David L.: Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. 2006.
264 N.N.: Rice in her own words – a selection of her own comments on subjects as diverse as Baghdad and Brahms. In: BBC News Online. 17.11.2004.
need to remind everybody that tyrants don’t respond to any kind of appeasement. Tyrants don’t respond to negotiation. Tyrants respond to toughness. And that was true in the 1930s and 1940s when we failed to respond to tyranny, and it is true today.”

This statement shows her cognitive frame of reference in dealing with current policy issues. The historic reference to World War II and the beginning of the Cold War clearly indicates her core belief-systems in this matter and the cognitive background against which she constructs her image of current foreign policy affairs. Military strength and, if considered necessary, the resolution of problems by force as the most appropriate means and the cognitive, historical reference are reflected in several statements: “In light of 50 years of bondage of Eastern Europe, [invading the Soviet Union in 1948 to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons] was probably a reasonable thing to do.” Especially in her line of argumentation before the Iraq war in 2003: “Any time you have a situation in which you are calling for more time rather than calling for Iraq to immediately comply, it plays into the hands of Saddam Hussein.”

The statement illustrates how Rice believes that the military solution trumps all others. This power politics reasoning is also reflected in the total rejection of the Clinton administration's approach to foreign policy: “the Clinton administration's attachment to largely symbolic agreements and its pursuit of, at best, illusory 'norms' of international behavior have become an epidemic.”

Besides Rice, other officials playing an active role in designing the Merida Initiative show a similar background: David Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, who played a key role in elaborating the initiative, was stationed at the front line between the two blocks in Berlin during the Cold War. Johnson underwent a military education at the Royal Military College of Canada and worked for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. Being a career diplomat, Johnson has a militarily fashioned education and conservative values. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, is similarly educated to Rice, with a PhD in Soviet History and a long standing career in the CIA during the Cold War. Having been deputy director of the agency under President Reagan, Gates shows a technocratic, yet politically ambitious background. Having served under Bush Sr. as political advisor during Gulf War I., Gates

266 N.N.: Rice in her own words. op. cit.
268 N.N.: Rice in her own words. op. cit.
269 Rice, Condoleezza: Campaign 2000 – Promoting the National Interest. op. cit., p. 2.
270 U.S. Senate: The Antidrug Package For Mexico And Central America – An Evaluation. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 15.11.2007.
271 cf. briefings, e.g. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Guns, Drugs and Violence. op. cit.
272 Ibidem.
274 Ibidem.
became dean of the Bush School of Governance during the Clinton administration.\textsuperscript{275} The education and career steps indicate a conservative belief-systems and him being in line with military interventions as performed by the Bush and Reagan administrations. Another indicator for this is his involvement in the Iran-Contra Affair during Ronald Reagan's presidency,\textsuperscript{276} which shows a realist, pragmatic and functional approach to security, centered around interventions, equipment supply and power politics.

This traditional security concept of the Bush administration is also reflected in the education and professional career of other members shaping the Merida Initiative. While Obama's U.S. ambassador to Mexico was appointed for his competence with regard to the Merida Initiative, the Bush administration's ambassador Antonio Garza served since 2002, long before the initiative was launched. This is important to notice, since Garza has no visible expertise in security matters but focused on economic development and cooperation between the two countries.\textsuperscript{277} The economy playing literally no role in the Merida Initiative, it is interesting to turn to other senior officials that shaped the Merida Initiative. For example, John P. Walters, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, does belief in interdiction and in the need for equipment rather than comprehensive reforms.\textsuperscript{278} He is also referring to drug trafficking ‘threat’ as a ‘top national security matter’ and using vocabulary like ‘terrorist-mafias’,\textsuperscript{279} hinting at an interpretation of the situation that is focused solely on the security side. David Johnson, introduced above, also believes that the violence in Mexico needs a security-only approach. His image of the conflict and hence of the solution to it is that it requires “border security, interdiction, and criminal justice reform.”\textsuperscript{280}

These examples show how different backgrounds shape a common belief-system within the Bush administration, with a traditional definition of security in which the military is the central tool. This is reflected in the discourse and the elaboration of the issue. On the other hand, the Obama administration shares different views of the situation. The demilitarization of the discourse on the situation in Mexico is rooted in the image officials perceive the issue through and the core belief-systems against which it is mirrored.

President Obama worked as a social worker before getting involved in politics and was criticized

\textsuperscript{275} Ibidem.


See also: Garza, Antonio: Mexico is rich with promise as well as challenges. In: Dallas Morning News. 15.9.2010.


\textsuperscript{279} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{280} U.S. Senate: The Antidrug Package For Mexico And Central America. op. cit.
for allegedly having no experience in foreign and security policy during his campaign.\(^{281}\) Prior to taking office, he had not been educated by or affiliated with the military, which is reflected in his approach to foreign policy. Promoting negotiation and diplomacy over military tools was a cornerstone of his presidential campaign. The following statement from a Q&A during the run for president illustrates Obama's beliefs toward the military as a problem solving tool: “force is the costliest weapon in the arsenal of American power in terms of lives and treasure. And it’s far from the only measure of our strength.”\(^{282}\) Obama initiated *Merida and Beyond* and clearly refrained from the narrative of war and terrorism. Making use of the aforementioned 'other measures', Obama nominated Carlos Pascual as the central figure to U.S.-Mexican relations, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico. Pascual is an expert for crisis management and failed states and stands for a comprehensive approach to the situation.

The different approaches to security are at the heart of the differences between *Merida and Beyond*. Pascual's nomination mirrors a clear change of how security is thought and defined from one administration to the other. The Obama administration enlarged the concept and adopted a comprehensive approach. With Pascual playing a central role in the U.S.-Mexican cooperation in this regard,\(^{283}\) the Obama administration nominated a career diplomat with an educational and professional background in crisis management. He studied conflict management, failed states and economic development and is one of the leading U.S. experts on crises.\(^{284}\) Pascual worked for the UN Peacebuilding Fund, he founded the initiative on global insecurity and transnational threats at the liberal think tank Brookings Institute,\(^{285}\) coordinated U.S. civil assistance to Europe and Eurasia, e.g. Afghanistan, at USAID and became the first coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the State Department.\(^{286}\) His professional background is thus focused on civilian means for crisis solution from a non-military point of view. The following statement serves as a good example of the comprehensive image of security Pascual has: “Rather than placing climate change, nuclear security, economics and terrorism into separate organizational cones [we have to] develop integrated management strategies that capitalize on ways these issues affect each other.”\(^{287}\)

Secretary of State Clinton comes from a Republican family and was at first a supporter of the


\(^{285}\) Brookings Institution: Experts – Carlos Pascual. sine dato.


conservative movement before getting involved with student protests during the Vietnam War. During her time as a Democratic Senator, she served on the Senate Armed Services Committee and got involved with homeland security, yet she also defends a comprehensive approach to security: “I will work to build a world in which security and opportunity go hand in hand, a world that will be safer, more prosperous, and more just.”

“With education, the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other dreaded diseases, human rights as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, women’s rights and fight against global warming.” In an interview she stated clearly that she believes in multilateral and multilevel approaches to crises and clearly distanced herself from the foreign policy conception of the Bush administration.

The different ways security is perceived and thought by decision-makers is connected to the way they see foreign policy in general. The Bush administration focused on high-level diplomacy, while the Obama administration installed working groups on lower diplomatic and inter-institutional level and went so far as to institutionalize the cooperation between the two states. Why has there been this change in the way of the cooperation? As seen, the two administrations adopted two different concepts of security. George W. Bush stands for a unilateral approach to foreign policy in which the federal state plays the most important role. The state-centrism is reflected by other members of the Bush administration, for example Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, who was involved in the first bilateral negotiations between Mexico and the U.S., refers in speeches almost exclusively to the state when talking about regional strategies and approaches.

Classifying the situation in Mexico as solely a security threat, Shannon refers to the core competences of the state and thus does not include other levels of policy making. Having worked solely on inter-state posts within the State Department and as director for Inter-American Affairs on the Security Council, Shannon does not incorporate or mention civil society when addressing the situation in Mexico. Similarly, the aforementioned David Johnson considers the situation an issue for the Mexican state with which the United States can help. In accordance with a traditional security concept, only the countries’ high-level diplomacy will be involved in a possible solution. This implies a simplified image of the conflict in Mexico as solely related to the violence but not addressing root causes. The strategy of repressing the violence and reforming the security sector is coherent with the administration’s image of the conflict and its approach in other

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289 Ibidem.
290 Ibidem.
290 See e.g.: Shannon, Thomas A.: The Future of Inter-American Relations. Speech at Georgetown University, Washington DC, 8.6.2009.
291 U.S. Department of State: Thomas A. Shannon Jr. – Biography. sine dato.
situations (e.g. Afghanistan or Iraq). This image of the conflict might be partially due to the concept but also to prior experiences that the key decision-makers relate to when analyzing the situation. For example, David Johnson was United States Afghanistan Coordinator after the U.S. invasion from 2002-2003.

The Obama administration, based upon a different and enlarged concept of security, undertakes an approach that goes 'all-the-way-down'. Still, the images of the cooperation with regard to the level of cooperation differ within the administration. Secretary of State Clinton focuses more on the high-level diplomacy, less on lower-level cooperation and civil society. This might be due to her prior experience in politics. As First Lady she traveled not just with her husband but was also involved in important decision-making processes and showed great initiative herself.\(^{294}\) As a Senator she was on the Armed Services Committee and as Secretary of State she is engaged in high-level diplomacy only. Not having any particular prior connection to, or any significant experience in Mexico, Clinton seems to refer to these past experiences when assessing the situation in Mexico. On the other hand, important members of the Obama administration that were involved in elaborating *Merida and Beyond* have a different approach: Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano was Attorney General and later Governor of Arizona, a state that directly borders Mexico. Considering herself rather conservative,\(^{295}\) she still adopts a transnational perspective of the problem, incorporating civil society and lower-level governmental cooperation between Arizona and Mexico during her term as Arizona Governor.\(^{296}\) Napolitano has a different image of the problems that arise from the situation in Mexico and the solutions proposed: a multi-level approach. In her confirmation hearing she emphasized several times her experience on the ground.\(^{297}\) Having toured the border, visited the illegal tunnels and having seen the shelters of traffickers and immigrants affect the way she analyzes the needs and tools. Also, having worked at the state level, Napolitano does recognize the need to incorporate all levels of government in the Merida process. A third example of the way the Obama administration perceives the need for transnational cooperation, is the case of Carlos Pascual. As described before, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico is an expert in crisis management and failed states. Pascual made a strong case for incorporating civil society into the new Merida initiative.\(^{298}\) He also pushed for the 'whole of government approach'

\(^{294}\) Troy, Gil: *Hillary Rodham Clinton – Polarizing First Lady.* 2006, p. 68.


\(^{297}\) *Ibidem.*

\(^{298}\) Clinton, Hillary: Ambassador Carlos Pascual. *op. cit.*
and for institutionalization, reflected in the different working groups and the Bilateral Implementation Office. This can be accounted to his different approach to an image of the situation. Pascual's background is not the one of high-level or state-level politics but the one of failed states and crisis situations. As a scholar at the Brookings Institute he offered insight into the cornerstones of his core belief-system through policy and advocacy papers, interviews and reports: Pascual believes in the transformation of economies and civil society to end conflicts; he emphasizes the transnational nature of new security threats and the interconnection of global issues. Before becoming ambassador, Pascual promoted four stages to address crisis situations: first, to stabilize problems; second, to address their root causes; and third, to create laws and institutions of a market economy. Then, a multinational and transnational network must enable stakeholders within a given country to develop a long-term transition plan. These points are reflected in Merida and Beyond. The Merida Initiative addressed the first and the third pillar, while the new initiative also addressed the fourth one. Addressing the root causes is also targeted by funding some domestic programs and supporting demand reduction strategies in Mexico but do not live up to the size of the other parts. Still, Pascual shows a technical and less politically motivated approach. His image of crisis management clearly influenced Merida and Beyond which reflects most of his main beliefs to this end.

Changing the focus from the conceptual approach to analyzing change of focus, it is interesting to look at the way the border issue was constructed by the two administrations. The Bush administration focused on fortifying the border while Merida and Beyond also enhanced border security, engaging with border security and promoting legal cross-border commerce at the same time. The Bush administration did subscribe to a discourse of shared responsibility, yet perceived the actual problem as being abroad and not at home. Janet Napolitano, Secretary for Homeland Security, applied a similar concept for the border security of the state of Arizona, while incorporating a more cross-border perspective: She perceived the situation in Mexico from a local and regional perspective with several dimensions. While she promoted the consequent enforcement of existing laws against illegal trafficking as well as illegal immigration, she promoted

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299 Ibidem.
302 Pascual, Carlos: Memo to the President. op. cit.
304 This is reflected for example in the different concepts of security, the way the border is used to 'shield off' the violence, or the Bush administration not funding domestic demand reduction programs as part of the Merida Initiative. It is also consistent with the way previous administrations have intervened abroad (e.g. in Latin America, see chapter on U.S.-Latin American relations).
305 U.S. Senate: Janet Napolitano Confirmation Hearing. op. cit.
transnational regional commerce and commute between the two countries. Having been governor of a border state, Napolitano seems to be more sensitive to local business needs and to take the situation of border communities into account. This is reflected in *Merida and Beyond* and has been prioritized to become one of the four pillars that form the initiative. The ambition to build a 21st century border, focusing not exclusively on security aspects but incorporating civil society and cross-border communities, reflects Napolitano's beliefs to this end. Another parallel that can be drawn between Napolitano and *Merida and Beyond* is the sending of National Guards to protect the border by both the Bush and the Obama administration. President Bush deployed 6,000 National Guard troops along the southern border in 2006, and President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol in May 2010. It was Janet Napolitano who became the first governor to send the National Guard to the border. Four months later, President Bush adopted the same policy. At the time, she explained that the policy was a way to prepare for a comprehensive immigration reform for the public to accept. This shows that Napolitano does perceive the deployment of the National Guard as a part to prepare a comprehensive approach to immigration and border security. Her image of the situation has influenced both administrations and contributed to the decision of the Obama administration to make use of this tool despite the general trend to demilitarize the border.

Looking at the way *Merida and Beyond* incorporates domestic demand reduction programs, there has been a change, but only minor funding is attributed to this part of the initiative. This moderate and rather symbolic inclusion of domestic programs into the program reveals another cleavage in the Obama administration. While both the Bush and the Obama administration publicly assumed co-responsibility and pledged to tackle domestic demand for drugs, the Bush administration relied on existing programs. Hillary Clinton and Carlos Pascual are examples of decision-makers with a more comprehensive approach to the situation in Mexico, pushing for more domestic efforts to complement the initiative within Mexico. Nonetheless, a great number of decision-makers involved still view the issue less as a social but rather as a technical problem. Robert Gates, being Secretary of Defense, does naturally focus on military and intelligence dimensions, yet he does not incorporate the social dimension. David Johnson and Janet Napolitano have a similar image:

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306 U.S. Department of State: Secretary Clinton Leads Cabinet-Level Delegation to Mexico. *op. cit.*  
Napolitano takes a rather technical and judiciary stands toward a solution. Having worked among others as attorney general for Arizona, she has treated the drug problem solely from a legal perspective. Especially in her confirmation hearing for Secretary for Homeland Security, it becomes clear that she perceives the problem as not being a social one.\(^ {312} \) This ambiguity or disagreement about the nature of domestic drug consumption within the administration is clearly reflected in the Obama administration's initiative. The need for demand reduction within the U.S. has been politically acknowledged and put into action. But since drug consumption is still not perceived as a social but as a legal and technical problem, it seems clear that the administration is not ready to make this a top priority.

The Merida Initiative has been much criticized to be just another version of Plan Colombia, extending U.S. military influence into Mexico. Both administrations have clearly distanced themselves from this in order to avoid unwanted parallels with the highly controversial initiative in Colombia. Yet, the heavy involvement of the military in the Merida Initiative as well as Merida and Beyond recalls main elements of the U.S. strategy in Colombia. Looking at previous experience of decision-makers involved in drafting Merida and Merida and Beyond, it is striking that several of them have intensive experience with Colombia or associate Mexico with Colombia. Thomas Shannon was director of Andean Affairs and a senior member for Western Hemisphere at the State Department,\(^ {313} \) or John P. Walters, who was Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Walters regards Plan Colombia to be a success and sees it as an example for Mexico:

> “The Obama administration could draw attention to this magnificent example of turning the tide against drugs and terror and explain how it happened – a great drug war victory led by Colombia’s president and supported by both the Clinton and the Bush administrations. If similar efforts are led, adapted, and sustained in Mexico and Afghanistan, the damage caused by cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the United States and globally can be dramatically reduced.”\(^ {314} \)

Walters does not differentiate between Mexico, Afghanistan or Colombia; a simplified image of a high-ranking and influential decision-maker who helped to form the Merida Initiative. But this is not only the case for the Bush administration. The Obama administration also officially and publicly tried to distance itself from analogies between Mexico and Colombia, while this parallel seems to be one of the core beliefs of decision-makers that influence their perception and assessment of the situation in Mexico. The most prominent example is the one of Hillary Clinton: In 2009, while negotiations for Merida and Beyond were ongoing, Clinton assessed the situation in Mexico as

\(^ {311} \) U.S. Senate: The Antidrug Package For Mexico And Central America. op. cit.
\(^ {312} \) U.S. Senate: Janet Napolitano Confirmation Hearing. op. cit.
\(^ {313} \) U.S. Department of State: Thomas A. Shannon Jr. – Biography. op. cit.
follows: "It's looking more and more like Colombia looked 20 years ago, where the narco-traffickers controlled certain parts of the country," and "These drug cartels are showing more and more indices of insurgencies". Clinton came to the conclusion that "We need a much more vigorous U.S. presence" in Central America to help countries improve their law enforcement capacity to fight drug traffickers. This shows how parallels are drawn between the two cases and how this leads to the same solution for the different situations. Associating drug violence with the Colombian case and estimating the U.S. intervention and strategy in Colombia as a success, decision-makers of both administrations use this simplified image to deduce the same interpretation of the situation and thus to adopt similar measures. Right after this comment, Mexico rejected this analogy and mounted the pressure to the point that President Obama publicly contradicted the statement of his Secretary of State the next day. This incident illustrates well how both administrations try to avoid the comparison in public but how mental maps and simplified images do influence decision-makers' perception significantly. Perceiving the violence in Mexico through the lens of the Colombian conflict creates the simplified image that denies taking the particular circumstances of the conflict in Mexico into account. Even though decision-makers did not copy Plan Colombia, Mexico being extremely sensitive about its sovereignty and not allowing any U.S. military presence on its soil, elements such as the heavy military involvement show how strongly past experience with Colombia has influenced the assessment of the Mexican situation and the elaboration of both the Merida Initiative as well as Merida and Beyond. The vast public criticism of the Merida Initiative with special reference to Plan Colombia (‘Plan Mexico’) and the Mexican government being determined to avoid all analogy with Colombia have shaken these core beliefs in the decision-makers' cognitive systems. Yet, as Holsti shows, core beliefs do account for the choice of instruments in major policy decisions. Being so heavily interconnected with weaker beliefs, core beliefs such as the association of Mexico with the selective memory of a 'successful' solution to the problem in Colombia are very hard to alter. This is what happened in this case.

D) Conclusion Analysis

To sum up the findings of this section, several factors have been identified. Three levels have been

316 Ibidem.
analyzed in order to determine why certain changes have occurred from one administration to another while other policies were continued. The first level are the U.S. norms vis-à-vis its relation with Latin America. The analysis shows that the United States have a strong relationship with the region and perceive Latin America as its own sphere of influence. Several examples illustrate the way that economic and military interventions by the U.S. within the region are perceived as legitimate, and even necessary. It is part of a collective U.S. conscience that constructed norms since the early 19th century to the point that both, Republicans as much as Democrats, favor interventions. While respective administrations differ in their approach (military vs. economic intervention), it is a part of the collective strategy to act proactively within a given Latin American country when a development would cause perceived negative effects for the U.S. Thus, the strategy to preferably act abroad than to take domestic action can be identified as a mutually agreed-upon common belief of Republican as well as Democratic governments.

The second level of analysis focuses on differences between the two parties. The examination offered insight into the different focal points through which both parties define their respective identities: For the Republican Party the military strength of the United States plays a central role in defining themselves. This is true for domestic as well as foreign policy. With regard to the latter, the Republican Party draws heavily on the Reagan doctrine that favored foreign military intervention and foreign military assistance during the Cold War. The Democratic Party on the other hand focuses much more on social and economic issues as cornerstones of its identity. With regard to foreign policy, the party positions itself around issues that relate rather to demilitarization than to the militarized identity of the Republican Party. Thus, the image both parties present of themselves and that make up their respective inherent identity is reflected in the change from the militarization of the issue by the Bush administration to the demilitarization by the Obama presidency; from a purely military securitization and a Merida Initiative exclusively focused on Mexico and equipment delivery, to the more broadly adjusted *Merida and Beyond* that incorporates economic, civil and domestic dimensions.

The third level of analysis offered insight into the cognitive background of key decision-makers within each administration. After having identified these actors, the analysis showed that Robert Gates and David Johnson stayed in key positions after the change of administration. The analysis further showed that while the Bush administration had a conservative approach to security due to key decision-makers relying on Cold War concepts, their military background and core beliefs that favor military tools, the Obama administration officially adopted a more comprehensive security concept. Carlos Pascual, with his non-military crisis management background, stands as the prime
example of this enlarged concept. His conceptual proposals for crisis management, published prior to having been nominated ambassador to Mexico, are almost all adopted in *Merida and Beyond*. Furthermore, the switch from one administration to another, from an inter-state to an 'all-the-way-down' approach has clearly been influenced by Janet Napolitano, who has had previous successful experience with cross-border cooperation, and Carlos Pascual on the one hand and Hillary Clinton favoring high-level diplomacy on the other hand. The change from a traditional, state-focused concept by the Bush administration to multi-level plus civil society governance reflects the input and professional experience of the decision-makers involved. Also, with regard to the way the border issue has been constructed and prioritized, the change from fortifying the border to building a dynamic '21st century border' strongly reflects the priorities of Janet Napolitano, whose handwriting resembles earlier policies she drafted. *Merida and Beyond* introducing domestic demand reduction programs clearly relates to the question how drug traffic and thus drug consumption is perceived. Here, again, key decision-makers of the Obama administration do not have a common belief-system: While Pascual and Clinton perceive the drug issue rather as a social problem, Gates, Johnson and Napolitano have a rather technical and judiciary image of the issue. Thus, there has been a change toward including new social domestic programs, to reduce the demand within the United States into *Merida and Beyond*. Yet, these programs represent but a fraction of the whole budget.

And lastly, this analysis revealed how transcended core beliefs that arise from past experiences and derive from simplified images that influenced both the Merida Initiative as well as *Merida and Beyond*. In both administrations key decision-makers related the conflict in Mexico to other conflicts, namely the one in Colombia, sometimes even to Afghanistan. This explains partially the continuing important role the military plays in both strategies, as well as the resemblance between the Merida Initiative, having been criticized as 'Plan Mexico', and Plan Colombia. The analogy shows the cognitive simplification and assimilation of two different conflicts, both centering around drugs but being systemically and inherently distinct cases, providing for the core belief that leads to a similar choice of tools.

Altogether, this analysis has shown how the cognitive background of key decision-makers can account for the changes and the continuation of parts of the U.S. strategy toward Mexico. Professional and educational experiences build the background against which policy-makers mirror new situations and create their images thereof. This in turn is reflected in the policies and strategies they draft, accounting for structural setting of strategic priorities.
V. Findings and Conclusion

This analysis answered two questions with regard to U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico within their common strategy against drug-trafficking. The first question was whether, and if so, to what extent there was a change in the Merida Initiative from the Bush to the Obama administration. The second question, based upon results of the first one, was how this (non-)change can be explained. At a first glance, the answers seemed to be clear due to the way the Obama administration tried to clearly distinguish itself from its predecessor and the change it sought to bring about in U.S.-foreign policy in general and the “paradigmatic change”\textsuperscript{319} for the Merida Initiative in particular. Thus, I formulated the first hypothesis in the beginning: I presumed that there was a clear change in policy and strategy toward Mexico from one administration to another. In the second part of the analysis, I examined why the presumed change in policy happened. My second hypothesis was that a distinct strategy was formulated due to the exchange of key decision-makers and their respective cognitive backgrounds. In order to determine whether these presumptions were correct and to answer the aforementioned questions, I first analyzed the way both administrations constructed the issue and contrasted the findings against the means attributed to the initiative by each presidency. In a second analysis, I drew upon the findings of the first analysis to analyze normative, cognitive and identity factors.

In a first step, I laid out the theoretical and conceptual avenues for the analysis. Subscribing to a constructivist approach, norms, identities and collective conscience were identified as main factors determining and influencing the perception and thus the choice of agents.

Having established the general theoretical framework for the analysis, I turned to Waever's concept of securitization and desecuritization. This approach is based upon the assumption that discourse has a direct impact on the choice of instruments: Waever argues that by using security-related vocabulary, speakers and audience relate to certain mechanisms and tools; by framing an issue with a certain vocabulary, according means can be mobilized. If an issue is elaborated in security-related terms such as war, threat or national security, Waever talks about the 'securitization' of the issue. By implying that the issue constitutes a threat, according means such as military or police instruments can be attributed. This is also true for the other way around: Desecuritizing an issue means to refrain from security-related terms when framing the issue. This permits to use other, softer

\textsuperscript{319} Clinton Hillary: Joint Statement of the Merida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime. \textit{op. cit.}
instruments, according to the framework of reference. Thus, according to Waever, the processes of securitization and desecuritization as raising or lowering the threshold to mobilize different types of instruments is done through the speech act. For the second part of the analysis, I turned to different cognitive concepts. By first introducing the fundamental functioning of information processing in the human brain, I built a foundation to understand the separate cognitive concepts in international relations. Identifying education, past experience and the limited information processing capacity of an individual as important factors leading to selective memory, I pointed out the important role that oversimplified perception of situations plays in the decision-making process. I explained and subscribed to the analytical approaches of cognitive mapping and the operational code in order to determine against which cognitive background key U.S. decision-makers have perceived the situation in Mexico. Thus, I identified the following main concepts for my analysis: the simplified images and the core belief-systems of decision-makers.

For the first part of the analysis, I used discourse analysis, examining the speech act of the Bush administration. The Bush administration framed the issue in military terms, bypassing Congress and attaching the funding request to the '2008 Iraq War supplemental funding bill'. The whole elaboration of the subject to this end is reminiscent of post World War II practice and discourse in the U.S. with regard to military interventions. The Bush administration securitized the issue in an almost purely military way, leading me to talk about the militarization of the issue. The second finding is that members of the administration and the Republican Party used the speech act of terrorism to assimilate drug-traffickers and terrorists. Thirdly, the border and illegal immigration were securitized in this context and mixed in with the drug-trafficking issue. The securitization of the issue suggests urgency and allows to mobilize harsher means and instruments, which is clearly reflected in the budget for the Merida Initiative. The overwhelming majority of the funding is attributed to equipment for the Mexican military and, second to that, other Mexican security institutions. Capacity building and training for authorities make up only a fraction of the budget for equipment. Furthermore, transnational cooperation between agencies and communities is hardly envisioned and funds for projects of the civil society make up less than 1% of the total budget, putting the administration's promises to this end into perspective. Similarly, funding for demand reduction programs in Mexico was only initiated after an explicit request by the GOM. Such programs, or addressing gun running and money laundering, are not envisioned at all within the U.S. challenging the discourse of co-responsibility.

Thus, the way the issue was constructed and securitized by the Bush administration is mirrored in the strategy, heavily relying on the supply of military and security equipment. At the same time,
there is a discrepancy between Bush's discourse of shared responsibility and the non-funding of complementing programs and strategies within the U.S.

In contrast, the Obama administration clearly refrained from military terms when framing the issue. Firstly, the Obama administration avoided language associated with war, like 'threat', 'battle' or 'fight' and thus demilitarized the issue. While the administration did use the speech act of security, the new administration lowered the threshold. Demilitarizing the issue and eradicating the speech act of terrorism, it detached terrorism from drug-trafficking. This suggested a different approach in general. Secondly, the concept of security was changed from a traditional to a more comprehensive one, including social and economic factors among others. Thirdly, the new presidency reframed the question of border security, excluding the aspect of illegal immigration. The security aspect remains important but is complemented by local trade and economic aspects. Additionally, the new discourse, shifting away from being centered around the military and security agencies, emphasizes the role of civil society. This was a step toward desecuritizing the issue to a certain extent and to reframe it as a complex set of problems. While negotiations of the Obama administration have been more public, they still excluded the civil society. The new discourse and speech act is reflected in the means attributed to Merida and Beyond. The budget includes a much bigger portion for civilian institutions as well as training, and shifts away from expensive equipment deliveries. The enlarged discourse on the U.S.-Mexican border is mirrored by introducing a more comprehensive approach as one of the four new pillars making up Merida and Beyond and has thus been attributed much more attention. Also, there has been a shift from secretive high-level diplomacy toward an all-the-way-down government approach that allows more transnational cooperation. In addition, the Obama administration defined the fourth pillar of Merida and Beyond to build strong and resilient communities, reflecting the discourse on communities, the people and civil society. The tremendous increase in financing for related projects is nonetheless harshly put into perspective when one looks at total numbers. And lastly, on the domestic side, the Obama administration has attributed some funds to reduce drug demand in the U.S. Still, these measures seem to make up a rather light portion of the effort, despite reiterating the shared responsibility for the subject.

Contrasting both strategies and answering the first question of the analysis, there were in fact big differences in the way both presidencies constructed the issue and in the instruments they attributed respectively. While the Bush administration constructed the issue in military terms and accordingly attributed most of the budget to military and security agencies, focusing on equipment, the Obama administration demilitarized the subject and reframed it in non-military, civilian terms. This change is clearly reflected in Merida and Beyond, constituting a clear change in strategy. Furthermore, the border topic has been reframed and changed from the strategy to seal off the frontier that had been
used by the Bush administration, to what the Obama presidency labels a ‘21st century border’. Again, desecuritizing the issue allowed to broaden the means that now include economic and community instruments. Generally, the Obama administration changed from the equipment-focused approach to a more comprehensive model enforcing capacity building, intelligence cooperation, reforming the security and judiciary sector and strengthening civil society. Lastly, the Obama administration introduced limited funding for domestic programs, which had not been the case for the Bush presidency.

Yet, a great number of programs and goals were not altered from one presidency to the other. *Merida and Beyond* builds on prior strategies and endorses its core goals: breaking the power of the cartels. Pillar one and two of *Merida and Beyond* are this foundation and are still the best-funded portions of the strategy. Also, Obama, similarly to Bush, attached great importance to the question of border security. While reframing and enlarging the scope of the subject, the core objective is still a question of security. And lastly, the domestic programs still make up less than 1% of the Merida budget. Thus, while there has been a change, it has been more symbolic in nature and does not at all match the importance attributed to it in Obama's discourse.

Altogether, my hypothesis that there has been a clear change from on administration to the other can be confirmed only partially. So, to answer the question, there has been a partial change in strategies. While the discourse changed and the subject was clearly reframed and demilitarized, this change has not been completely translated into the strategy itself. *Merida and Beyond* alters the Merida Initiative but still relies on core strategies that were outlined before. Still, the shift from a traditional toward a comprehensive security concept is clearly visible and reflected in *Merida and Beyond*.

Building on these findings, the last part analyzed the question why this partial change happened. To do so, I hypothesized that the decision-maker's cognition plays a decisive role in the perception of an issue and thus in its construction and the choice of respective instruments. I therefore examined the perception on three levels: the national level, the perception along party lines, and on the personal cognitive level of key decision-makers involved in drafting the strategies. The main focus lying on the third category, I included three dimensions into the analysis of the cognitive background: the personal background influencing core belief-systems and simplified images.

With regard to the national level and U.S.-Latin American relations, the analysis showed that the U.S. has a long history of interventionism in Latin America. The United States perceive the region as their inherent sphere of influence. While there have been changes in the ways the interventions were performed, ranging from military to economic interventions, one can identify the strategy to intervene abroad as being part of the U.S. collective conscience and as an operational norm.
On the second level of analysis, these shifts from military to economic interventions become clearer when examining the differences in the collective consciences along party lines. Defense policy and a strong military are of defining character for the identity of the Republican Party. Relying on foreign policy concepts used by the Reagan administration during the Cold War, amongst which there was heavy military assistance to Latin American regimes, the Republicans adopt a strictly traditional concept of security. In contrast, defense, security and military play only a subordinated role in the identity of the Democratic Party. Focusing on social and economic issues as cornerstones of Democratic identity, the party promotes issues such as non-proliferation and adopts a comprehensive concept of security.

With regard to the largest part of the analysis, there are several factors that were identified to have impacted the decision-makers in shaping both initiatives. First, the different security concepts that became obvious in the way the administrations constructed the issue and that make up part of respective party identity can be explained with the scholarly and professional background of key decision-makers. Bush administration's officials have been Cold War-educated in military institutions, involved in CIA interventions in Central America during the Reagan Administration and prior academic Soviet Union specialists, which make up their respective educational and professional backgrounds. In contrast to that, the Obama administration assigned officials with a rather civil background to key positions involved with Merida and Beyond. This reflects the rather demilitarized approach this administration takes toward the issue as well as the comprehensive security concept of the Democratic Party. The professional and personal backgrounds as well as core belief-systems of key players are clearly reflected in Merida and Beyond. To name the most important ones, Carlos Pascual's education and professional experience in crisis management and failed states played an important role in adopting a more civil approach and in focusing on institutional reform. Also, Janet Napolitano and her 'hands-on' experience as attorney general and later governor of Arizona is reflected in the emphasis on the 21st century border. While the Bush administration's officials involved in drafting the Merida Initiative had a rather homogenous cognitive background with norms and shared ideas coinciding largely, the Obama administration paints a more pluralistic picture in terms of shared ideas and personal cognition. Being rather conservative, Robert Gates or Janet Napolitano have a rather technical or legal perception of the drug-trafficking issue while Carlos Pascual or Barack Obama perceive the issue as being rather a social one. This fraction within the administration shows in the ambiguity of Merida and Beyond, especially with regard to the border and domestic programs. As a last important aspect, the simplified images against which decisions were taken have been identified. Both administrations employed personnel that relate the situation in Mexico to situations in Colombia or Afghanistan.
Cognitive assimilation of these distinct settings leads to a choice of similar instruments. Thus, factors that can account for the changes from one strategy to another include (1) the distinct party identities that go along with different security concepts; (2) the exchange of personnel bringing in different cognitive backgrounds due to diverse educational and professional experiences; (3) the personal input and concepts of key decision-makers that are mirrored in changes adopted, particularly with regard to the approach to border security and civilian crisis management concepts. Meanwhile, a number of factors account for the continuation and the non-change between the Merida Initiative and Merida and Beyond: (1) the U.S. norm to legitimately intervene in Latin America, be it militarily or economically; (2) the fact that the Obama administration kept key decision-makers from the Bush presidency that helped draft the initial Merida Initiative; (3) simplified images and the association of the situation in Mexico with the one in Colombia or Afghanistan by top officials; (4) the diverging perception of the drug-trafficking issue among Obama officials as being either a technical/legal or a social issue.

Altogether this means that my second hypothesis has been confirmed. The cognitive background with individual belief-systems, educational as well as professional backgrounds, and the reference to prior experiences in simplified images, do both account for the changes as well as the continuances of the strategies. Additionally to the personal level, shared ideas in the form of national norms and party identity influence the choice of instruments and means.

This analysis fills the void in current research that was identified in the introduction. By adopting the concepts of securitization and cognitive approaches to the analysis of the U.S. strategy toward Mexico, this analysis introduced a new perspective to U.S. foreign policy toward Mexico and the 'war on drugs'. The next step in the research can be to test whether the findings of this case study can be extrapolated with regard to the 'war on drugs' in general. In order to identify core beliefs of decision-makers in the construction of the 'war on drugs' and to test if they correspond with the findings of this research, further case studies will be needed.

Current research on international anti-drug strategies advocates a radical shift in the U.S. strategy altogether: A recent report on international drug policy by a distinguished group from academia, civil society and high ranking civil servants including Kofi Annan and Javier Solana suggests a change in drug policy away from an interdiction policy toward a treatment policy of drug users. This implies a shift in the perception of the issue away from identifying the problem on the production side within poor countries and the trafficking of drugs toward the U.S. and Europe; away from impeding production abroad and the subsequent domestic criminalization of drug use,

toward a strategy focused on demand reduction with social instruments. The report directly suggests a radical change in the way drug consumption is constructed, securitized, thought and perceived, and aims at initiating a process to do so differently at the same time. Applying these suggestions to the United States, research can draw on the findings of this analysis: Adopting a similar approach to the 'war on drugs' in general, future inquiries could seek to identify further core beliefs by decision-makers and societal norms resisting change. To test the findings of this analysis or to identify further norms and core beliefs, analysis of the reactions of decision-makers to this report, as well as other case studies similar to this one could be conducted.

Forty years ago, president Nixon and the United States went to war; not against an ordinary enemy, but against a product, and everyone involved with it, from producers to consumers: the 'war on drugs' was declared. Merida and Beyond does not abandon the security aspect of the situation in Mexico, it does enlarge the scope of its policy. The new strategy changed the focal point of the initiative, not letting it turn into a perpetuum motion. But is rejecting to call it 'war on drugs' the first step to end the war altogether, to reframe the issue and treat it differently? Or will the traditional, conservative perception of drugs and the connected issues prevail in the end? This will ultimately depend on the construction of the issue and the belief-systems attached to it. Changing these aspects is the key to ending the war.
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## VII. Appendix

MERIDA INITIATIVE

MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION PLAN – PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 29.2.2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>FY 2008 in $U.S.</th>
<th>FY 2009 in $U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counternarcotics, Counterterrorism and Border Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>For radar and aerial surveillance</td>
<td>2 Citation surveillance aircraft</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Army/ Air Force (SEDENA)</td>
<td>To enable forces to quickly deploy rapid reaction forces in order to support counternarcotics and counterterrorist operations</td>
<td>eight Bell 412 EP transport helicopters</td>
<td>104,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Army/ Air Force (SEDENA)</td>
<td>For check-points within Mexico, complementing police forces</td>
<td>Mobile Gamma Ray Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Army/ Air Force (SEDENA)</td>
<td>To detect illicit drugs and precursors</td>
<td>Ion Scanners</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Navy (SEMAR)</td>
<td>Enhance the SEMAR to conduct long range maritime patrols to intercept transnational criminals and terrorists</td>
<td>4 maritime surveillance aircrafts CASA 235</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Migration Institute (INAMI)</td>
<td>Enhance measures against illegal migration</td>
<td>Hard and software to track persons entering and leaving Mexico including biometric data-tracking</td>
<td>31,287,000</td>
<td>60,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Communication and Transport Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hardware: satellite communication system to facilitate inner Mexican and</td>
<td>25,310,000</td>
<td>5,872,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own table with information from: [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Mex%20FY08-09%20descriptions%201-2.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Mex%20FY08-09%20descriptions%201-2.pdf) and [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Mex%20FY08-09%20descriptions%203.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/Mex%20FY08-09%20descriptions%203.pdf)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>FY 2008 in $U.S.</th>
<th>FY 2009 in $U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Security and Law Enforcement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention and police modernization: Secretariat of Public Security (SSP)</td>
<td>Support counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions; enable fast deployment of rapid reaction forces</td>
<td>3 helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention and police modernization: SSP</td>
<td>Enable surveillance and logistic missions in support of counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations</td>
<td>3 surveillance aircrafts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention and police</td>
<td>Support the GOM's interdiction strategy</td>
<td>Non intrusive inspection</td>
<td>29,950,000</td>
<td>31,550,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attorney General (PGR)**
- **Cross-border initiative:** Operations against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS)
- **Equipment:** None
- **FY 2008 in $U.S.:** 2,000,000
- **FY 2009 in $U.S.:** 4,500,000

**Mexican Customs**
- **Enhance Custom's capability to support the GOM's comprehensive interdiction strategy**
- **Equipment:** Non intrusive inspection equipment (e.g. x-ray scanners) and training for Mexican customs, including canine (dog) handlers
- **FY 2008 in $U.S.:** 31,447,000
- **FY 2009 in $U.S.:** 38,400,000

**National Security and Investigation Center**
- **Enhance Mexican intelligence capabilities for counter-terrorism. The goal is to establish a comprehensive nation-wide database (Plataforma Mexico) linking all information, explicitly mentioned in this context: the Immigration Service**
- **Equipment:** Computer systems
- **FY 2008 in $U.S.:** 7,933,000
- **FY 2009 in $U.S.:** 8,864,000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>FY 2008 in $U.S.</th>
<th>FY 2009 in $U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of Public Security (SSP)</td>
<td>Strengthening units on anti-gang, anti-organized crime and anti-money laundering by bilateral tactical</td>
<td>Training and equipment for units such as communication devices, protective gear,</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Network for Technological Transfer in Addictions (RENADIC)</td>
<td>Mentioning explicitly the demand of the GOM, the program promotes drug awareness, demand reduction and rehabilitation</td>
<td>Computer hardware</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,157,000</td>
<td>10,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)</td>
<td>Enhance computer and data management to prevent money laundering in counterterrorism and counternarcotic efforts</td>
<td>Software and hardware</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>Enhance security for staff of the PGR investing criminal organizations at risk</td>
<td>Equipment includes armored vehicles, bullet proof vests and communication systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat of Public Security (SSP)</td>
<td>at interior checkpoints</td>
<td>equipment (e.g. x-ray scanners) and training for Mexican customs, including canine (dog) handlers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>FY 2008 in $U.S.</strong></td>
<td><strong>FY 2009 in $U.S.</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extradition training</td>
<td>Seminars and workshop to train Mexican authorities to facilitate bilateral cooperation to increase extraditions between the two nations</td>
<td>None, but expert visits</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Attorney General (PGR) Constanza information technology</td>
<td>To support the PGR's effort to completely re-engineer its operation and</td>
<td>Hardware and software</td>
<td>28,800,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equipment</strong></td>
<td><strong>FY 2008 in $U.S.</strong></td>
<td><strong>FY 2009 in $U.S.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Attorney General (PGR) Forensics Laboratories</td>
<td>To support the only forensic laboratory in Mexico operationally and for training purposes</td>
<td>State-of-the-art medical equipment (for details see description, pt. 2, p. 21)</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>8,529,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>Case tracking and Penal Process; PGR/CENAPI Databases; Maintenance for OASISS, CENAPI and Link Analysis</td>
<td>Server systems, hardware, software and licensing</td>
<td>19,878,000</td>
<td>9,350,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretariat for Public Security (SSP)</td>
<td>Enable SSP polygraph capability to vet applicants for security forces and investigations</td>
<td>Expert training and equipment</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture of Lawfulness Program (COL)</td>
<td>Expand the existing COL program working with schools and police stations</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>Establish citizen complaint centers</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2,5000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>To reengineer the Human Resources and Financial Management Systems for the Office of the Attorney General (PGR)</td>
<td>Technical assistance and training</td>
<td>2,4710,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGR and SSP</td>
<td>To strengthen the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and SSP Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)</td>
<td>Limited training and technical assistance in partnership with USAID</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGS's and Civil Society</td>
<td>Support NGS's and Civil Society in</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1,029,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Training Costs</td>
<td>Total Costs</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Support for existing Law Schools and Bar Associations</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Police and Judicial training</td>
<td>Human Rights Training for Police, Prosecutors and Prison Officials and development of control standards to ensure the adherence of human rights by officers</td>
<td>Training and experts</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alternative Case Resolution</td>
<td>To support justice sector personnel and human rights NGO's to expand the use of alternative case resolutions</td>
<td>Training and technical support</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII. Règlement sur le plagiat – Jury du Département de science politique, adopté le 1er décembre 2009

Considérant que le plagiat est une faute inacceptable sur les plans juridique, éthique et intellectuel;

Conscient que tolérer le plagiat porterait atteinte à l’ensemble des corps étudiants, scientifiques et académiques en minant la réputation de l’institution et en mettant en péril le maintien de certaines approches pédagogiques;

Notant que les étudiants sont sensibilisés aux questions d’intégrité intellectuelle dès leur première année d’étude universitaire et que le site web des Bibliothèques de l’ULB indique clairement comment éviter le plagiat : (www.bib.ulb.ac.be/fr/aide/eviter-le-plagiat/index.html)

Rappelant que le plagiat ne se limite pas à l’emprunt d’un texte dans son intégralité sans emploi des guillemets ou sans mention de la référence bibliographique complète, mais se rapporte également à l’emprunt de données brutes, de texte traduit librement, ou d’idées paraphrasées sans que la référence complète ne soit clairement indiquée;

Convenant qu’aucune justification, telle que des considérations médicales, l’absence d’antécédents disciplinaires ou le niveau d’étude, ne peut constituer un facteur atténuant.


Le Jury du Département de science politique recommande formellement d’attribuer systématiquement aux étudiants qui commettent une faute de plagiat avérée la note 0 pour l’ensemble du cours en question, sans possibilité de reprise en seconde session.

Moi, Lukas Hähnel, confirme avoir pris connaissance de ce règlement et atteste sur l’honneur ne pas avoir plagié.

Fait à Bruxelles, le 16.8.2011